IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-7076
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GEORGE JAMES DOCKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
(March 12, 1993)
Before Reynaldo G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and Emilio M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
Defendant appeals his convictions on two grounds. He first
argues that the district court erred in ruling him competent to
stand trial and in failing to grant a mistrial and hold a third
competency hearing after his behavior at trial. Second, defendant
urges that the government failed to prove his status as a convicted
felon, requiring reversal of his convictions for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and making false statements in the
acquisition of a firearm. We affirm.
I.
In June 1987, defendant George James Dockins, using the name
of Carl Smith, had repairs performed on his car at Little Willie's Salvage and Garage in Clarksdale, Mississippi. When Dockins went
to pick up his car on June 30, he told the garage owner that
someone had removed a shotgun from the car's trunk. After a brief
search, Dockins found the gun and left the garage.
On July 22, Dockins returned to Little Willie's to pick up his
car which had undergone further repairs. He informed the garage's
foreman that he would not pay for the repairs without first taking
the car for a test drive. Dockins then drove, with the foreman as
his passenger, to the home of one of Dockins' relatives in Marks,
Mississippi. After a brief stop, Dockins began to head in the
opposite direction instead of returning to the garage. Dockins'
passenger complained and, when the car came to a stop at an
intersection, pushed it into park, took the keys from the ignition,
and jumped out of the car. Dockins had other keys, however, and
drove away.
The passenger gave the police a description of the car. The
highway patrol later stopped Dockins for speeding. Dockins
produced a Colorado driver's license in the name of George J.
Dockins. The license check uncovered the fact that the license had
been suspended, but under the name Carl Smith. After Dockins'
arrest, an inventory search of the car turned up a .25 caliber,
semi-automatic pistol and the sawed-off shotgun earlier seen by the
garage owner. The police also found a VISA charge slip showing the
purchase of a different shotgun by a Carl Smith at a local Wal-
Mart.
2 ATF Agent Don Medley, Secret Service Agent Hal Purvis, and
Sergeant Thomas McCloud interviewed Dockins the next day. After
Miranda warnings, Dockins admitted that he purchased the pistol in
Jonestown, Mississippi, used the VISA card in the name of Carl
Smith, and signed the name Carl Smith on the Firearms Transaction
Record, Form 4473, to buy a shotgun at Wal-Mart. The Form 4473
asked whether he had ever been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment exceeding one year, and Dockins, as Carl Smith,
answered "no." Dockins denied knowledge of the sawed-off shotgun.
Dockins admitted that he had been convicted of a felony in Colorado
and that he frequently used aliases. Dockins was held in jail for
approximately 60 days and released in September 1987.
A federal grand jury indicted Dockins on July 21, 1988 on two
counts of illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one
count of possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, and one
count of making false statements in the acquisition of a firearm.
A plea agreement was filed on December 28, 1989, but the court
rejected it when Dockins' claimed innocence at the plea proceeding.
Upon motions filed by Dockins and the government, the district
court ordered psychiatric examination at the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. After two
months of treatment and examination by experts, Dockins moved for
a determination of competency. On September 27, 1990, the district
court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found him incompetent to
stand trial. Dockins was then returned to Springfield for further
evaluation and treatment which reported on February 11, 1991 that
3 Dockins was now competent to stand trial. The district court held
a second evidentiary hearing on April 29, this time concluding that
Dockins was competent.
Dockins went to trial in July 1991, but the trial did not
proceed smoothly and the court eventually removed Dockins from the
courtroom. Pointing to Dockins' conduct at trial, the defense
moved for a mistrial asserting that Dockins was not competent and
requested a continuance for further psychological and physical
testing. The district court denied a mistrial and continuance. At
the close of the government's case, the district court granted
Dockins' motion for acquittal on one of the two counts alleging the
illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the shotgun
purchased at Wal-Mart. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the
remaining three charges. Dockins filed a Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative for a
New Trial, arguing, among other things, that the government failed
to prove by admissible evidence Dockins' status as a prior
convicted felon, and he should be acquitted of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and making false statements in the
acquisition of a firearm. After a hearing, the court denied the
motion and sentenced Dockins to concurrent terms of fifteen years
for the illegal possession of a firearm (pistol) by a convicted
felon, ten years for the illegal possession of an unregistered
sawed-off shotgun, and five years for making false statements in
connection with a firearm purchase. This appeal followed.
