Urquidez v. Hyatt Corporation

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 14, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01975
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JAVIER URQUIDEZ, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01975-CAB-MMP 12

Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 14 v. REMAND

15 HYATT CORPORATION, et al., [ECF No. 10] 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Plaintiff has moved to remand this case to state court. [ECF No. 10.] The key 20 question for this Court is whether the removal is proper on diversity grounds. The Court 21 finds that it is and denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff filed this case in state court, suing his former employer Hyatt Corporation 24 and, as relevant to the diversity calculus, an individual named Mr. Derek Whitbread. [ECF 25 No. 1-2 at 7.] Plaintiff alleged several state and common law causes arising from a claimed 26 pattern of sexual harassment. [ECF No. 1-2 at 8–10.] 27 28 There is no question that Defendant Hyatt, a nonresident of the forum state, timely removed after being served. Plaintiff argues (1) that diversity jurisdiction does not exist since Defendant Whitbread (alleged to be a California citizen) is a party to this case, and 1 (2) that Defendant Hyatt has failed to show that the amount in controversy exceeds 2 $75,000. 3 II. ANALYSIS 4 1. Defendant Hyatt’s “Snap Removal” Was Proper 5 “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 6 States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants.” 28 7 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where 8 the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 9 costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In 10 general, “[t]he removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the 11 burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” 12 13 California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir.), opinion amended 14 on denial of reh’g, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004). An action removable solely on diversity 15 grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest 16 properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 17 brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 18 “Snap removal” refers to a properly served defendant’s removal of a multi-defendant 19 case to federal court prior to a plaintiff’s service of a non-diverse defendant. This practice 20 is not without controversy. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Reynolds, 757 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 21 2014) (discussing whether snap removal encourages gamesmanship). The Ninth Circuit 22 has expressly reserved ruling on its propriety. See Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 23 965 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he final chapter on snap removals in the Ninth Circuit remains to 24 be written”). But the circuit court nevertheless has placed some limits on the practice 25 (which are not relevant here). See id. (disallowing “ever-snappier” removals by requiring 26 27 defendants to wait until the complaint has been “officially filed” in the state court). 28 Defendant Hyatt removed this case but did so before Defendant Whitbread could be served. Plaintiff concedes that only Defendant Hyatt—which is not a California resident— has actually been served. Indeed, Plaintiff makes this clear: he has made multiple failed 1 attempts at serving Defendant Whitbread. [See ECF No. 10-1 at 12–13.] The first issue 2 for the Court is whether Defendant Hyatt’s removal prior to the service of Defendant 3 Whitbread was proper. 4 The text of the removal statute makes clear that a case may not be removed if any of 5 the parties in interest “properly joined and served as defendants” are residents of the citizen 6 of the state in which the action is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added). “It 7 is well established that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts 8 – at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd – is to enforce it according 9 to its terms.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (internal quotes and citations 10 removed). Defendant Whitbread, an alleged California resident, still has not been served. 11 As the non-diverse Defendant Hyatt is the only Defendant to be “properly” served, this 12 13 Court finds that the removal does not offend the Court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction. 14 Plaintiff argues that (1) he has made good faith efforts to serve Defendant Whitbread 15 without any luck, and (2) that Defendant Hyatt knows Defendant Whitbread’s whereabouts 16 but has deliberately withheld that information. First, the text of the statute forecloses 17 Plaintiff’s good faith argument: for purposes of weighing actual diversity on removal, a 18 defendant must be properly served. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). And second, Plaintiff points 19 to no legal principle that requires Defendant Hyatt to voluntarily disclose Defendant 20 Whitbread’s location (or facilitate service upon him). 21 The Court finds that Defendant Hyatt appropriately effectuated removal. 22 2. Defendant Hyatt Has Presented Evidence of the $75,000 Threshold to 23 Maintain A Lawsuit in Diversity 24 Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hyatt has not presented evidence that Plaintiff’s 25 claim exceeds $75,000 to meet the amount in controversy requirement. See 28 USC § 26 27 1332(a). It is Defendant’s burden to do so. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 28 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s complaint meets this jurisdictional threshold. Defendant Hyatt provides the Court with a sworn declaration showing that damages for 1 || Plaintiff's past earnings alone would reach at least $67,572.64. [ECF No. 1-2 at 50-51.] 2 || Additional damages in the form of future earnings, mental/emotional distress damages, and 3 punitive damages—all of which are sought in the operative complaint ([See Compl., ECF * IINo. 1-2 at 6-35 » 99 25, 27, 164])—would reasonably push the amount in controversy over ° $75,000. See, e.g., Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 946 (9th Cir. 2001) (potential ° punitives may be considered in calculating the amount in controversy). Ht. CONCLUSION

9 Plaintiff's motion to remand, [ECF No. 10], is denied. Should the addition of a 10 properly served defendant threaten the Court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction, the Court 11 || Will address any arguments related to sham defendants at that juncture. 12 3 Itis SO ORDERED.

14 15 Dated: January 14, 2025 € ZL Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28