U.S. Bank Trust National Association v. Brammer

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 17, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2355
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No. 23-2355 (JMC) Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM BRAMMER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On August 15, 2023, Defendant William Brammer removed this matter from the District

of Columbia Superior Court. See ECF 1. The basis for removal was diversity jurisdiction. See id.

¶¶ 6–8; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff U.S. Bank Trust National Association now moves to remand

the matter back to the Superior Court, arguing that Brammer may not remove this case because he

is a citizen of the District of Columbia, i.e., the jurisdiction in which this action commenced. ECF 4

¶ 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Finding no basis for federal jurisdiction other than diversity

jurisdiction, the Court agrees that the forum-defendant exception applies, and therefore this case

must be REMANDED to the Superior Court. 1

This case is a residential foreclosure action under D.C. Code § 42-816, in which Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants owe $1,687,854.74 incurred under an adjustable-rate note. ECF 1-1 ¶¶ 6,

13; see ECF 1-2. Not long after the complaint was filed, Brammer filed a notice of removal, in

which he claimed “there is complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 defendants and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” ECF 1 ¶ 6. Brammer also stated in

his notice that he “was at the time the action commenced and continues to be a resident of the

District of Columbia.” Id. ¶ 8. Once Plaintiff filed the present motion to remand, Brammer

submitted an “Errata” noting that he “inadvertently overlooked the presence and likelihood of

Federal Question in likely defenses and counterclaims to be filed,” ECF 6, and then formally

opposed remand based on the purported “additional” hook of federal question jurisdiction. See

ECF 7.

Contrary to Brammer’s assertions, federal question or “arising under” jurisdiction is

inapplicable here. Whether a case arises under federal law turns on the well-pleaded complaint

rule. Aetna Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004). This means that federal question

jurisdiction “must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his

own claim in the bill or declaration.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75–76 (1914)).

Jurisdiction “cannot be predicated on an actual or anticipated defense,” nor can it “rest upon an

actual or anticipated counterclaim.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). In the present

case then, it is irrelevant that “[t]he defenses and counterclaims to be brought by the Defendant

will include those implicated under Federal Statutes and Regulations.” ECF 7 ¶ 1.

No exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule applies either. The main exception to the

well-pleaded complaint rule is complete preemption of a state-law claim by a federal statute, see

Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 207, but Brammer does not claim this exception applies to D.C. law

governing residential foreclosure (nor would the Court agree with him if he did). Instead, Brammer

argues that, to acquire evidence for his defenses and counterclaims, he “will need the extended

reach for . . . discovery” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 rather than the more

2 geographically limited D.C. Superior Civil Rule 45. ECF 7 ¶ 2. This too, however, is

jurisdictionally irrelevant. Cf. Castro v. Molecular Sys. Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 3, 4 (D.D.C. 2013).

That leaves diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1332(a) as the sole basis for jurisdiction.

Where that is the case, an action “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly

joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C

§ 1441(b)(2). As such, because Defendant Brammer is a citizen of the District of Columbia,

removal is inappropriate in this case.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court ORDERS that this matter is REMANDED to

the Superior Court for the District of Columbia for all further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: October 17, 2023