4 II.
A.
To decide competency to stand trial, a district court must
determine whether "the defendant is presently suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences
of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). While "'a district court's
determination of competency to stand trial may not be set aside on
review unless it is clearly arbitrary or unwarranted,'" United
States v. Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 822 (5th Cir. 1979)), the
parties agree that this court "should take a hard look at the trial
judge's ultimate conclusion and not allow the talisman of clearly
erroneous to substitute for thoroughgoing appellate review of
quasi-legal issues." United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 907
(5th Cir. 1976); see also Birdsell, 775 F.2d at 648. We turn to
the evidence presented at Dockins' competency hearings to determine
whether the district court's finding of competence was clearly
arbitrary or unwarranted.
The district court held two competency hearings in which it
heard the testimony of four witnesses. At the first hearing, two
experts testified. Dr. James Leach, a psychiatrist, testified on
behalf of the government, and Dr. William Kallman, a clinical
psychologist, testified for the defense. At the second hearing,
the government called Dr. Clayton Pettipiece, a staff psychiatrist
5 at Springfield, and a lay witness, Agent Donald H. Medley. Dr.
Kallman testified again for the defense. All three experts stated
that while Dockins suffered from schizophrenia and his mental
functioning was retarded, these conditions, if treated with the
proper medication, would not render him incompetent to stand trial.
All three experts also agreed that Dockins had a general
understanding of the nature and consequences of the proceedings.
The experts, however, sharply disagreed on Dockins' ability to
assist in his defense, the second part of the competency test set
out in the statute.
Dr. Leach opined that Dockins was competent to stand trial.
He concluded that Dockins was capable of assisting in his defense
at trial if properly medicated and if his attorney spent extra time
explaining the process to him. He reached this opinion after
interviewing Dockins on nine occasions, totaling three to five
hours in all, and considering reports from others on staff at the
medical center. Dr. Leach noticed that Dockins acted differently
when he knew he was being observed, leading Dr. Leach to believe
that Dockins was exaggerating his symptoms and wanted it to appear
that he was more disturbed than he really was. With knowledge that
he was being watched, Dockins was low key, talked softly, and
showed no interaction with others. In contrast, when unaware that
he was being monitored, Dockins was sociable and outgoing with
other prisoners and talked normally. Dockins also explained to Dr.
Leach why he denied having a felony conviction on the Form 4473 he
filled out at Wal-Mart. Dockins said he could not read, so he
6 answered "no" to all of the questions on the form. On cross-
examination, Dr. Leach agreed that dementia was a possible
alternative diagnosis.
Dr. Kallman disagreed with Dr. Leach and testified that
Dockins was not competent to stand trial. He diagnosed Dockins as
suffering from dementia with severe impairment in both short and
long term memory which would prevent him from assisting in his own
defense. He began his study of Dockins with the assumption that
Dockins was faking his memory loss. Ultimately, however, Dr.
Kallman concluded that Dockins' inconsistent answers to questions
was a result of confabulation, making up answers when one does not
remember, rather than an attempt to fake memory loss. Dr. Kallman
based his opinions on two one-on-one interviews with Dockins,
lasting a combined total of eight to nine hours, and extensive
psychological testing. One of these tests, the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, has two safeguards to detect
faking. One safeguard is a series of questions known as the F or
"Fake" scale. Dockins' MMPI showed extreme elevation of the F
scale. Although a high F Scale generally indicates faking, Dr.
Kallman testified that an F scale as high as Dockins suggests an
organic brain dysfunction. Dockins' performance on the other tests
was consistent with a diagnosis of organic brain dysfunction.
Finally, Dr. Kallman testified that Dockins' I.Q. of 49 placed him
in the severely retarded range.
