U.S. Bank National Association v. Thompson

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 8, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-1593
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 241593-U No. 1-24-1593 Order filed May 8, 2026 Sixth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) v. ) No. 19 CH 05814 ) GWENDOLYN THOMPSON; ROBERT ) BARNEY, ) The Honorable ) James T. Derico, Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirming trial court order confirming judicial sale.

¶2 U.S. Bank, N.A. filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against Gwendolyn Thompson

and her husband, Robert Barney, after they became delinquent on their loan. The trial court

entered an order of default against Barney, a summary judgment order against Thompson, and

a judgment of foreclosure for U.S. Bank. Barney appealed pro se, which this court dismissed 1-24-1593

for lack of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the trial court confirmed the judicial sale and entered a

deficiency judgment.

¶3 Barney again appeals pro se arguing the trial court (i) lacked jurisdiction to confirm the

foreclosure sale while his appeal was pending and (ii) failed to follow the Uniform Commercial

Court, a federal executive order, and the Land Patent Act. We affirm. Barney’s first appeal did

not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to confirm the judicial sale because the order appealed

from was not final and appealable. Further, Barney waived his UCC and executive order

arguments by failing to raise them in the trial court and his sovereign citizen arguments are

without merit, so we do not address them.

¶4 Background

¶5 Gwendolyn Thompson took out a loan from Park National Bank, secured by a mortgage

on her home. Thompson’s husband, Robert Barney, signed the mortgage solely to waive his

homestead rights. U.S. Bank purchased Park National Bank’s assets under a FDIC receivership

and sued to foreclose when Thompson failed to make timely payments. Thompson and Barney

initially had counsel, but their counsel withdrew and they proceeded pro se.

¶6 Non-attorney Sharon Renee-Lloyd filed a “special appearance” as a “certified land patent

holder *** communicating on behalf of the land,” a theory espoused by the “sovereign citizen

movement.” Renee-Lloyd also filed an answer to the foreclosure complaint, a motion to

dismiss, and several other documents. The trial court construed some of Renee-Lloyd’s filings

as a petition to intervene, which it denied, along with her motion to dismiss. And the court

granted U.S. Bank’s motion to strike Renee-Lloyd’s other filings.

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¶7 U.S. Bank moved for an order of default, summary judgment, and judgment of foreclosure

and sale. The trial court entered an order of default against Barney, a summary order against

Thompson, and a judgment of foreclosure and sale.

¶8 Barney and Renee-Lloyd filed a notice of appeal, asking this court to dismiss the

foreclosure proceeding with prejudice due to a land patent. (No. 1-23-1716). U.S. Bank moved

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the judgment of foreclosure was not a final

appealable order or include a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) of

no just reason to delay appeal. We granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied

Barney’s motion to vacate the dismissal.

¶9 Meanwhile, Thompson, Barney, and Renee-Lloyd filed an objection to the judicial sale,

arguing the case should be stayed while on appeal. The trial court did not rule on the objection

but re-noticed the sale. After U.S. Bank submitted the winning bid, the trial court confirmed

the sale and entered a deficiency judgment.

¶ 10 Analysis

¶ 11 Barney asserts that once he filed a notice of appeal, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction

to confirm the foreclosure sale.

¶ 12 It is true that when a proper notice of appeal is filed, the jurisdiction of the appellate court

attaches, rendering the case beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction. State ex rel. Beeler, Schad

and Diamond, P.C. v. Target Corp., 367 Ill.App.3d 860, 863 (2006). But this general rule

applies only to a “proper” notice of appeal. Where the appealed order is not final and

appealable, the filing of the notice of appeal does not vest this court with jurisdiction, which

remains with the trial court. Id. at 863-64.

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¶ 13 “It is well settled that a judgment ordering the foreclosure of mortgage is not final and

appealable until the trial court enters an order approving the sale and directing the distribution.”

EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419 ¶ 11. A judgment ordering the foreclosure of

mortgage is not final and appealable “because it does not dispose of all the issues between the

parties.” Id. While a judgment of foreclosure is final as to the matters it adjudicates, the trial

court still must consider whether to enter a later order approving the foreclosure sale. Id. ¶ 16

Accordingly, the order confirming the sale operates as the final and appealable order in a

foreclosure case. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 12 (quoting Kemp,

2012 IL 113419 ¶ 11). The judgment of foreclosure does not terminate litigation and does not

operate as the final and appealable order. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419 ¶ 11.

¶ 14 Barney’s first appeal sought to challenge the judgment of foreclosure. That was not a final

and appealable order (EMC Mortgage Corp., 2012 IL 113419 ¶ 11), so the notice of appeal did

not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to confirm the judicial sale. State ex rel. Beeler, Schad

and Diamond, P.C., 367 Ill. App. 3d at 863.

¶ 15 Barney also contends the trial court failed to adhere to provisions of the Uniform

Commercial Code, a federal executive order, and the Land Patent Act. Barney did not raise the

UCC or executive order arguments before the trial court and has forfeited them. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A. v. Maka, 2017 IL App (1st) 153010 ¶ 24 (party that does not raise issue in trial

court forfeits that issue and may not raise it for first time on appeal). Barney’s contentions

regarding the Land Patent Act are characteristic of “sovereign citizen” theories. We have held

those theories without merit. See Parkway Bank v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 (holding

similar arguments are sanctionable). The trial court did not err by ignoring them.

¶ 16 Affirmed.

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