[J-22-2019] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
US AIRWAYS, INC. AND SEDGWICK : No. 35 WAP 2018 CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, : INC., : Appeal from the Order of the : Commonwealth Court entered Appellants : February 22, 2018 at No. 612 CD : 2017, affirming the Order of the : Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board v. : dated April 19, 2017 at No. A16-0545. : : ARGUED: May 14, 2019 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL : BOARD (BOCKELMAN), : : Appellees :
Justice Wecht delivers the Opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II and IV and announces the Judgment of the Court. Justice Wecht also delivers an opinion as to Part III.
OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: NOVEMBER 20, 2019 This appeal involves an airline employee who was injured while riding an airport
shuttle bus to an employee parking lot after her shift ended. The question before us is
whether the employee’s injury can be said to have occurred on the airline’s premises for
purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act even though the City of Philadelphia owned
both the shuttle bus and the employee parking lot.
I. The Claimant in this appeal, Betty Bockelman, is a Philadelphia-based flight
attendant. On January 23, 2015, Bockelman was scheduled to work a one-day trip from
Philadelphia to Miami and then back to Philadelphia. On that morning, Bockelman drove
her personal vehicle to the Philadelphia International Airport and parked (for free) in one
of two employee parking lots at the airport. Bockelman’s employer, US Airways,1 does
not own or operate these parking lots. Instead, the City of Philadelphia Division of
Aviation (“the Division” or “Division of Aviation”) owns, operates, and maintains the
parking lots specifically for airport and airline employees.
Anyone seeking to enter the Division’s restricted parking lots must swipe a special
credential called a Secured Identification Display Area (“SIDA”) badge. The Division is
responsible for issuing SIDA badges to all airport employees with jobs that require access
to secure areas of the airport. The Division conducts a background check and
fingerprinting before issuing a SIDA badge to an airline employee. When a new employee
is hired, her employer pays the Division of Aviation a one-time administrative fee to cover
the cost of the badge and the background check.
After an employee parks in one of the reserved lots, a Division of Aviation shuttle
bus transports the employee to the airport terminal.2 These shuttles are not open to the
public; they are for airport employees only. US Airways itself does not own or exercise
control over the shuttle buses, nor does it pay the Division any fees for its employees to
use the shuttles. US Airways does not require employees to use the Division’s parking
1 Not long after Bockelman’s injury, US Airways and American Airlines completed a merger and formed American Airlines Group, Inc. To avoid confusion, however, we will continue to refer to Bockelman’s employer as “US Airways.” 2 Although the City of Philadelphia owns these shuttle buses, a private company called First Transit manages day-to-day operations of the shuttle service.
[J-22-2019] - 2 lots or shuttle service. In fact, US Airways gives its employees no guidance at all
regarding how they should commute to work.
On the day of her injury, Bockelman rode the Division shuttle to the airport terminal
and flew to Miami as scheduled. She then returned back in Philadelphia just before 10:00
p.m. that evening. After a brief discussion with a co-worker, Bockelman left the terminal
and boarded the shuttle bus to take her back to her vehicle. While lifting her suitcase
onto one of the shuttle’s luggage racks, Bockelman slipped in a puddle, fell backwards,
and crushed her left foot.
Bockelman later filed a workers’ compensation claim petition alleging that she
sustained disabling foot and ankle injuries as a result of the January 2015 slip and fall.
She sought total temporary disability benefits for a closed period from January 23, 2015
(the date of her injury) through April 19, 2015 (when she ultimately returned to work). US
Airways filed an answer, denying that Bockelman was within the course of her
employment at the time of her injury. See 77 P.S. § 411(1) (defining a compensable injury
to mean an injury that arises in the course of employment).
A Workers’ Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) held a hearing on Bockelman’s claim
petition in late October 2015. In support of her petition, Bockelman testified that, at the
time of her injury, she was a member of the Association of Flight Attendants (“AFA”), a
labor union representing flight attendants. Bockelman also produced a collective
bargaining agreement between the AFA and US Airways, which included a provision
stating that US Airways was responsible for providing either free or reimbursed parking
for flight attendants at their domicile airports.
In opposition, US Airways presented documentary evidence and offered the
testimony of Anthony Stanley, the Director of Planning and Administration for US Airways.