Dr. Kallman performed another evaluation of Dockins before the
second competency hearing. These interviews lasted a total of six
7 and one-half hours and included repeating some of the tests given
earlier. Dr. Kallman concluded that Dockins' condition had
deteriorated since the first evaluation.
Dr. Pettipiece studied Dockins between the first and second
competency hearings and, like Dr. Leach, concluded that Dockins was
competent to stand trial. Over a seven-week period, Dr. Pettipiece
interviewed Dockins on five occasions, lasting from one-half to one
and one-half hours each. Dr. Pettipiece reported that Dockins was
able to find the complicated location of his office at Springfield,
whereas other patients had difficulty doing so. Dr. Pettipiece
also conferred with others, including a psychiatrist and
psychologist, who were involved in Dockins' evaluation and
treatment. Dockins told Dr. Pettipiece that he was experiencing
visual and audible hallucinations, but was able to give only vague
descriptions of them. Dr. Pettipiece testified that a true
schizophrenic gives concrete answers about hallucinations. Dockins
identified himself to Dr. Pettipiece by several different names.
Nevertheless, his personality was always the same, allowing Dr.
Pettipiece to rule out a multi-personality disorder. Dr.
Pettipiece further concluded that Dockins was in control of his own
memory loss; he suffered from a loss of integrity not a loss of
memory. On cross-examination, Dr. Pettipiece testified that he
could not evaluate Dockins' memory, because Dockins was
"unreliable." Dr. Pettipiece based this conclusion on Dockins'
use of aliases and the fact that he often asked for additional
medication but chemical tests showed that he was not actually
8 taking it. Instead, Dockins would "cheek" the medication; he would
hold it in his cheek until the nurse was gone and then remove it.
He also disagreed with Dr. Kallman's categorization of Dockins'
I.Q. score of 49 as indicating severe retardation. According to
Dr. Pettipiece, an I.Q. result of 40-50 indicates moderate
retardation while a result of 50-70 indicates mild retardation.
Dr. Pettipiece's estimation of Dockins' I.Q. was somewhere around
80. Dr. Pettipiece diagnosed Dockins as having an anti-social
personality disorder, which is common to many habitual criminals
but not a disorder affecting competence.
Agent Medley testified at the second competency hearing about
his interview with Dockins on July 23, 1987, the day after his
arrest, regarding his purchase of the shotgun at Wal-Mart on June
11, 1987. Dockins admitted purchasing a gun and explained his use
of a credit card with the name Carl Smith as necessary because his
credit under his real name had been ruined by a girlfriend.
Dockins told Medley about convictions in Michigan, Colorado,
Missouri and Tennessee and said the Michigan conviction was on
appeal. Medley later verified that an appeal was pending on the
Michigan conviction. When asked how Medley was supposed to know if
he was really George Dockins, Dockins told him he could find a
birth certificate in Dockins' car to prove this fact. Medley found
the birth certificate. He further stated Dockins acted in an
appropriate manner and answered questions rationally and
coherently.
9 After the second competency hearing, the district court
concluded that the government had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that Dockins was competent to stand trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987)
(government bears burden of proving competence by preponderance of
the evidence). In its order, the court gave a number of reasons
for its finding. It mentioned the concurrence of two psychiatrists
that Dockins was in control of his memory loss. The court also
felt that the testimony of Agent Medley and Dockins' explanation to
Dr. Leach of why he answered "no" to all questions on the Form 4473
showed that Dockins was capable of formulating a defense to the
charges against him. Finally, the court was of the opinion that
Dockins was simply attempting to manipulate the court, a skill he
apparently learned as a result of spending much of his life in the
criminal justice system.
Dockins contends that the district court's finding was
arbitrary and unwarranted. Dockins first calls attention to the
fact that the court held Dockins incompetent after the first
hearing, thus it must have relied heavily on the testimony of Dr.
