Unocal Pipeline Co. v. Kennedy

898 So. 2d 395, 2004 La. App. LEXIS 3208, 2004 WL 3016017
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 30, 2004
DocketNo. 2003 CA 1946, 2003 CA 1947
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 898 So. 2d 395 (Unocal Pipeline Co. v. Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Unocal Pipeline Co. v. Kennedy, 898 So. 2d 395, 2004 La. App. LEXIS 3208, 2004 WL 3016017 (La. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

RPARRO, J.

This case involves an appeal by the Louisiana Department of Revenue from a district court judgment granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of a corporate taxpayer and ordering' it to refund $909,241.08 and $222,895.53' in taxes that were paid under protest, based on a finding that the taxpayer’s income from its interest in an unincorporated association was income from a partnership under LSA-R.S. 47:287.92. For the following reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

Factual Background and Procedural History

In 1986, Pure Transportation Company was merged into Unocal Pipeline Company (Unocal), formerly Union Alaska Pipeline Company, which held at that time less than a two percent interest in Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), a pipeline system used to transport crude oil from one point in the state of Alaska to another. By virtue of its status as an unincorporated association, TAPS was treated as a tax partnership for federal and Louisiana income tax purposes and was, therefore, subject to the provisions of Subchapter K (Sections 701-777) of Subtitle A of' the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and similar Louisiana tax law provisions. Pursuant to the applicable provisions of the IRC and Louisiana tax laws, the owners of TAPS, including Unocal’s predecessor-in-interest, made-a decision to “elect out” of the application of the provisions of Subchapter K and similar state law provisions, and this election was approved by the appropriate authorities.

The dispute in this case arises over how Unocal should treat, on its Louisiana corporation income tax return, the income that it receives as a result of its ownership interest in the TAPS tax partnership in light of its election. Louisiana corporation income tax law, LSA-R.S. 47:287.92(B)(6),1 requires that income from a partnership be treated differently from other corporate income, in that such income must be allocated to the state where that income was earned. On the other hand, if the income from TAPS does not constitute income from a partnership, it is apportioned among those states in which Unocal does business.

| ^Unocal advocated that its share of income from TAPS constitutes income from a partnership. Because that income was earned by TAPS in Alaska, Unocal submits that its share of that income should be allocated to Alaska for corporation income tax purposes. On the other hand, the Louisiana Department of Revenue (Department) maintains that because the owners of TAPS elected out of the provisions of Subchapter K of the IRC and similar state law provisions, the income Unocal received from its interest in TAPS was not partnership income for state income tax purposes. Therefore, the legal issue to be resolved in this case is whether the income generated by a partnership that elects out of the requirements of Sub-chapter K of the IRC and similar state law provisions still constitutes income from a [397]*397partnership for purposes of LSA-R.S. 47:287.92(B)(6).

In reporting the income it received from TAPS in 1986 and 1987, Unocal apportioned such income on its corporation income tax return for those' years and paid the resulting taxes. During its initial audit, the Department determined that the income Unocal received from TAPS constituted income from a partnership pursuant to LSA-R.S. 47:287.92. Therefore, such income for 1986, 1987, and 1988 was considered by the Department to be allocable. Pursuant to the Department’s determination, Unocal filed a request for a refund with the Department for the taxes that had erroneously been paid for 1986, 1987, and 1988. Subsequently, the Department changed its position, recognizing that only the income received from TAPS in 1986 constituted income from a partnership.

With Unocal’s claim for a refund pending before the Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals (Board) and its failure to report the income received from TAPS as appor-tionable income on its Louisiana corporation income tax returns for 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992, the Department (in 1996) proposed to assess taxes, together with interest, against Unocal for those years in the amount of $869,488.29. By notice dated May 5, 1997, the Department proposed to assess additional interest against Unocal in the amount of $39,752.79. Unocal paid these amounts to the Department under protest and subsequently filed a petition in district court for a refund of taxes paid | ¿under protest.2 In 1998, the Department proposed to assess additional taxes and interest in the amount of $220,895.53 against Unocal for 1993.3 Unocal again paid the amount under protest and filed an action in district court for the return of this amount.4 Unocal’s two actions for a refund in the district court were consolidated for trial.

Prior to trial, Unocal filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have the district court determine the classification of the income received by it from TAPS. The hearing on this motion was delayed pending the resolution by the Board of Unocal’s refund claim concerning its 1987 and 1988 payment of taxes, which involved the same issue as the consolidated cases pending before the district court. In written reasons for judgment, the Board concluded'that Unocal’s election under Section 761 of the IRC did not change TAPS’s status as a partnership for the purposes of LSA-R.S. 47:287.92(B). Therefore, the Board vacated the Department’s assessment'for the 1987 and 1988 tax years, insofar as the Department sought to tax a portion of Unocal’s income from TAPS, on the theory that such income did not qualify as partnership income under LSA-R.S. 47:287.92(B).

In light of the Board’s decision in its favor on the issue in question, Unocal renewed its motion for summary judgment, prompting the Department to file a cross-motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing on these matters, the district court, like the Board, held that the income Unocal had received from its interest in TAPS constituted income from a partnership under LSA-R.S. 47:287.92. Accordingly, the district court ruled that Unocal was entitled to refunds of $909,241.08 and $222,895.53, which had been paid by it [398]*398under protest. Thus, a judgment was entered granting Unocal’s motion for summary judgment and denying the cross-motion filed by the Department. The Department appealed.

\ Summary Judgment

Summary judgments are reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 750. A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Jarrell v. Carter, 632 So.2d 321, 323 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993), writ denied, 94-0700 (La.4/29/94), 637 So.2d 467. The summary judgment procedure is favored and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2); Rambo v. Walker, 96-2538 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/7/97), 704 So.2d 30, 32. The motion should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). The parties concede that there are no genuine issues of material fact.

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Bluebook (online)
898 So. 2d 395, 2004 La. App. LEXIS 3208, 2004 WL 3016017, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/unocal-pipeline-co-v-kennedy-lactapp-2004.