Stanley testified that US Airways did not pay for Bockelman, or any other Philadelphia-
[J-22-2019] - 3 based flight attendants, to park in the employee parking lots at the Philadelphia
International Airport. Stanley explained that the City of Philadelphia owns and operates
all airport-employee parking lots, including the lot in which Bockelman parked on the day
that she was injured. Stanley testified that the Division’s lots are not only for US Airways’
employees; rather, they are open to all airport and airline employees. Finally, while
Stanley acknowledged that the AFA’s collective bargaining agreement states that US
Airways will provide free or reimbursed parking for flight attendants, he testified that those
specific provisions do not apply to flight attendants like Bockelman who are domiciled in
Philadelphia, since the Division of Aviation already provides free parking for airport
employees.
The WCJ granted Bockelman’s claim petition. In his decision, the WCJ explained
that, if an employee is not actively furthering her employer’s business or affairs when she
suffers an injury, the injury arises in the course of employment only if: (1) the injury occurs
on the employer’s premises; (2) the employee’s presence on the employer’s premises is
required by the nature of her employment; and (3) the employee’s injury was caused by
the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business thereon.3
WCJ Opinion, 4/27/2016, at 11; see 77 P.S. § 411(1).
The WCJ found that Bockelman’s injury satisfied all three elements of this test. As
for the first prong, the WCJ noted that Bockelman was injured while “taking a specifically
designated shuttle bus to an employee parking lot that required an identification card (the
SIDA badge) for entry and exit.” WCJ Opinion, 4/27/2016, at 11. Turning to the second
prong, the WCJ stressed that Bockelman “boarded the [shuttle] bus soon after her flight
had landed in Philadelphia.” Id. Finally, with regard to the third prong, the WCJ noted
3 Courts sometimes refer to this three-factor inquiry as the Slaugenhaupt test, though the elements derive from Section 301(c)(1) of the Act directly. 77 P.S. § 411(1); see generally W.C.A.B. (Slaugenhaupt) v. U.S. Steel Corp., 376 A.2d 271 (Pa. 1977).
[J-22-2019] - 4 that the evidence was undisputed that Bockelman’s injury was caused by the wet floor on
the shuttle bus. Id. Accordingly, the WCJ concluded that Bockelman’s injury arose in the
course of her employment. US Airways appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board (“Appeal Board”), which affirmed the WCJ’s decision.
US Airways then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, arguing that the WCJ
erred in concluding that Bockelman’s injury satisfied the first two prongs of the
Slaugenhaupt test. According to US Airways, Bockelman’s injury did not occur on the
airline’s premises given that US Airways neither owned nor operated the shuttle upon
which Bockelman was injured. Furthermore, US Airways maintained that Bockelman’s
presence on the airport shuttle was not mandatory, since US Airways did not direct its
employees to park in any particular lot at the airport.
The Commonwealth Court rejected both of US Airways’ arguments in a
unanimous, published opinion. US Airways, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Bockelman), 179 A.3d 1177
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). The court first agreed with the WCJ that, under the Slaugenhaupt
test, an employee’s injury arises in the course of her employment when: (1) the employee
is on the premises occupied or controlled by the employer or upon which the employer’s
affairs are being carried on; (2) the employee is required by the nature of her employment
to be present on the employer’s premises; and (3) the employee sustains injuries caused
by the condition of the premises or by operation of the employer’s business or affairs
thereon. Id. at 1180 (citing Slaugenhaupt, 376 A.2d at 273).
The court next explained that the first element of the Slaugenhaupt test is satisfied
not only when an employee is on an employer’s premises proper, but also any areas
significantly connected to an employer’s affairs, including a reasonable avenue of ingress
to and egress from the workplace. Id. at 1180-82 (citing Epler v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp.,
393 A.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Pa. 1978) (holding that an employee crossing a public street
[J-22-2019] - 5 between employer’s plant and employer’s parking lot remained on the employer’s
premises); Interstate United Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Bair), 424 A.2d 1015, 1017 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1981) (holding that a steel-plant cafeteria worker was on her employer’s premises when
she fell on a footbridge that connected the plant to a public street); and Fashion Hosiery
Shops v. W.C.A.B. (Kurta), 423 A.2d 792, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (holding that a walkway
near the entrance of a multi-tenant commercial building constituted part of the employer’s
premises)). Thus, the court found that, because Bockelman was present on a reasonable
means of access to and from the airport terminal, she satisfied the first requirement of the
Slaugenhaupt test.
