Upton v. Miller

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 16, 2025
• Docket: 444, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LIAM UPTON,1 § § No. 444, 2024 Petitioner/Respondent Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Family Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § File No. CK13-01836 TESS MILLER, § Petition Nos. 23-08009 § 23-14507 Respondent/Petitioner Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: April 25, 2025 Decided: June 16, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the opening brief and the record on appeal, it appears

to the Court that:

(1) The appellant (“Father”) and the appellee (“Mother”) are the parents of

two children. The older sibling turned eighteen shortly after this appeal was filed.

The younger sibling was born in 2009. After the parents separated, Father moved to

California; Mother continued living in Delaware. On January 5, 2022, the Family

Court entered a consent order (the “2022 Custody Order”) providing that the parents

would have joint legal custody of the children; the children would primarily reside

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). with Mother; and the children would visit with Father in California for eight weeks

each summer and during certain other school breaks.

(2) In 2023, the parents filed cross-petitions to modify the 2022 Custody

Order. Father later filed a motion alleging that Mother was in contempt of the 2022

Custody Order. The motion alleged that Mother violated the order by not providing

Father with sufficient notice of a chaperoned trip that the older sibling took to visit

colleges in other states; not pursuing certain mental-health services for the younger

sibling; and “purchasing a car for [the older sibling] without discussing it with the

Petitioner (Father) first.”

(3) Following an evidentiary hearing on the petitions and motion, the

Family Court denied Father’s contempt motion. As to custody and visitation, the

court applied the statutory best-interest factors and determined that Mother should

have sole legal custody; Mother should continue to have primary residential

placement; and Father should continue to have summer and holiday visitation as

provided in the 2022 Custody Order.

(4) Father has appealed to this Court. He argues that the Family Court’s

order should have included a provision requiring Mother to follow mental- and

behavioral-health professionals’ recommendations for treatment for the younger

sibling and challenges the Family Court’s findings of fact. This Court reviews the

Family Court’s factual and legal determinations as well as its inferences and

2 deductions.2 We review legal rulings de novo.3 When deciding whether to modify

a custody order that was entered by consent, the Family Court considers the best-

interest factors established in 13 Del. C. § 722.4 This Court will not disturb the trial

court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and justice requires that

they be overturned.5 “The judgment of the Family Court must be affirmed when the

inferences and deductions upon which it is based are supported by the record and are

the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”6

(5) After careful consideration, we find no reversible error in the Family

Court’s judgment. The parents disagreed about what mental- and behavioral-health

services the younger sibling should receive. Neither party presented testimony from

a mental-health professional regarding diagnoses or recommendations for treatment

or the basis for such professional’s opinion. The parents’ testimony and Father’s

exhibits from the hearing reflect that different professionals have provided different

recommendations and that neither parent has followed the recommendations of the

providers selected or preferred by the other parent. Thus, we find no basis for

2 Mundy v. Devon, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del. 2006). 3 Id. 4 See 13 Del. C. § 729(b) (“An order entered by the Court by consent of all parties, an interim order or a written agreement between the parties concerning the legal custody of a child or such child’s residence may be modified at any time by the Court in accordance with the standards set forth in § 722 of this title.”); id. § 722(a) (providing that the Family Court “shall determine the legal custody and residential arrangements for a child in accordance with the best interests of the child” and listing factors to consider). 5 Mundy, 906 A.2d at 752. 6 Id. at 752-53. 3 reversal based on Father’s contentions that (i) the Family Court should have included

a provision in the new order requiring Mother to follow professionals’

recommendations for treatment or (ii) the court erroneously declined to find Mother

in contempt of the 2022 Custody Order for her failure to follow the

recommendations of Father’s preferred professionals.

(6) Although Father identifies some immaterial errors, the Family Court’s

material factual findings were not clearly erroneous. For example, the court’s

statement that the younger sibling was a licensed driver is not a materially erroneous

factual finding. Rather, when the statement is read in context, it is clear that the

reference to the younger sibling was a typographical error and that the court

understood that the older sibling was a licensed driver, which was relevant to

Father’s claim that Mother violated the prior order by allowing that child to drive a

car without consulting Father.7 Similarly, Father argues that the court erroneously

determined that “Mother did not disobey the [2022 Custody] Order by neglecting to

seek Father’s input in the decision to allow [the younger sibling] to attend the

[college tour] trip,” because it was the older sibling, not the younger sibling, who

went on the trip. When the court’s statement is read in context, it is clear that the

court understood that the older sibling went on the trip. The court’s order discusses

7 Whether Mother or the maternal grandmother purchased the car also is immaterial. The issue was whether Mother was required to consult Father about the child driving the car, not which adult owned the car. 4 the older sibling’s preparations for college, and it uses the older sibling’s name five

times—and the younger sibling’s name once—in the paragraph discussing the trip.

Again, the mistaken use of the younger sibling’s name is not a reversible error in the

context here. Finally, although we have not identified in the record evidence

demonstrating that the younger sibling participated in art therapy when he was with

Mother in Delaware, as stated in the Family Court order, the evidence does support

the court’s finding that the child participated in therapy when he was with Mother in

Delaware. Father has not explained why the Family Court’s description of the

therapy as “art therapy” warrants reversal.

(7) We conclude that the Family Court’s factual findings are sufficiently

supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. The court acted within its

broad discretion to weigh the best-interest factors when deciding custody, residential

placement, and visitation.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice