U.S. Engineering Company v. United Sheet Metal, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 4, 2019
DocketCivil Action No. 2017-2004
StatusPublished

This text of U.S. Engineering Company v. United Sheet Metal, Inc. (U.S. Engineering Company v. United Sheet Metal, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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U.S. Engineering Company v. United Sheet Metal, Inc., (D.D.C. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) U.S. ENGINEERING COMPANY, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Civil Case No. 17-cv-02004 (TSC) ) UNITED SHEET METAL, INC., ) ) Respondent. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner U.S. Engineering Company (“U.S. Engineering”) brings this suit seeking the

confirmation of an arbitration award against Respondent United Sheet Metal, Inc. (“Sheet

Metal”). Sheet Metal has not filed an appearance in this matter. Before the court is U.S.

Engineering’s motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 9.) For the reasons stated herein, the

court will GRANT the motion for default judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

U.S. Engineering is a mechanical contractor that performed “mechanical contracting

services” as part of a renovation project for the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa. (ECF

No. 1-1 (“Mem. in Supp. of Pet.”) at 1.) In February 2012, U.S. Engineering entered into a

subcontract with Sheet Metal to “fabricate and install sheet metal and duct work in the HVAC 1

system” for the embassy renovation project. (Id. at 1; ECF No. 1-3 (“Subcontract”).) The

agreement contained a clause whereby all disputes concerning the agreement were to be

addressed in binding arbitration. (Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 2 (quoting Subcontract ¶ 26).)

1 HVAC is an abbreviation for Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning. 1 At some point after entering into the agreement, a dispute arose regarding the quality of

Sheet Metal’s work. (Id. at 2.) The parties then entered into arbitration proceedings before the

International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”), in which U.S. Engineering sought an

award of $338,877.00 from Sheet Metal, alleging breach of contract due to “incomplete and

defective work,” and developed a record in support of its claim. (Id.) Sheet Metal, on the other

hand, asserted claims and defenses but abandoned the arbitration in December 2014. (Id. at 3.)

According to U.S. Engineering, a Sheet Metal representative informed U.S. Engineering that

Sheet Metal “went out of business” in March 2014. (Id.)

The ICDR issued its “Final Award” on July 26, 2017, noting Sheet Metal’s failure to

participate in the proceedings. (Id.) ICDR awarded U.S. Engineering the entire $338,877.00 it

claimed in damages for breach of contract and an additional $83,267.85 for attorney’s fees, costs,

and expenses, for a total award of $417,144.85. (Id.) U.S. Engineering now seeks judicial

confirmation of the arbitration award. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts may “enter default judgment [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55] when a

defendant fails to defend its case appropriately or otherwise engages in dilatory tactics.” Peak v.

District of Columbia, 236 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Keegel v. Key West &

Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 375 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Rule 55 establishes a two-step

procedure that a plaintiff must follow to obtain default judgment. First, the plaintiff must ask the

Clerk of Court to enter default based on a defendant’s failure “to plead or otherwise defend” in

response to the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Upon entry of default, “the defaulting

defendant is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation in the complaint.” Robinson v. Ergo

Sols., LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 171, 178 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see

2 also Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001). Second, after the Clerk has entered

default, if applying to the court for default judgment, the plaintiff must “prove its entitlement to

the amount of monetary damages requested” by submitting “detailed affidavits or documentary

evidence” on which the court may rely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Fanning v. Permanent Sol.

Indus., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2009). Once a plaintiff has satisfied those procedural

requirements, “[t]he determination of whether default judgment is appropriate is committed to

the discretion of the trial court.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier

Drywall, LLC, 531 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836

(D.C. Cir. 1980)).

Default judgments are disfavored resolutions to controversies because courts prefer to

resolve disputes on the merits rather than on procedural technicalities. See Jackson, 636 F.2d at

835. This is especially true when a party seeks an undetermined amount in damages against a

silent respondent. See id. (noting that a hearing is required when a claim for damages is

“unliquidated”). See also Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1949) (“default

judgments for money damages where there is any uncertainty as to the amount must ordinarily

be supported by actual proof”). However, although it is a disfavored remedy, default judgment is

appropriate where “the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive

party,” and “the diligent party must be protected lest it be faced with interminable delay and

continued uncertainty as to its rights.” Swiss Inst. Of Bioinformatics v. Glob. Initiative on

Sharing All Influenza Data, 49 F. Supp. 3d 92, 96 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations and alterations

omitted).

3 III. ANALYSIS

Courts have limited discretion in reviewing an arbitration award. See United

Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36–37 (1987). Indeed, a “court

must confirm an arbitration award where some colorable support for the award can be gleaned

from the record.” Int’l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d

12, 20 (D.D.C. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). And “in the absence of a legal

basis to vacate, [a] court has no discretion but to confirm the award.” Int’l Thunderbird Gaming

Corp. v. United Mexican States, 473 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted).

Heeding this directive, courts confirm arbitration awards via default judgment where the

petitioner’s request is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et

seq. See e.g. Non-Dietary Exposure Task Force v. Tagros Chems. India, Ltd., 309 F.R.D. 66

(D.D.C.

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Related

Klapprott v. United States
335 U.S. 601 (Supreme Court, 1949)
International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States
473 F. Supp. 2d 80 (District of Columbia, 2007)
Adkins v. Teseo
180 F. Supp. 2d 15 (District of Columbia, 2001)
Robinson v. Ergo Solutions, LLC
4 F. Supp. 3d 171 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Fanning v. Permanent Solution Industries, Inc.
257 F.R.D. 4 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Non-Dietary Exposure Task Force v. Tagros Chemicals India, Ltd.
309 F.R.D. 66 (District of Columbia, 2015)
Peak v. District of Columbia
236 F.R.D. 13 (District of Columbia, 2006)

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