Pettipiece and Agent Medley, who provided the only new evidence of
competence at the second hearing. According to Dockins, these
witnesses were not worthy of such reliance. Dr. Pettipiece's
belief that Dockins was simply "unreliable" precluded him from
taking seriously any possibility that Dockins might be suffering
from dementia. As to Agent Medley, Dockins concedes that lay
testimony may be beneficial on the question of competency, see
10 Birdsell, 775 F.2d at 650-51; White v. Estelle, 669 F.2d 973, 978
(5th Cir. 1982), but argues that his testimony was entitled to
little weight because he observed Dockins over a brief span and
four years before the hearing. Second, Dockins argues that Dr.
Kallman's testimony was more reliable because he spent more time
with Dockins, although the government experts conducted more face-
to-face interviews, he was the only expert to perform objective
testing, and his examinations occurred in closer proximity to the
competency hearings than the other experts. See Birdsell, 775 F.2d
at 650-51 (length of time spent with the defendant is reasonable
basis upon which to rely on one expert over another).
The district court credited the testimony of the government's
experts, both of whom testified that Dockins was competent to stand
trial, and the lay testimony of Agent Medley. The governments'
experts, two medical doctors with a combined experience of 63 years
in medical practice, conducted a total of fourteen interviews with
Dockins over a six month period and both concluded that he was
competent. Although the defense expert was the only one to perform
objective tests, we are unable to say that crediting the testimony
of two psychiatrists who conducted subjective evaluations over the
testimony of one psychologist who relied on objective tests was
clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. See Birdsell, 775 F.2d at 651.
B.
Dockins also claims that his conduct during his trial should
have led the district court to grant his motion for a mistrial and
a third competency hearing. At the jury selection conference,
11 Dockins became angry with counsel after the government struck two
black women from the venire and insisted on striking the next two
veniremen against the advice of counsel. During the testimony of
the government's first witness, Dockins interrupted the
questioning. Following the government's second witness, Dockins
attempted to fire his counsel. After counsel discussed his
difficulties in preparing cross-examination with the court, the
court authorized counsel to have a second attorney present at trial
to insulate him from Dockins. After the government's third witness
was sworn, Dockins addressed the jury, explaining that he did not
want his attorneys representing him, and he was being forced to use
them. Dockins continued to address the jury despite admonishment
from the court and had to be removed.
The following morning Dockins returned to the courtroom to
testify, outside the presence of the jury, regarding the
admissibility of his statements to Agent Medley on July 23, 1987.
Dockins insisted the interview occurred on July 20 and continued to
do so when confronted with the fact that he was not arrested until
July 22. He also testified that he had been in jail two or three
days when the interview took place, but actually he had been
confined less than 24 hours. Dockins also gave inconsistent
answers about the substance of the interview. Dockins now claims
that these inconsistencies were clear examples of confabulation.
After this hearing, the jury returned and Dockins remained in the
courtroom for the remainder of the trial without incident. Based
12 on these events, Dockins argues that the court erred in failing to
grant a third competency hearing and a mistrial. We cannot agree.
A district court must hold a competency hearing following a
showing of reasonable cause for believing the defendant may be
incompetent. United States v. Williams, 819 F.2d 605, 608 (5th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Morgan, 559 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1977).
In this case, the district court was of the opinion that Dockins
was deliberately attempting to cause a mistrial.1 This assessment
is entitled to considerable deference. See Maggio v. Fulford, 103
S. Ct. 2261, 2263-64 (1983) (reversing the Fifth Circuit and
deferring to the district court's conclusion, based on observing
the defendant, that defendant was intentionally trying to disrupt
the trial); Williams, 819 F.2d at 608 (interpreting Fulford to
allow a trial judge to base a finding of competence on personal
observation in the face of a psychiatric report to the contrary).
Dockins' testimony during a hearing on a motion to suppress
evidence seized from his car adds support to the court's decision
not to conduct another competency hearing. On the first day of
trial and before opening statements, Dockins testified in detail
1 Outside the presence of the jury, Dockins told the court:
I don't know how to represent myself. And the law - - the states if you don't want an attorney representing you, you can explain that to the jury, the defendant's conduct, or whatever, or however it states, that it's going to be a mistrial.
