Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Texas Attorney General Reports·Decided July 2, 1993·No. DM-279·Published

Opinion

QBfficeof tty 2hmwp Qberal Mate of Z!kxae DAN MORALES ATTORSEI GENERAL December 31,1993

Honorable James L. Anderson, Jr. Opiion No. DM-279 Aransas County Attorney 301 North Live Oak Re: Whether a wncrete material company Rockport, Texas 78382 owned by a county commissioner may provide services and materials to the county or to another contractor under contract with the wlmty (RQ-295)

Dear Mr. Anderson:

You state that a person who is likely to be appointed county commissioner in the timm owns either the majority interest in or sll of the stock in a corporation that sells wncrete materials. The commissionerscourt has contracted with a general contractor for extensive runway construction at the Aransas County Airport, and you believe he will purchase materials from the concrete company becsutseit is the only such company in the area1 On the assmnption that the owner of the concrete company will be a member of the commissioners court when the materials are purchased, you ask whether a concrete material company owned by a county commissionermay provide services and/or concrete materials to the county, or to a contractor performing services to the county under contract. Thus, you inquire about a sale from the concrete company to the county as well as a sale from the concrete company to the contractor who is already under contract with the wunty.

You wish to know how section 81.002 and section 171.004 of the Local Government Code apply to the facts you have presented. Section 81.002 provides in part: (a) Before undertaking the duties of the county judge or a wtmty wmmissioner, a person must take the official oath and swear in writing that the person will not be interested, directly or indirectly, in a contract with or claim against the county except: (1) a contract or claim expressly authorized by law; or (2) a warrant issued to the judge or wmmissioner as a fee of 05ce. (b) [bond requirement]

twe~thstthcwunty.inpurhasingmatcrialrfortbisprojeRwillwmplywithany applicablecompetitivebiddinglaws. See LocalGov’tCodeQ#271.021-271.030.

p. 1460 Honorable James L. Anderson, Jr. - Page 2 @M-279)

(c) [permittingcounty judge or county wmmissioner to serve as member of the governing body or as officer or director of another entity that does business with the wunty, subject to the provisions of chapter 1711. The special oath required of the wunty judge and a county wmmissioner by section 81.002(a) has been in effect since 1876. See Acts 1876, 15th Leg., ch. 55, at 51. Prior to 1981, when the precursor of section 81.002(a)(l) was adopted, only the county judge’s and county wmmissioners’fees of office were specificallyexcepted from the oath provision. See Acts 1981,67th Leg., ch. 527, 4 3, at 2230. Public wntmcts in which a member of the wntmcting body had a direct or indirect pecuniary interest were against public policy and void, acwrding to the common-law ruleapplied by Terms courts. Meyers v. Wuker, 276 SW. 305 (T’ex.Civ. App.-Easthmd 1925, no writ); see ako Cig ojI%Murg v. Ellis, 59 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Commh App. 1933, holding approved); Bexar County v. Wentworth, 378 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Sfotr Counq v. Guerra, 297 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951. no writ); fiippu v. Stewari Iron Works,66 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-1902, no writ). This rule applied to counties, cities, school districts, and other state and local govemmemal bodies. See Attorney General OpinionsH-916 (1976); V-640 (1948).

In 1981 the legislature adopted an exception applicable to the predecessor of section 81.002(a) and to former article 988 V.T.C.S. (1925), which prohibited members of a~city wuncil from being “diiectiy or ir$rectly interested in any work, business or wntract, the expense, price or consideration of which is paid from the city treasury.” Acts 1875, 14th Leg., ch. 100, at 154 (repeuZedJ+JActs 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 640. at 4082). The 1981 exception read upon adoption as follows: An incorporated city or town or a county may purchase equipment or supplies from a cooperative association to which one or more members of its governing body . . belongs if no member of the governing body. . will receive a pecuniary benefit 6om the purchase except as is reflected in an increase in dividends distributed generally to members of the cooperative assokti0n.s Acts 1981,67th Leg., ch. 527, 5 1, at 2229 (revised and rewdified 1987) (current version at Local Gov’t Code 0 271.902). The bill that adopted the provision quoted above also adopted the exception for “such contracts or claims as are expressly authoriaed by law.” now wdiied as section 81.002(a)(l), Local Government Code. Acts 1981,67th Leg., ch. 527,s 3, at 2230.

Chapter 171 of the Local Govemment Code, adopted in 1983, etTected a major change in the traditional common-law prohibition against a public officer’s direct or

2ThirpmvisionavrrmledAttomcyGcaualOpinionEM24 (1975) (oo- -may”ot pwchasc suppliesfroma farm&s mopcmtivein +ich Bcommissionu owns 8 small share).

p. 1461 Honorable James L. Anderson, Jr. - Page 3 (DM-279)

indirect interest in a public contract entered into by the governing body to which the officer belonged. Acts 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 640, 4 1, at 4079 (adopting predecessor of chapter 171 as V.T.C.S. art. 988b (1925); see generally Attorney General Cpiion JM-424 (1986)). Chapter 171 permits local governing bodies to enter into ~ntracts in which a member of the governing body has a “substantialinterest” as defmed by section 171.002, but the “interested”public 05ce-r must comply with section 171.004 of the Local Government Code, which provides as follows: (a) If a local public official has a substantial interest in a business entitys or in real property, the official shall file, before a vote or decision on any matter involving the business entity or the real property, an a5davit stating the nature and extent of the interest and shall abstain from the further participation in the matter Z (1) in the case of a substantial interest in a business.entity the action on the matter wili have a special economic effect on the business entity that is distinguishablefrom the effect on the public; . . A “local public official”includes the following: a member of he governing body or another officer . of mry diict (including a school district), county municipality, precinct, central appraisal district, transit authority or district . . . Local Gov’tCode 8 171.001(l) (emphasisadded).

A local public 05&l commits an offense by knowinglyviolating section 171.004, id. 8 171.003(a)(l), but this violation will not invalidate the wntract unless the measure would not have passed the governing body without his vote. Id. 5 171.006. This enactment modiies the strict common-law rule that would have invalidated the contmct even if the public officer had not participated. It permits the transaction but forbids the interested officer from participating in it, enforcing this requirement by a crimmal penalty. Id. 8 171.003.

The legislature has not expressly repealed section 8 1.002 of the Locai Government Code, but the apparent overlap of this provision with chapter 171 of the Local Government Code raises an issue of implied repeal. Section 81.002 requires the county judge and wunty wmmissioners to talce an oath that they will not be interested in wntracts with the wunty, but chapter 171 permits the wunty to enter into wntracts in which these officers are interested. See Local Goti Code 5 171.001(l) (detining “local public 05&l* to include a member of the governing body of a county).

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Related

City of Edinburg v. Ellis
59 S.W.2d 99 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1933)
Starr County v. Guerra
297 S.W.2d 379 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1956)
Bexar County v. Wentworth
378 S.W.2d 126 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1964)