Urschler, A. v. Estate of Hartman, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 17, 2024
• Docket: 740 WDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S05001-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ARIANE URSCHLER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ESTATE OF CLEVA L. HARTMAN, : No. 740 WDA 2023 DECEASED :

Appeal from the Order Entered May 22, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 32-22-0105

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: May 17, 2024

Ariane Urschler appeals pro se from the order entered in the Indiana

County Court of Common Pleas on May 22, 2023, denying Urschler’s claim for

payment and damages from the estate of Cleva L. Hartman, Urschler’s

mother. After careful review, we affirm.

The orphans’ court summarized the factual and procedural history of

this will dispute as follows:

Cleva L. Hartman, resident of Indiana County, Pennsylvania, passed from life on January 4, 2022. A Last Will and Testament was admitted to probate on February 16, 2022. On August 29, 2022, John C. Uccellini, Executor of Cleva Hartman’s Estate, filed a First and Final Account with an Accompanying Petition for Adjudication. [Urschler] filed an objection, titled “Petition of formal objection to the Petition for the Adjudication/Statement of Proposed Distribution of the Estate of Cleva L. Hartman (Deceased), File No. 32-22-0105,” to the First and Final Account on September 23, 2022. Petitioner also filed an objection titled “Petition Contesting Probate of Will” on September 29, 2022. J-S05001-24

A status conference was held in this matter on November 8, 2022. At this conference it was determined by the [c]ourt that the two objections should be tried separately. The [c]ourt also drew attention to typographical errors contained within the first objection and granted [Urschler] additional time to file an amended document. [Urschler] filed the “First Amended Claim for Payment and Damages” on December 2, 2022. The Estate then filed a Motion in Limine addressing the Dead Man’s Act on January 9, 2023. This Motion sought to bar [Urschler] from offering her own testimony, in relation to her claim as a creditor of Cleva Harman’s Estate, as to any matter occurring on or before the death of Cleva Hartman. [Urschler] also filed a document titled “Motion to Allow Evidence on the Issue of Breach of Contract Retaliation” on December 30, 2022. In this filing, [Urschler] argued that the Dead Man’s Act was serving as an instrument of retaliation and that it was also being utilized to conceal previous threats and acts of retaliation.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/23, at 1-2.

On May 2, 2023, following a non-jury trial, the court entered an opinion

and order denying Urschler’s claim for payment and damages from her

mother’s estate.

On June 26, 2023, the trial court clerk docketed Urschler’s pro se notice

of appeal, noting a postmark date of June 20, 2023. In response, the executor

of the estate filed an application to quash the appeal as untimely in this Court.

Urschler filed a response, claiming the appeal was timely filed within the

applicable thirty-day appeal period. Specifically, Urschler asserted the office

of the clerk of Orphans’ Court of Indiana County “provide[s] the general public

with no instruction relative to the office’s mail handling procedure to define

timely legal filings.” Answer to Application to Quash Appeal, 8/16/23. Urschler

confusingly proceeded to make unfounded claims of a paid working

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relationship between the attorney for the estate and the clerk of the orphans’

court. Finally, Urschler stated that she used a November 18, 2022, written

instruction from the clerk’s office that she received after making a filing date

clarification request. Urschler attached a copy of an email response from a

deputy at the Indiana County Orphans’ Court regarding a previous “filing date

clarification request” in which the deputy stated as follows:

November 28th would be 20 days from November 8th. We would go by the postmarked date rather than the date we receive the filing in case something happens that the mail will get it to us too late. You would just need to mail it by the 28th rather than have us receive it by the 28th.

Answer to Application to Quash Appeal, 8/16/23, at Exhibit 1. Urschler did not

indicate to which filing that response was in reference.

This Court subsequently denied the estate’s application to quash without

prejudice to the moving party’s right to raise the issue on appeal. The executor

of the estate has raised the issue again in an appellate brief.

Prior to addressing the merits of Urschler’s issues, we must first

determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear her appeal. Generally, an

appellant must file an appeal within thirty days of the date the order was

entered. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. For purposes of Rule 903, an order is entered

when it is placed on the docket and notation is made in the record that the

court official delivered or mailed copies of the order to the parties. See In re

K.P., 872 A.2d 1227, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005). “An order is not appealable

until it is entered on the docket with the required notation that appropriate

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notice has been given.” Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115

(Pa. 1999) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that compliance

with Pa.R.C.P. 236 is necessary for the appeal period to start running. See id.