The court responded:
Well, it's obvious to the Court what you're attempting to accomplish here.
13 about the events that occurred on the day of his arrest. Included
in this testimony was the fact that Dockins' uncle, James A.
Shanks, accompanied him to Little Willie's on June 30, 1987.
Dockins also stated that Shanks was mayor of Jonestown, Mississippi
in 1987, a fact later confirmed at trial. Dockins also remembered
that when he went to Little Willie's on the day of his arrest,
Willie was not there because he had gone to a car sale in Memphis.
In addition to recounting these facts, Dockins explained why the
highway patrolman could not have clocked him at 70 m.p.h. in a 55
m.p.h. zone. He stated he was going no faster than 51 or 53
m.p.h., because he was caught in between two other cars and a
trailer truck coming up behind him which prevented him from
passing. This testimony not only shows Dockins ability to recall
what happened almost four years earlier but also his ability to
formulate a defense. The district court was not required to hold
a third competency hearing or to grant a mistrial.2
III.
Dockins argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions for illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted
2 Contrary to Dockins' urging, United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987), does not argue for another hearing in this case. Like this case, the defendant requested a competency hearing, was adjudicated incompetent, and was committed to an institution for evaluation and treatment. However, unlike this case, when defendant's treating psychiatrist reported that she was competent to stand trial, the case proceeded to trial with no further competency hearings or findings. We remanded for a hearing to determine whether the defendant was competent at the time of trial. Here, the district court held a competency hearing after Springfield reported that Dockins was competent.
14 felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and knowingly making false statements
during the purchase of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).
Specifically, he argues the government failed to introduce any
competent evidence of his status as a convicted felon, which was
necessary to establish both offenses.
Without objection, the government introduced Exhibit 5, a
judgment of conviction of Carl Tyron Smith on robbery charges in
Colorado. The government attempted to link Dockins to this
conviction through Exhibit 5a, a fingerprint card and police record
sheet reflecting the arrest and conviction of Carl Smith. On its
face, Exhibit 5a includes two official Denver Police Department
documents. Agent Medley testified that he sent Exhibit 5a, along
with handwriting exemplars, the original copy of the Form 4473, and
a number of fingerprint cards, to the ATF Crime Laboratory. Medley
said that Exhibit 5a included a fingerprint card from the Denver
Police Department. Nancy Davis, a document examiner, testified
that the signature of Carl Smith on the fingerprint card was
written by Dockins. Next, the government called Rick Canty, a
fingerprint expert, who testified that the fingerprints in Exhibit
5a matched the known fingerprints of Dockins. With Canty on the
stand, the government offered Exhibit 5a into evidence. The court
admitted the evidence over Dockins' objection on grounds of
authentication.
After trial, Dockins moved for a Judgment of Acquittal
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial,
claiming that Exhibits 5 and 5a had not been properly
15 authenticated.3 The court held a hearing on the authenticity of
these two exhibits. Laurence Jantz, an officer of the Denver
Police Department, testified that the documents in Exhibit 5a were
exact copies of the records in his file. The court ruled that
Exhibit 5 was properly admitted, because Dockins did not object.
As to Exhibit 5a, the court ruled that it was not a self-
authenticating document under Rule 902. Neither the fingerprint
card nor the police record sheet is under seal and no public
officer of the Denver Police Department certified under seal that
the signature is genuine; the certification on the fingerprint card
is only a rubber stamp. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(2), (4); United
States v. Beason, 690 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1982). The court, without
relying on the testimony of Jantz, nevertheless found this exhibit
to be admissible under Rule 901.
The parties agree that the documents comprising Exhibit 5a are
not self-authenticating. Admissibility turns on Rule 901.4 We do
not require conclusive proof of authenticity, and Rule 901's list
3 Dockins also argued that these documents contained inadmissible hearsay; however, Dockins did not object on this ground at trial. Authentication is the only question before us. See United States v. Wake, 948 F.2d 1422, 1434 (5th Cir. 1991). 4 Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification
(a) General provision
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. . . .
