IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
CV12I2-~,~ ) 2 RICHARD J. UNTALAN AND EDWARD) CIVIL CASE NO. 3 G.UNTALAN, ~ w;
) 4 Plaintiffs, ) DECISION & ORDER ) 5 ) vs. ) 6 ) CHRISTOPHER STAHL, ) 7 ) Defendant. ) 8 ) ) 9 ---------------------------) 10 This matter came before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on October 26,2012. 11 Attorney Ron Moroni represented Defendant, who was present. Attorney Jacques G. Bronze 12 represented Plaintiff, who was present. The Court took the motion under advisement. After 13 having heard the Parties' arguments, considering the Parties' pleadings and the record, the Court 14 now issues the following Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 The background of this case rests on an agreement between Plaintiffs Richard J. U ntalan 17 and Edward G. Untalan (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") and Defendant Christopher Stahl (hereinafter 18 "Defendant"). The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on August 3, 2011 asking for damages, 19 interest and attorney's fees. The Defendant filed an Answer on September 9,2011 and Motion 20 for Judgment on the Pleadings on May 4, 2012. The Plaintiffs opposed the motion and filed a 21 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on August 16, 2012. In this Decision and Order, the 22 Court will only address the dispositive motion and cross-motion by the opposing Parties. To the 23 extent that other issues remain pending, the Court will address those issues in the future. 24 DISCUSSION 25 I. Summary Judgment or Judgment on the Pleadings 26 The Court deems Defendant's motion and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion as competing 27 motions for summary judgment. The Court makes such a conclusion based on the review of 28 information and argument outside of the pleadings. See GRCP Rule 12(c). Furthermore, the
Richard J Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-II - Page I of5 Court will address both motions in this Decision and Order pursuant to the Court's indication to
2 do so at the August 31, 2012 hearing.
3 II. Defendant's Motion 4 Standard for Summary Judgment 5 Summary judgment shall be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 6 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue exists when 7 there is sufficient evidence establishing a factual dispute requiring resolution by a fact-finder. 8 Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho In!'l Inc., 1997 Guam 10 ~ 7; T W Elect. Serv Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 9 Contractors Ass'n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The factual dispute must concern a 10 material fact. !d. Whether a fact is material is determined by the governing substantive law; if 11 the fact may affect the outcome, it is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 12 248,106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Edwards Co. v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 2000 Guam 27
13 ~ 7.
14 Inferences must be drawn, and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 15 the non-moving party, and the moving party carries the burden of showing the Court those 16 portions of the relevant documents which it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of 17 material fact. Edwards Co. v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 2000 Guam 27 ~ 7. The moving party is not 18 required to negate each element of the non-moving party's case. Rather, the moving party 19 satisfies and discharges its burden by establishing the absence of evidence to support the non- 20 moving party's case. Kim v. Hong, CVA97-007, 3 (1997). If a lack of evidence is established 21 by the moving party, the non-moving party must present specific facts showing there is a 22 genuine issue for trial. The non-moving party may not merely rely on conclusory allegations 23 contained in the pleadings, but must present some significant probative evidence tending to 24 support his assertion. !d. If the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 25 the existence of an element essential to that party's case, for which the party will bear the burden 26 of proof at trial, then Rule 56(c) requires entry of summary judgment against the non-moving 27 party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 31(1986).
Richard J Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl. Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-11 - Page 2 01'5- Controversy as to Material Facts 2 Defendant argues that the four year statute of limitations provided for in 7 GCA § 11303 3 bars the Plaintiff's complaint in this case. Defendant suggests that no controversy of material 4 facts exist and judgment should be entered in his favor. Defendant contends that Plaintiff 5 provided no affirmative pleading to explain why the complaint was not barred by the statute of 6 limitations as required under Amsden v. Yamon, 1999 Guam 14. 7 The Plaintiffs object to summary judgment by stating that the statute of limitations is 8 tolled when there is an acknowledgement of the debt. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that a 9 promissory estoppel argument prohibits the Defendant from winning in summary judgment. 10 Here, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs regarding the application of the Amsden 11 decision. The Amsden Court only required that Plaintiff "must plead facts which show an 12 excuse, tolling, or some other basis for avoiding the statutory bar." Amsden at ~12. The 13 Complaint contained several allegations that Defendant requested more time to become current 14 on the note at issue. Complaint at ~13. Defendant asked the Plaintiffs to "please hold on just a 15 little longer!" Id Therefore, the Complaint affirmatively plead facts that tend to prove an 16 exception to the statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs did not hide from the dates relevant to the 17 Complaint. They expressly stated the date of the note in the Complaint being "[o]n or about 18 March 24, 2004." Id at ~5. From the Complaint alone, it is clear that Plaintiffs intend to argue 19 that the statute of limitations is tolled from the factual allegations presented. The Court will not 20 dismiss the Complaint under Amsden as the Plaintiffs plead facts which tend to show tolling 21 occurred. 22 Furthermore, the tolling requirements may actually be met. If the facts presented in the 23 Complaint are true, Defendant made several acknowledgments of the debt and made additional 24 promises to prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing a civil claim. 1 Thus, the four years did not 25 begin until the breach of Defendant's final promise to payor his latest acknowledgment of the 26 debt. 7 GCA § 11412 may very well apply if either Party can convince the Court on the issue of 27 I A promise can easily be found where there is consideration. If proven at trial, the allegations that Defendant expressed a desire 28 to make payment in the hopes that the Plaintitfs would not take civil action show adequate consideration from both Parties.