The Orphans’ Court Rules require court officials to immediately give

written notice of an order to the parties and indicate on the dockets when such

notice has been provided. See Pa.O.C.R. 4.6. Rule 4.6 was derived from

Pa.R.C.P. 236. See id., Note. We therefore conclude Pa.O.C.R. 4.6 serves the

same function as Pa.R.C.P. 236. An order pursuant to orphans’ court

jurisdiction is entered, for purposes of Pa.R.A.P. 903 once a court official

complies with Rule 4.6.

Here, the docket entries indicate that the clerk recorded the order at

issue on May 22, 2023. Directly below this docket entry, the docket indicates:

“One certified copy placed in the mailbox of John Barbor in the ROD office,

one copy mailed to Ariane Urschler[.]”

Even if the clerk intended this note to convey that the clerk provided

notice of the order to the parties on the listed date, we find this note fails to

satisfy Rule 4.6’s mandate to note on the docket the date that notice was

given. “The procedural requirements reflected in the rules serve to promote

clarity, certainty and ease of determination, so that an appellate court will

immediately know whether an appeal was perfected in a timely manner, thus

eliminating the need for a case-by-case factual determination.” Frazier, 735

A.2d at 115 (citation omitted).

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In a similar situation, in Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource,

264 A.3d 755 (Pa. Super. 2021), we observed that “[o]n the docket,

immediately following the text of a March 25, 2020 order, the typewritten text

read: ‘SENT TO R & B. SMITHSON, N. PARKER ESQ & A. EBECK ESQ.’” Id. at

757. While we acknowledged that the docket entry contained “enough

information to infer logically that the note references the prothonotary’s

provision of notice pursuant to Rule 236[,]” we determined that the docket

entry was ambiguous as to whether the Rule 236 notice was sent to the parties

on the same day the order was entered on the docket. Id. at 760. Accordingly,

we concluded “[t]his failure to abide by the strict requirements of Rule 236

constitutes a breakdown in the operation of the trial court[,]” and we declined

to quash the appeal as untimely. Id. at 757.

Similarly here, it could be inferred that a copy of the May 22, 2023 order

was mailed to Urschler and the estate’s counsel on the same date that the

order was entered on the docket. However, it remains ambiguous whether this

is actually the case. It is possible that it was mailed out the Friday before, the

next day, or a few days later. We simply have no way of knowing.

Accordingly, although Urschler’s notice of appeal was filed in the trial

court thirty-two days after the order was recorded, the breakdown in court

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operations means that the appeal period never began to run.1 As such, we do

not quash Urschler’s appeal as untimely.

We now turn to the merits of Urschler’s appeal. In her brief, Urschler

sets forth the following issues for our review:

1. Did the Indiana County Orphans’ Court abuse its discretion and erred [sic] as a matter of law by improperly applying, 207 Pa.C.S. ____________________________________________

1 Urschler argued her appeal was timely based on the email she provided that

shows that a deputy with the orphans’ court advised Urschler that an unspecified document from November 2022 would be received as filed by the postmark date rather than the date the document was received by the court. Urschler did not aver that she did not receive notice of the entry of the order, merely that, based on the email from the clerk’s office regarding a prior filing, she believed her appeal was timely. The email does not indicate that the statement in the email is a court-wide policy, or that the instruction would apply to any other type of filing, i.e. an appeal.

Further, while Urschler claims Indiana County fails to provide the public with any instruction on timely filing procedures, our Rules of Appellate Procedure are applicable here and are readily available for anyone. We acknowledge it is likely Urschler’s pro se status led to her confusion over proper appellate procedure and timelines. Nevertheless, this Court has consistently held

pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.

In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211–1212 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

The email from a clerk referencing a separate filing not relevant to this appeal is simply not sufficient to support a contention that the orphans’ court incorrectly advised Urschler that she could timely file an appeal by the postmark date. We are not empowered to extend the thirty-day appeal period. See Pa.R.A.P. 105. As such, this reasoning on its own would not have been enough to overlook the facial untimeliness of the current appeal. We advise Urschler to ensure compliance with our rules of appellate procedure in the future.

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Rule 2.11(1) in which [the trial judge]’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned, given the petitioner asserted [the trial judge]’s court was an essential instrument of the Estate’s pernicious scheme causing personal, professional, and political consequences to [the trial judge] if he issued an ‘approved’?

2. Did the Indiana County Orphans' Court abuse its discretion and erred [sic] as a matter of law by Obstructing the Administration of Law by Breach of Official Duty under 18 PA C.S. Stat § 5101, by [the trial judge]’s intentional use of an Estate created tactic against [Urschler], which almost prevailed, to dismiss the case and avoid an ‘approved’ Order of Court?