Next, the court noted that the second requirement of the Slaugenhaupt test—that
the employee is required by the nature of her employment to be present on the employer’s
premises—is satisfied not only where an employee is on the premises at issue to work,
but also where she is entering or exiting her workspace within a reasonable time before
or after her shift. US Airways, 179 A.3d at 1182-83 (discussing ICT Group v. W.C.A.B.
(Churchray-Woytunick), 995 A.2d 927, 932 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (holding that an employee
leaving for her lunch break and walking on employer’s premises was required by the
nature of her work to be present) and Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Hines), 913
A.2d 345, 349 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (holding that an employee starting his shift and walking
along the only authorized route to workspace was required by the nature of his work to
be present)). Applying that principle, the Commonwealth Court held that, because
Bockelman used the airport shuttle as a reasonable means of egress from her workplace,
she satisfied the second requirement of the Slaugenhaupt test. Having rejected US
Airways’ arguments regarding the first two prongs of the Slaugenhaupt test, the
Commonwealth Court affirmed the WCJ’s award of benefits.
[J-22-2019] - 6 US Airways filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which we granted to consider
whether a worker who voluntarily uses an optional employee parking area remains in the
course of her employment while traveling between that area and her typical workspace.
The answer to that question lies in Section 301(c)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
which we construe using the interpretative principles codified in the Statutory Construction
Act. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. Foremost among those principles is the rule that
remedial legislation like the Workers’ Compensation Act should be construed liberally to
effectuate its humanitarian objectives. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c); Colpetzer v. W.C.A.B.
(Standard Steel), 870 A.2d 875, 882 (Pa. 2005).
II.
We begin our analysis with Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, which provides as follows:
The terms “injury” and “personal injury,” as used in this act, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous physical condition, except as provided under subsection (f), arising in the course of his employment and related thereto . . . . The term “injury arising in the course of his employment,” as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe or because of his employment; nor shall it include injuries sustained while the employe is operating a motor vehicle provided by the employer if the employe is not otherwise in the course of employment at the time of injury; but shall include all other injuries sustained while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon, sustained by the employe, who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises occupied by or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on, the employe’s presence thereon being required by the nature of his employment.
77 P.S. § 411(1) (footnote omitted).
Although this provision is somewhat unwieldy at first blush, it distills to a few simple
rules for our purposes. Most importantly, an employee’s injury is compensable if it
[J-22-2019] - 7 “aris[es] in the course of his employment.” Id. This can occur in two distinct situations.
The first is when an employee is injured on or off the employer’s premises while engaged
in furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs. Here, all parties agree that
Bockelman was not furthering US Airways’ business interests at the time of her injury,
since her shift had concluded and she was heading back to her vehicle.
The second type of injury that arises in the course of employment occurs when an
employee is not furthering her employer’s business or affairs but nonetheless: (1) “is on
the premises occupied or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s
business or affairs are being carried on;” (2) “is required by the nature of his employment
to be present on his employer’s premises;” and (3) “sustains injuries caused by the
condition of the premises or by operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon.”
Slaugenhaupt, 376 A.2d at 273. Both US Airways and Bockelman agree that
Slaugenhaupt’s three-factor test governs here. See Reply Brief for US Airways at 2; Brief
for Bockelman at 7-8.
As this Court has explained, the meaning of the phrase “the employer’s premises”
in Section 301(c)(1)—and, by extension, in the Slaugenhaupt test—is not limited to
property that the employer legally owns or physically controls. Epler, 393 A.2d at 1165.
Parking lots, public streets, and common areas in multi-unit office buildings, for instance,
may be considered part of the employer’s premises if they are integral to the employer’s
workspace or constitute a reasonable means of ingress to or egress from the workplace.
Id.; Fashion Hosiery Shops, 423 A.2d at 797; see DAVID B. TORREY & ANDREW E.
GREENBERG, W EST’S PA. PRAC., W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 4:75 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp.
2018) (collecting cases).
Our decision in Epler best illustrates the proper application of these principles. In
that case, the municipality in which the employer’s plant was located banned on-street
[J-22-2019] - 8 parking, thus requiring the employer to provide off-street parking for its employees. Epler,
393 A.2d at 1164. The employer secured a parking lot adjacent to the plant for
management personnel to use, but relegated non-management employees to an
unpaved parking lot across the street. Id. The employer issued parking permits and
subjected employees to disciplinary action for violating the parking policy. Id.
