U.R. Neely v. Commissioner

116 T.C. No. 8
United States Tax Court·Decided February 13, 2001·No. 14936-98·Unknown

Opinion

116 T.C. No. 8

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

U.R. NEELY, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 14936-98. Filed February 13, 2001.

P contends that R is barred from assessing additional employment taxes because the notice of determination concerning worker classification was issued after the expiration of the general 3-year period of limitations under sec. 6501(a), I.R.C. R contends that the period of limitations on assessment is indefinitely extended pursuant to sec. 6501(c)(1), I.R.C., by reason of P’s fraud in the filing of various employment tax returns.

Held: The elements of fraud in the employment tax context are the same as those in the income, estate, and gift tax contexts.

Held, further, P did not commit fraud for purposes of sec. 6501(c)(1), I.R.C. Accordingly, R is barred by the statute of limitations from assessing additional employment taxes for the taxable periods in issue. - 2 -

Kirk A. McCarville, for petitioner.

John W. Duncan, for respondent.

VASQUEZ, Judge: Respondent issued to petitioner a notice of

determination concerning worker classification. Petitioner

contends that respondent is barred from assessing additional

employment taxes for the taxable periods in issue on the grounds

that the notice of determination was issued after the expiration

of the general 3-year period of limitations under section

6501(a).1 Respondent argues that the period of limitations on

assessment remains open pursuant to section 6501(c) by reason of

petitioner’s fraudulent conduct.

In a previous opinion, we addressed whether this Court

possesses jurisdiction to address issues pertaining to the period

of limitations on assessment in the context of a case brought

under section 7436. We resolved that inquiry in the affirmative.

See Neely v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 287 (2000). Accordingly, we

now address whether the period of limitations on assessment

expired prior to the issuance of respondent’s notice of

determination.

1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 3 -

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are

incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in

Phoenix, Arizona, at the time he filed his petition in this case.

Petitioner’s Background

Petitioner graduated from high school in 1972 and

immediately thereafter began working in the air-conditioning

business by installing ductwork for his father. In 1976, after

attending one semester of college, petitioner went to work for

Geottle’s Metal Products (Geottle). Petitioner’s initial

responsibilities at Geottle included installing sheet metal and

air-conditioning units. He later worked his way up into the

estimating department, where he bid jobs on behalf of his

employer.

In 1985, petitioner left Geottle and formed his own business

called the A/C Co. (the company).2 The company specialized in

the installation of air-conditioning equipment and associated

ductwork, and the company’s principal place of business was

located in Mesa, Arizona. The activities of the company during

1992 constitute the focus of respondent’s determination.

2 The company was initially operated as a partnership between petitioner and an associate, whom petitioner later bought out. At all times during the 1992 tax year, the company was operated by petitioner as a sole proprietorship. - 4 -

Activities of the Company During 1992

The company experienced a busy year in 1992. Petitioner had

approximately 100 jobs, with each job lasting anywhere from 6

weeks to 6 months. While petitioner typically maintained a

workforce of approximately 20 to 25 people, during 1992 that

figure increased to 40. Most of the employees served in the

field as installers. Petitioner, a superintendent, an estimator,

and an office manager operated out of the business office.

At some point in 1992, Robert Cook approached petitioner

about working at one of his job sites. Mr. Cook, however,

conditioned his services upon being paid in cash. Due to his

need for labor, petitioner agreed, but only after informing Mr.

Cook that he would be issued a Form 1099 with respect to the cash

payments made to him.

William Baker and Dennis Page were hired by petitioner under

similar circumstances. Petitioner did not meet with these

individuals; rather, he hired them on the recommendation of his

job foremen. Mr. Baker and Mr. Page each insisted on being paid

in cash for their services, a condition to which petitioner again

agreed on the understanding that Forms 1099 would be issued with

regard to the payments.

Petitioner’s arrangements with Messrs. Cook, Baker, and Page

(collectively, the workers) constitute the only instance in which

petitioner paid a worker in cash for services rendered. During - 5 -

less busy times, petitioner rejected requests from individuals to

be paid in cash.

Petitioner’s Internal Accountant

Ann Gerber (formerly Ann Melcher) served as the company’s

office manager from 1986 until the company was sold in 1994. Ms.

Gerber was responsible for all monetary aspects of the business.

In addition to collecting receivables and paying expenses, Ms.

Gerber maintained the company’s books and processed the payroll.

As part of her payroll obligations, Ms. Gerber calculated the

proper amount of employment taxes3 to be withheld from each

employee’s paycheck.

Each time petitioner notified Ms. Gerber that a worker was

to be paid in cash, he instructed her that the worker was to be

issued a Form 1099 to reflect the payment. Petitioner believed

that the issuance of a Form 1099 was sufficient to keep him in

compliance with relevant tax laws.

The workers submitted weekly timecards to Ms. Gerber, and

she would distribute the appropriate cash payments to them. In

order to generate the cash necessary to pay the workers, Ms.

Gerber would write a check from the company’s account to

3 For convenience, we use the term “employment taxes” to refer to taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), secs. 3101-3128, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), secs. 3301-3311, and income tax withholding, secs. 3401-3406. See Henry Randolph Consulting v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 1, 1 n.1 (1999). - 6 -

petitioner. The amount of the check included petitioner’s weekly

$500 draw, plus whatever amounts were owed to the workers. After

depositing petitioner’s $500 draw to his individual account, Ms.

Gerber received the remainder of the check proceeds in cash. She

in turn distributed the cash to the workers in the amounts they

were owed. As a result of this practice, the amounts paid to the

workers were reflected on the company’s books as distributions to

petitioner. Petitioner was not aware that the cash payments to

the workers were being accounted for in this manner.

Ms. Gerber withheld no employment taxes from the amounts

paid to the workers. In addition, Ms. Gerber did not issue Forms

1099 to the workers, as such was the responsibility of

petitioner’s outside accountant. Petitioner did not instruct nor

suggest to Ms. Gerber that the cash payments were not to be

reported to the Internal Revenue Service.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

U.R. Neely v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 8 (tax 2001).

116 T.C. No. 8 (U.R. Neely v. Commissioner) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

George C. McGee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
519 F.2d 1121 (Fifth Circuit, 1975)
Henry Randolph Consulting v. Commissioner
112 T.C. No. 1 (U.S. Tax Court, 1999)
Neely v. Commissioner
115 T.C. No. 21 (U.S. Tax Court, 2000)
Neely v. Commissioner
116 T.C. No. 8 (U.S. Tax Court, 2001)
McGee v. Commissioner
61 T.C. No. 27 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)
Parks v. Commissioner
94 T.C. No. 38 (U.S. Tax Court, 1990)