Richard J Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-11 - Page 3 of5 whether Defendant's emails promising to pay should be deemed as signed writings or irrelevant 2 documents. 3 Furthermore, the Complaint did allege facts that indicated affirmatively that Defendant 4 acknowledged the debt. Complaint at 2-3. The Plaintiffs' Complaint does not violate the four 5 year statute of limitations provided in 7 GCA § 11303 as the Court currently views the case 6 based on the factual allegations presented in the Complaint. In addition, the Court has reviewed 7 all of Defendant's alleged defenses and no alleged defense is currently strong enough to warrant 8 dismissal of the complaint without additional evidence. Finally, the Court finds sufficient 9 material facts in controversy as to prohibit summary judgment.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
CV12I2-~,~ ) 2 RICHARD J. UNTALAN AND EDWARD) CIVIL CASE NO. 3 G.UNTALAN, ~ w;
) 4 Plaintiffs, ) DECISION & ORDER ) 5 ) vs. ) 6 ) CHRISTOPHER STAHL, ) 7 ) Defendant. ) 8 ) ) 9 ---------------------------) 10 This matter came before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on October 26,2012. 11 Attorney Ron Moroni represented Defendant, who was present. Attorney Jacques G. Bronze 12 represented Plaintiff, who was present. The Court took the motion under advisement. After 13 having heard the Parties' arguments, considering the Parties' pleadings and the record, the Court 14 now issues the following Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 The background of this case rests on an agreement between Plaintiffs Richard J. U ntalan 17 and Edward G. Untalan (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") and Defendant Christopher Stahl (hereinafter 18 "Defendant"). The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on August 3, 2011 asking for damages, 19 interest and attorney's fees. The Defendant filed an Answer on September 9,2011 and Motion 20 for Judgment on the Pleadings on May 4, 2012. The Plaintiffs opposed the motion and filed a 21 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on August 16, 2012. In this Decision and Order, the 22 Court will only address the dispositive motion and cross-motion by the opposing Parties. To the 23 extent that other issues remain pending, the Court will address those issues in the future. 24 DISCUSSION 25 I. Summary Judgment or Judgment on the Pleadings 26 The Court deems Defendant's motion and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion as competing 27 motions for summary judgment. The Court makes such a conclusion based on the review of 28 information and argument outside of the pleadings. See GRCP Rule 12(c). Furthermore, the
Richard J Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-II - Page I of5 Court will address both motions in this Decision and Order pursuant to the Court's indication to
2 do so at the August 31, 2012 hearing.
3 II. Defendant's Motion 4 Standard for Summary Judgment 5 Summary judgment shall be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 6 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue exists when 7 there is sufficient evidence establishing a factual dispute requiring resolution by a fact-finder. 8 Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho In!'l Inc., 1997 Guam 10 ~ 7; T W Elect. Serv Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 9 Contractors Ass'n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The factual dispute must concern a 10 material fact. !d. Whether a fact is material is determined by the governing substantive law; if 11 the fact may affect the outcome, it is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 12 248,106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Edwards Co. v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 2000 Guam 27
13 ~ 7.
14 Inferences must be drawn, and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 15 the non-moving party, and the moving party carries the burden of showing the Court those 16 portions of the relevant documents which it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of 17 material fact. Edwards Co. v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 2000 Guam 27 ~ 7. The moving party is not 18 required to negate each element of the non-moving party's case. Rather, the moving party 19 satisfies and discharges its burden by establishing the absence of evidence to support the non- 20 moving party's case. Kim v. Hong, CVA97-007, 3 (1997). If a lack of evidence is established 21 by the moving party, the non-moving party must present specific facts showing there is a 22 genuine issue for trial. The non-moving party may not merely rely on conclusory allegations 23 contained in the pleadings, but must present some significant probative evidence tending to 24 support his assertion. !d. If the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 25 the existence of an element essential to that party's case, for which the party will bear the burden 26 of proof at trial, then Rule 56(c) requires entry of summary judgment against the non-moving 27 party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 31(1986).
