Upton v. Whitaker

196 F. 651, 116 C.C.A. 343, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1532
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMay 15, 1912
DocketNo. 2,203
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 196 F. 651 (Upton v. Whitaker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Upton v. Whitaker, 196 F. 651, 116 C.C.A. 343, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1532 (6th Cir. 1912).

Opinion

DENISON, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). We are satisfied that the Gault cannot escape blame. The finding of the District Judge was that the collision occurred1 in the lower and wider part of the channel, and as the result óf¡the Gault’s sudden and inexcusable sheer. This conclusion would end all controversy; but we prefer to rest the liability of the Gault [653]*653upon a somewhat broader ground, and one which is not complicated, as the other is, by a great mass oí conflicting testimony, but depends on the undisputed facts. The vessels had in due time exchanged signals, and had agreed upon a meeting port' to port. The Gault was coming up along what may be called the easterly edge of the body of the bottle. 300 feet away from the range line, and was approaching, the shoulder leading over to the neck. The Whitaker was coining down in this narrow neck. Her exact position, laterally in this channel, is in dispute; but it is clear that she had a right to be following the range line, and only yielding, or being prepared to yield, so much as would give room for a safe meeting. It is also clear that the Gault, from her position, was observing the Whitaker’s lights from a considerable angle, and could not exactly place her laterally in the channel, and so was bound to assume that the Whitaker was, or might be, where she had a right to be, viz., substantially on the range line. Further, the Gault being up bound, in a current of 2 or 2% miles an hour, had full control of her own course and speed, could estimate fairly well the speed at which the Whitaker was coming down, and knew the difficulties attending the handling of a down-bound boat in such a channel and in such a current. If, therefore, the meeting was, as the Gaiilt claims, exactly abreast of the red light, the Gault was bound to know, with substantial accuracy, that it would occur at that place. So it appears that the Gault, knowing or being bound to know that the Whitaker might be passing the red light at the very moment the Gault reached the same point, nevertheless starboarded and followed westerly' along the shoulder of the bottle, coming out into the narrow neck channel at an angle which on that course would have taken her bow well over toward the central or range line before her stern passed the red light. It would be quite possible to accomplish this at the moment a down-bound boat was passing slightly west of the range line and to avoid collision, but this possibility, and, indeed, the probability that it could be successfully done nine times out of ten, do not. remove the inherent danger of the movement. A very slight mistake in the steering of the boat or a misconception of the deflecting force of the current at that point, or any one 'of several other causes, might cause the boat to come into the narrow channel at a wider angle or to carry her further over into such narrow channel than was intended, and so-might cause exactly what did happen here.

This maneuver is not to be excused because it was necessary; for it was wholly unnecessary. If the Gault chose to come up the easterly edge of the channel and close along the shore as she did, a trifle of additional slowing so as to be sure that the Whitaker was clear of this part of the channel before the Gault attempted to swing into it-would have avoided the accident, and would not have cost two minutes of time. Again, if the up-bound boat, some distance below the so-called shoulder of the bottle, had swung over on to or near to the Elliott Point range line and then followed up parallel with that line she could have seen the lights and judged the course of the Whitaker to better advantage, the change of direction into the new course would have been as gradual as desired, and the specific danger would never have de> [654]*654veloped. Nor is it importánt- if, as claimed, vessels frequently meet at this point, and do not regard it as dangerous. An up-bound boat, following the Elliott Point range, would swing her bow to starboard about one point to take the Rime Kiln Crossing range, and this swing would be away from the course of a down-bound boat and would tend to safety. This, doubtless, was the kind of meeting which was common at this point; but a boat in the Gault’s position was compelled first to swing to port, over toward the course of the other boat. This was a swing into danger, and to make that swing under such circumstances was careless, if not reckless, navigation. We do not overlook the rule, or rather the exception, that one of two approaching vessels may swing toward the course of the other when required by the turns or angles of the channel (Lake Erie Transp. Co. v. Gilchrist Co. [C. C. A. 6] 142 Fed. 89, 95, 73 C. C. A. 313); but we find no decision of this character which justifies unnecessarify cutting into a narrow channel at the very instant the other boat is passing. This case is not one where both boats must turn at the same point, and so, if they are to reach it at the same time, each may anticipate a simultaneous swing by the other. , The Whitaker could be expected to turn very little, if at all. The Gault selected that moment for such a maneuver that, even if the Whitaker was well on her own side of the range, still the Gault could not miss her by more than 100 feet. That distance may not be dangerous when the vessels meet on parallel courses. It is dangerous under the situation here existing. We conclude, therefore, that the Gault was at fault.

A more difficult problem arises as to the fault of the Whitaker. The vital question may be formulated as being whether the Whitaker, when opposite the red light, was on her own side of the range, and at least 175 or 200 feet away from the light, or whether she was over on the wrong side of the channel and within 50 or 100 feet of the light. The two lights of the range, according to which .the Whitaker was taking her. course, .were over the bow' and less than one mile away. The night was clear, and these lights were perfectly visible. The universal testimony from the Whitaker is that these lights were continuously open to the west, andl it necessarily follows, if this is true, that the Whitaker was continuously well to the westward of the range line, and hence well westward of the center of the channel. This testimony is clear, positive, and certain, and there is little or no opportunity for mere mistake. On the other hand, the captain of the Gault had no accurate means of locating himself with reference to this range at this time, and nothing definite to tie to excepting that, when he struck the Whitaker, he was close to the red light. This state of the proof makes, as we think, a clear, initial preponderance in favor of the Whitaker. Since, upon the undisputed facts, we find] the Gault guilty of “fault sufficient to account for the disaster,” the contributing fault of the Whitaker must be very clearly and satisfactorily established. The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72, 85, 13 Sup. Ct. 211, 216, 31 L. Ed. 84; The Chisholm (C. C. A. 6) 153 Fed. 704, 713, 82 C. C. A. 562, 571. It only remains to determine whether this initial preponderance is destroyed and the contrary conclusion clearly established by the four matters to which we now allude:

[655]*655(1) The Whitaker’s captain testified that for some distance above the point of collision, and while going down through the narrow channel, and while pursuing a course substantially parallel to the range line and westward therefrom, he maintained his heading directly upon the front light of the Rime Kiln Crossing lights, and kept his stern bearing directly upon the lightship marking the westerly edge of this 300 foot channel.

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Bluebook (online)
196 F. 651, 116 C.C.A. 343, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1532, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/upton-v-whitaker-ca6-1912.