3. Did the Indiana County Orphans' Court abuse its discretion and erred [sic] by improperly applying, 207 Pa. C.S. Rule 2.11(1) in which a judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned, given [the trial judge] simply refused rule on the Motion to Allow Evidence on the Issue of Breach of Contract Retaliation as tactic of omission to exclude evidence and avoid an ‘approved’ Order of Court?

Appellant’s brief at 5.

Urschler’s issue statements and accompanying arguments raised on

appeal are somewhat confusing and mostly contain nonsensical, and frankly

insulting, accusations against the orphans’ court judge. To the best of our

ability to decipher Urschler’s rambling, repetitive, and frequently incoherent

argument on appeal, she seems to argue in all three issues that the trial court

judge “weaponized” the Dead Man’s Act along with the estate.

In all three argument sections, she only cites to one authority, for a

general proposition regarding disqualification of a judge. Urschler copies and

pastes this citation in all three argument sections of her brief, and it remains

the only citation to case law in her entire argument section. She cites no

specific authority supporting her assertions that the judge was impartial for

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applying the Dead Mans Act, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. Rule 2119. The brief does

not adequately give us cases that contain facts related to Urschler’s issues.

Her arguments are no more than undeveloped assertions. See Lackner v.

Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“[A]rguments which are not

properly developed are waived”) (citation omitted). Further, she appears to

simply copy, paste and repeat the same bullet points of these undeveloped

assertions in each section of her brief.

“[A]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a

pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an

appellant.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citation omitted). “[A]ny layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal

proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of

expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.” Commonwealth v. Gray,

608 A.2d 534, 550 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation omitted). As such, we cannot

serve as Urschler’s counsel and litigate her claims for her.

Upon review, Urschler fails to present a coherent legal argument on

appeal. Therefore, her arguments are waived. See Commonwealth v.

Walter, 966 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. 2009) (finding waiver where argument was

vague and confusing).

We note, even if not waived, her issues are without merit. Urschler

challenges the court’s application of Pennsylvania’s Dead Man’s Statute

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(“Dead Man’s Act”). The Dead Man’s Act is a valid statute under our law, and

the orphans’ court was simply following the letter of the law in applying it.

The Dead Man’s Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in any civil action or proceeding, where any party to a thing or contract in action is dead, ... and his right thereto or therein has passed ... to a party on the record who represents his interest in the subject in controversy, neither any surviving or remaining party to such thing or contract, nor any other person whose interest shall be adverse to the said right of such deceased ... party, shall be a competent witness to any matter occurring before the death of said party ....

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5930.

The rationale behind the Dead Man’s Act is that the law should not permit the surviving party to testify since he could make false statements and attempt to testify favorably to himself and adversely to the deceased party, knowing the other party is incapable of contradicting the fallacious testimony. The Dead Man’s Act is an exception to the general rule of evidence in this Commonwealth that no interest or policy of law ... shall make any person incompetent as a witness.

Under the Dead Man’s Act three conditions must exist before the surviving party or witness is disqualified: (1) the deceased must have had an actual right or interest in the matter at issue, i.e. an interest in the immediate result of the suit; (2) the interest of the witness—not simply the testimony— must be adverse; (3) a right of the deceased must have passed to a party of record who represents the deceased’s interest.

In re Fiedler, 132 A.3d 1010, 1024 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Urschler seeks to evade the provisions of the Dead Man’s Act by

asserting unsubstantiated claims of a conspiracy and pernicious behavior by

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and between the executor for the estate, his counsel, and the trial court judge.

Not only does Urschler not point to any evidence in the record to back up

these claims, but she also provides no authority for the assertion that the

intent of the moving party seeking the protection of the Dead Man’s Act is

somehow relevant to its application. The orphan’s court properly found that

the three requirements were met in order for Urschler to be disqualified from

testifying. The orphan’s court did not err. Hartman had an interest in whether

or not she owed her daughter a large sum of money. Urschler’s interest is

clearly adverse as she is arguing a large sum of money is due to her as a

creditor of Hartman and her estate. Hartman’s rights are represented by her

executor, a party of record. This is a straightforward scenario that the Dead

Man’s Act seeks to prevent.

As we find Urschler’s issues are waived, and otherwise without merit,

we affirm the order denying Urschler’s claim for payment and damages from

the estate.

Order affirmed.

5/17/2024

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