Richard J Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl. Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-11 - Page 2 01'5- Controversy as to Material Facts 2 Defendant argues that the four year statute of limitations provided for in 7 GCA § 11303 3 bars the Plaintiff's complaint in this case. Defendant suggests that no controversy of material 4 facts exist and judgment should be entered in his favor. Defendant contends that Plaintiff 5 provided no affirmative pleading to explain why the complaint was not barred by the statute of 6 limitations as required under Amsden v. Yamon, 1999 Guam 14. 7 The Plaintiffs object to summary judgment by stating that the statute of limitations is 8 tolled when there is an acknowledgement of the debt. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that a 9 promissory estoppel argument prohibits the Defendant from winning in summary judgment. 10 Here, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs regarding the application of the Amsden 11 decision. The Amsden Court only required that Plaintiff "must plead facts which show an 12 excuse, tolling, or some other basis for avoiding the statutory bar." Amsden at ~12. The 13 Complaint contained several allegations that Defendant requested more time to become current 14 on the note at issue. Complaint at ~13. Defendant asked the Plaintiffs to "please hold on just a 15 little longer!" Id Therefore, the Complaint affirmatively plead facts that tend to prove an 16 exception to the statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs did not hide from the dates relevant to the 17 Complaint. They expressly stated the date of the note in the Complaint being "[o]n or about 18 March 24, 2004." Id at ~5. From the Complaint alone, it is clear that Plaintiffs intend to argue 19 that the statute of limitations is tolled from the factual allegations presented. The Court will not 20 dismiss the Complaint under Amsden as the Plaintiffs plead facts which tend to show tolling 21 occurred. 22 Furthermore, the tolling requirements may actually be met. If the facts presented in the 23 Complaint are true, Defendant made several acknowledgments of the debt and made additional 24 promises to prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing a civil claim. 1 Thus, the four years did not 25 begin until the breach of Defendant's final promise to payor his latest acknowledgment of the 26 debt. 7 GCA § 11412 may very well apply if either Party can convince the Court on the issue of 27 I A promise can easily be found where there is consideration. If proven at trial, the allegations that Defendant expressed a desire 28 to make payment in the hopes that the Plaintitfs would not take civil action show adequate consideration from both Parties.
Richard J Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-11 - Page 3 of5 whether Defendant's emails promising to pay should be deemed as signed writings or irrelevant 2 documents. 3 Furthermore, the Complaint did allege facts that indicated affirmatively that Defendant 4 acknowledged the debt. Complaint at 2-3. The Plaintiffs' Complaint does not violate the four 5 year statute of limitations provided in 7 GCA § 11303 as the Court currently views the case 6 based on the factual allegations presented in the Complaint. In addition, the Court has reviewed 7 all of Defendant's alleged defenses and no alleged defense is currently strong enough to warrant 8 dismissal of the complaint without additional evidence. Finally, the Court finds sufficient 9 material facts in controversy as to prohibit summary judgment. Summary judgment, or 10 judgment on pleadings, is not currently appropriate and Defendant's motion is denied. 11 II. Plaintiffs' Motion 12 The Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment will be reviewed applying the 13 same standard discussed above. The Court also applies the same analysis from above in the 14 determination of the issue of whether dispute as to material facts exists. The Plaintiffs argue 15 that no material issues are in dispute? 16 As explained above, the Court finds sufficient material facts in controversy to prohibit 17 summary judgment at this stage in the case. The Court has concerns over material facts that 18 may affect the Plaintiffs' claims for promissory estoppel or request for damages under a breach 19 of contract claim. As to each of the defenses alleged by Defendant, the current state of the facts 20 is insufficient for the Court to find summary judgment appropriate. Only at trial, with the 21 presentation of witnesses and after a complete review of all relevant evidence, can the finder of 22 fact rule on all material facts alleged in this case. For example, the Court could not possibly 23 make a ruling on which note is the note to have been breached, which email serves as the valid 24 tolling instrument, if any, and whether any of the alleged defenses are supported by the 25 evidence. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that many, if not all, of the remaining issues 26 27 2The Court believes it to be mildly disingenuous for the Plaintiffs to argue that trial controversy exists while opposing Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings but then argue that no material issues offact are in dispute while requesting 28 summary judgment from the Court.
Richard J. Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl. Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-11 - Page 401'5- relate to legal conclusions. Yet, the facts relevant to those legal conclusions need to be more
2 fully fleshed out. 3 CONCLUSION
4 The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Plaintiffs'
5 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. A Status Hearing is scheduled for January
6 28,2013 at 9:00a.m .. 7 So ORDERED this _ day ofDece~r, 2012.
8 ,h /t//. , 9 OONORABLE VERNON P. PE Z 10 JUDGE, SUPER10R COURT OF GUAM 11
22 23
24 25
26 27
Richard J. Untalan and Edward G. Untalan v. Christopher Stahl, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV1212-11 - Page 5 of5