While crossing the street one evening on his way back to the non-management
parking lot, Epler was struck by a motorist and killed. When Epler’s wife sought workers’
compensation benefits, the employer argued that Epler’s injury did not arise in the course
of his employment because it occurred in a public street, an area clearly not occupied by
or under the control of the employer.
This Court ultimately held that the public street where Epler’s injury took place
constituted part of “the employer’s premises” for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation
Act. We explained that “there are circumstances where an area can properly be
designated as ‘on the employer’s premises’ within the meaning of the Act even though
the employer is not the legal owner of that area.” Id. at 1166. For this reason, courts
must consider not just mere ownership of the land, but also “whether the location of the
accident was so connected with the [employer’s] business or operating premises as to
form an integral part thereof.” Id. at 1165 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, “the critical factor is not the employer’s title to or control over the area, but rather
the fact that [the employer] had caused the area to be used by [employees] in
performance of their assigned tasks.” Id. at 1167.
III.
US Airways argues that Epler is distinguishable given that, unlike the employer in
Epler, US Airways does not instruct employees where to park, issue parking permits, or
discipline employees for parking in restricted areas. Brief for US Airways at 21-22; Reply
[J-22-2019] - 9 Brief for US Airways at 4. Put differently, US Airways contends that Bockelman’s injury
on the shuttle bus did not arise in the course of her employment because she remained
“free to park her vehicle where she chose” and because the airline did not “exercis[e]
control over the mode of transportation [Bockelman] chose to commute to and from work.”
Brief for US Airways at 19. In this regard, US Airways suggests that the decision below
conflicts with longstanding precedent which holds that an employee is not in the course
of employment while traveling between a parking lot and the workplace “unless the
employer mandates how an employee commutes to work and/or where the employee
must park his [or] her vehicle.” Brief for US Airways at 13-16; see PPL v. W.C.A.B.
(Kloss), 92 A.3d 1276, 1285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (holding that a private parking deck
subsidized by employer did not constitute part of employer’s premises because
employees were free to park wherever they wished and employer had a similar subsidy
arrangement with another nearby lot); Waronsky v. W.C.A.B. (Mellon Bank), 958 A.2d
1118, 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (holding that a parking garage across the street from
workplace was not part of employer’s premises where employer “neither issued parking
directives nor exercised control over the mode of transportation [employees] chose to
commute to and from work”); Ortt v. W.C.A.B. (PPL Servs. Corp.), 874 A.2d 1264, 1267-
68 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (explaining that a parking lot “could not be considered an integral
part of [e]mployer’s business because parking in that lot was purely optional, not required
or ‘integral’ to [c]laimant’s employment”).
US Airways is correct that a handful of Commonwealth Court decisions—like
Waronsky, Ortt, and PPL—have read our decision in Epler narrowly. In Waronsky, for
example, the Commonwealth Court concluded that an employee who parked across the
street from her office was not injured in the course of her employment when she was
struck by a vehicle while crossing a street that separated her office from the parking
[J-22-2019] - 10 garage. Waronsky, 958 A.2d at 1125. Though the Waronsky Court correctly recognized
that “a parking garage may be so related to the operation of employer’s business as to
constitute an integral part of its operations,” id., the court nevertheless distinguished Epler
as follows:
In the current controversy, unlike in Epler, Employer neither issued parking directives nor exercised control over the mode of transportation Claimant chose to commute to and from work. Claimant was free to park her vehicle where she chose. The testimony of record demonstrated that, unlike in Epler, Claimant was in no way obligated to park in Mellon parking garage because Employer neither issued any form of written or verbal policy nor mandated where its employees parked. Further, the municipality where Employer operated and where Claimant worked did not ban on-street parking. There was no necessity for Employer to provide private parking, again, unlike in Epler.
There is no question, and there is no dispute, that the employees, including Claimant, were not required to park at Mellon garage. Under the present factual circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that Mellon parking garage was not integral to the Employer’s business and therefore, it was not part of the Employer’s premises. Consequently, it may not be said that Claimant was traversing . . . between two parts of the Employer’s premises, as in Epler. Id. (footnote omitted).
We are not persuaded by Waronsky’s reasoning. To begin with, the decision
overstates the level of control that the employer in Epler exerted over its employees.