16 of illustrations is not exclusive.5 United States v. Jimenez
Lopez, 873 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lance,
853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988). The issue is whether the
district court abused its discretion in finding that the government
presented sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding that
Exhibit 5a contained official Denver Police Department documents.
See First State Bank of Denton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 918 F.2d 38,
41 (5th Cir. 1990); Jimenez Lopez, 873 F.2d at 772. We hold that
it was an abuse of discretion to admit these documents.
Agent Medley testified that Exhibit 5a contained a fingerprint
card from the Denver Police Department. However, he was simply
testifying as to what appears on the face of the document. He had
no knowledge, other than from reading the document, that the
fingerprint card actually came from the Denver Police Department.6
Furthermore, Davis and Canty simply compared the signature and
fingerprints contained in Exhibit 5a with known samples from
Dockins. Their testimony had nothing to do with whether these
documents came from the Denver Police Department.
Our decision in Jimenez Lopez is instructive. That case also
required proof of a prior conviction. The government offered a
copy of the Record of Proceedings and Judgment asserted to be from
the office of a United States Magistrate for the Southern District
of California. Like this case, the document was not self-
5 None of the illustrations in 901(b) apply to this case. 6 901(b)(1) also does not apply for this reason.
17 authenticating.7 A border patrol agent, Johnston, testified that
he personally requested the document and received it from a
California border patrol agent who Johnston said procured it from
the magistrate's court. 873 F.2d at 771. In finding the document
to have been properly admitted, we said,
Without the testimony of Agent Johnston the admissibility of the document would have been doubtful. But Johnston's testimony as to the chain of custody of the photostatic copy combined with the internal indicia of reliability within the document itself justified the conclusion of the court that the document was admissible to prove its contents. Johnston was not testifying as custodian of the document. Rather, his testimony provided circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion that the document was an official record.
Id. at 772. Medley was certainly not the custodian. Jantz was the
custodian, but he did not testify at trial.8 The government
offered no circumstantial evidence at trial to support a finding
that Exhibit 5a came from the Denver Police Department.
Consequently, there was no basis for a reasonable jury to conclude
that these documents were what they purported to be. Cf. United
States v. Casto, 889 F.2d 562, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Palella, 846 F.2d 977, 981 (5th Cir. 1988).
The admission of Exhibit 5a, however, does not warrant
reversal. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). The error was harmless; put
another way, there was sufficient evidence of Dockins' prior felony
conviction without Exhibit 5a. Cf. Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell,
Inc., 673 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1982) (concluding under a
7 A signature on the document was illegible. 8 If Jantz had testified at trial, Exhibit 5a would have been admissible under 901(b)(7).
18 harmless error analysis that jury would have reached same result if
improperly excluded evidence had been admitted); United States v.
Turquitt, 557 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding under
harmless error analysis that jury may have acquitted without the
improperly admitted evidence). Dockins told Agent Medley he had a
prior felony conviction in Colorado, that he used aliases, that he
used the VISA card in the name of Carl Smith, and that he signed
the name Carl Smith on the Form 4473. Agent Medley testified to
these admissions at trial. While "'an accused may not be convicted
on his own uncorroborated confession,'" United States v. Garth, 773
F.2d 1469, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Smith v. United States,
348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954)), Dockins' statements to Medley are
sufficiently corroborated. The judgment of conviction of Carl
Smith was in evidence via Exhibit 5. Additionally, Dockins
identified himself at Little Willie's as Carl Smith. His driver's
license was suspended under the name of Carl Smith, and he told the
trooper he was Carl Smith. There was also a wealth of evidence
linking Dockins to Colorado. He gave a Colorado address on the
Form 4473. Moreover, his Colorado driver's license in the name of
George J. Dockins displayed the same Colorado address that Dockins,
using the name Carl Smith, listed on the Form 4473. The license
plates on his car were also from Colorado. Without considering
Exhibit 5a, the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Dockins had a prior felony conviction.
AFFIRMED.