Untitled California Attorney General Opinion

California Attorney General Reports·Decided March 17, 2020·No. 15-1102·Published

Opinion

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL State of California

XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General

_________________________

: OPINION : No. 15-1102 : of : March 17, 2020 : XAVIER BECERRA : Attorney General : : ANYA M. BINSACCA : Deputy Attorney General : :

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Tia Boatman Patterson, the Executive Director of the California Housing Finance Agency, has requested an opinion on the following questions of state law:

1. Under California’s Housing Authorities Law (Health & Saf. Code, § 34200 et seq.), may a local housing authority operate throughout the entire state?

2. May a corporation or other instrumentality formed by a local housing authority exercise the statutory powers of a local housing authority throughout the entire state?

3. May a local housing authority accept a federal grant for a housing project that is outside its territorial jurisdiction?

4. May an out-of-state housing authority, or a corporation formed by an out-of- state housing authority, exercise the statutory powers of a housing authority in California?

1 15–1102 CONCLUSIONS

1. Under California’s Housing Authorities Law (Health & Saf. Code, § 34200 et seq.), a local housing authority may not operate generally throughout the entire state; it may operate outside its defined geographic boundaries as specifically allowed or contemplated by statute.

2. A local housing authority may not delegate a statutory power it does not have. Because a local housing authority may not operate generally throughout the entire state under state law, it may not delegate such power to a corporation or other instrumentality.

3. State law does not allow a local housing authority to accept a federal grant for a housing project outside its territorial jurisdiction.

4. An out-of-state housing authority, or a corporation formed by an out-of-state housing authority, may not exercise the statutory powers of a housing authority in California.

ANALYSIS

California’s housing authorities have their origin in the United States Housing Act of 1937,1 which Congress enacted to “promote the general welfare of the nation” by remedying “‘the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of low income.’”2 The Housing Act authorized the federal government “to make loans to public-housing agencies of the several states or their political subdivisions with a view to assisting in the development, acquisition or administration of low-rent housing or slum-clearance projects.”3

To avail California of this federal funding,4 and recognizing a shortage of safe, affordable housing, our Legislature enacted the state Housing Authorities Law in 1938. 5 The Legislature declared that clearing areas of unsafe and insanitary dwellings, and constructing safe and sanitary housing projects for low-income people, were “public uses

1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1430. 2 Housing Authority of Los Angeles County v. Dockweiler (1939) 14 Cal.2d 437, 441, quoting then 42 U.S.C. §1401 (similar language now in 42 U.S.C. § 1437). 3 Ibid. 4 Id. at p. 443. 5 Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34200-34380 (Stats. 1938, Ex. Sess., p. 9).

2 15–1102 and purposes for which public money may be spent and private property acquired and are governmental functions of state concern . . . .”6 To address these concerns, the Housing Authorities Law created, in each county and city, a public corporation known as a housing authority, which is not authorized to operate until the governing body of the county or city declares a need for it.7 Each housing authority is governed by an appointed board of commissioners.8

1. May a Local Housing Authority Operate Throughout the State?

Our first question is whether a housing authority created by California’s Housing Authorities Law has statewide jurisdiction as a matter of state law. We begin our inquiry with the statutes that create and govern housing authorities. “Our primary task when faced with a question of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the Legislature, and we begin by looking to the statutory language.”9 In determining such intent, “[w]e must give ‘the language its usual, ordinary import and accord[] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’”10 If the statutory language is clear, we “follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.”11 The statutory language must be read “in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.”12

Here we are also guided by the tenet that if an agency is “created by statute, the agency’s authority is circumscribed by the relevant legislation.”13 “[I]t is well settled that

6 Health & Saf. Code, § 34201, subd. (c). 7 Health & Saf. Code, § 34240. 8 Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34270, 34271; see also § 34290. 9 McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group (2010) 48 Cal.4th 104, 110. Ibid., quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 10

1379, 1386-1387. 11 Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737. 12 Ibid. 13 Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Zingale (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, overruled on another point by legislation (Sen. Bill No. SB 842 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.), citing Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 299–300. See also 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 164, 165 (1955) (“It is axiomatic that the powers of public districts are derived from the statutes which create them and define their functions . . .”).

3 15–1102 administrative agencies have only the powers conferred on them, either expressly or by implication, by Constitution or statute,”14 and an agency cannot itself expand the scope of authority legislatively delegated to it.15 Our Supreme Court has explained that both local governments and housing authorities are “vested with specific duties and powers under the Housing Authorities Law and Housing Cooperation Law to effect a state objective. Neither is functioning independently of that state law. In pursuing the state objective each is governed by the state law and neither may exercise powers not vested or recognized by that law.”16

We first observe that housing authorities are created “[i]n each city and county,” and cannot operate in the first instance unless authorized by the locality in which they exist.17 Additionally, the Housing Authorities Law defines “areas of operation” for both city and county authorities. For a city authority, the area of operation:

includes the city and the area within five miles of its territorial boundaries. It does not include any area which lies within the territorial boundaries of another city unless the governing body of such other city has consented by resolution. It does not include any area which lies within the unincorporated area of any county for which an authority has been authorized to transact business. If a county authority becomes empowered to transact business and exercise its powers, a city authority empowered to transact business and exercise its powers in any of the unincorporated area of the county shall not initiate any further project within such unincorporated territory.18

A county authority’s area of operation:

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McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group
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Torres v. Board of Commissioners of the Housing Authority
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Walter W. v. Jacqueline W.
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Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
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