Nothing in Epler indicates that the employer had ever “exercised control over the mode
of transportation [that its employees] chose to commute to and from work.” Waronsky,
958 A.2d at 1125. Nor is it entirely correct to suggest that the worker in Epler was
“obligated,” id., to park in the lot across the street from his workplace. The employer’s
parking policy simply focused on preventing junior employees from occupying the better,
more conveniently located parking lot, which the employer wanted to reserve for
managers and supervisors. See Epler, 393 A.2d at 1164 (“The pecking order for the most
[J-22-2019] - 11 desirable contiguous parking places was established by the issuance of parking lot
permits to limit access to contiguous places to designated employees.”).
These misstatements are not trivial. Epler revisionism has led to the mistaken
belief that a parking area cannot be integral to an employer’s premises if workers are
given a choice whether or not to use it. PPL, 92 A.3d at 1288 (holding that a private
parking deck was not integral to employer’s premises because claimant was “was not
required” to park there); Ortt, 874 A.2d at 1267-68 (concluding that a parking lot was not
integral to employer’s premises because “parking in that lot was purely optional”); see
Reply Brief for US Airways at 9 (“If the claimant has options as to how to commute and
where to park, like [Bockelman,] she is not on the employer’s premises while traveling
between the workplace and the parking lot.”). In reality, though, almost every employer-
sponsored parking program is, to some extent, optional. Even under the harsh employee-
parking regime at issue in Epler, for example, workers presumably could have walked,
biked, or taken public transportation to work.
To make matters worse, decisions like Waronsky and Ortt suggest that an injury
does not occur on “the employer’s premises” unless the employer owns or controls the
area in question. The Waronsky Court, for example, held that an employer’s premises
includes “any area owned, leased, or controlled by the employer to a degree where the
property could be considered an integral part of the employer’s business.” Waronsky,
958 A.2d at 1124 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Ortt, 874 A.2d at 1267 (“The
term ‘premises,’ as contemplated by Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, means that the area
where the injury occurred was owned, leased, or controlled by the employer to a degree
where that property could be considered an integral part of the employer’s business.”).
Yet Epler makes clear that an area may constitute part of an employer’s premises even
if the employer does not own or control it. Epler, 393 A.2d at 1167 (“[T]he critical factor
[J-22-2019] - 12 is not the employer’s title to or control over the area, but rather the fact that he had caused
the area to be used by his employees in performance of their assigned tasks.”).
Put simply, the decisions that US Airways faults the court below for not applying
were themselves based on a misunderstanding of Epler’s central holding. We stand by
Epler’s conclusion that the phrase “the employer’s premises” in Section 301(c)(1) of the
Act should be construed liberally to include any area that is integral to the employer’s
business operations, including any reasonable means of ingress to or egress from the
workplace. See Epler, 393 A.2d at 1166 (“We are satisfied that there are circumstances
where an area can properly be designated as ‘on the employer’s premises’ within the
meaning of the Act even though the employer is not the legal owner of that area.”). “[T]he
critical factor is not the employer’s title to or control over the area, but rather the fact that
he had caused the area to be used by his employees in performance of their assigned
tasks.” Id. at 1167.
IV.
Applying this rule, the Commonwealth Court, Appeal Board, and WCJ correctly
concluded that the lot in which Bockelman parked her vehicle was integral to US Airways’
business operations. Bockelman used the airport parking lot and shuttle service to enter
and exit her workplace. As part of US Airways’ business relationship with the airport, US
Airways clearly was aware that the Division of Aviation would make employee parking
available to the airline’s employees. Indeed, the evidence presented to the WCJ suggests
that, had the Division not done so, US Airways would have been obligated under its
collective bargaining agreement with the Association of Flight Attendants to reimburse
flight attendants like Bockelman for the cost of airport parking. Additionally, US Airways
was required to (and did) obtain SIDA badges—which could then be used to enter the
Division’s employee parking lots—for all of its Philadelphia-based flight attendants. Given
[J-22-2019] - 13 these facts, we have little difficulty concluding that the parking lot and shuttle were
connected with, and thus integral to, US Airways’ business operations at the Philadelphia
International Airport.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.
Justices Todd and Donohue join the opinion.
Justices Baer and Mundy join parts I, II, and IV of the opinion and concur in part
Justice Baer files a concurring opinion in which Justice Mundy joins.
Justice Dougherty files a concurring opinion.
Chief Justice Saylor did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
[J-22-2019] - 14