Urgo v. Patel

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Urgo v. Patel

279 A.D.2d 518, 719 N.Y.S.2d 120, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 361

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 16, 2001

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 279 A.D.2d 518 (Urgo v. Patel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Urgo v. Patel, 279 A.D.2d 518, 719 N.Y.S.2d 120, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 361 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, for specific per[519]*519formance of a joint venture agreement, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DeMaro, J.), dated January 31, 2000, as denied that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 6514 (a) for mandatory cancellation of the notice of pendency filed by the plaintiff.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which sought mandatory cancellation of the plaintiffs notice of pendency. CPLR 6501 permits a notice of pendency to be filed “in any action * * * in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property.” Since the plaintiff seeks specific performance of a joint venture agreement which would require the defendants to transfer the subject real property to the enterprise, this action falls within the scope of the statute (see, Mitchell Field Realty Corp. v United Artists Communications, 188 AD2d 451; Peterson v Kelly, 173 AD2d 688; Yorktown Floorworld v Wagon Prods., 170 AD2d 823; Flotteron v Steinberg, 88 AD2d 968; cf., Felske v Bernstein, 173 AD2d 677; General Prop. Corp. v Diamond, 29 AD2d 173). Krausman, J. P., Friedmann, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action, inter alia, for specific per[519]*519formance of a joint venture agreement, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DeMaro, J.), dated January 31, 2000, as denied that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 6514 (a) for mandatory cancellation of the notice of pendency filed by the plaintiff.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which sought mandatory cancellation of the plaintiffs notice of pendency. CPLR 6501 permits a notice of pendency to be filed “in any action * * * in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property.” Since the plaintiff seeks specific performance of a joint venture agreement which would require the defendants to transfer the subject real property to the enterprise, this action falls within the scope of the statute (see, Mitchell Field Realty Corp. v United Artists Communications, 188 AD2d 451; Peterson v Kelly, 173 AD2d 688; Yorktown Floorworld v Wagon Prods., 170 AD2d 823; Flotteron v Steinberg, 88 AD2d 968; cf., Felske v Bernstein, 173 AD2d 677; General Prop. Corp. v Diamond, 29 AD2d 173). Krausman, J. P., Friedmann, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

279 A.D.2d 518, 719 N.Y.S.2d 120, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 361, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/urgo-v-patel-nyappdiv-2001.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack