Univest Bank v. Pandya, J.

Opinion

J-A14004-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

UNIVEST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JIGNESH N. PANDYA, MITAL PANDYA : : : No. 2445 EDA 2025 APPEAL OF: SOUTHERN SHOALS, LLC :

Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-04916

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2026

Appellant, Southern Shoals, LLC, appeals from the August 19, 2025

order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which, inter alia,

denied Appellant’s petition to set aside the Sheriff’s sale of property formerly

owned by Jignesh N. Pandya and Mital Pandya (“Debtors”). After careful

review, we affirm.

The following is the relevant factual and procedural history of this

litigation involving Debtors’ former residence at 8 Woodland Road in Newtown

(“the Property”). In December 2011, Appellee, Univest Bank and Trust

Company, issued to Debtors a $3,920,000 promissory note secured by a

mortgage on the Property (“Note”). In August 2023, Appellee filed a mortgage

foreclosure complaint after Debtors defaulted with an outstanding balance of

approximately $2.7 million on the Note. J-A14004-26

On February 9, 2024, Debtors filed for bankruptcy in federal bankruptcy

court, resulting in an automatic stay under the United States Bankruptcy

Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

On February 15, 2024, while the automatic stay was in effect, Appellee

obtained a default judgment against Debtors in the Bucks County Court of

Common Pleas.

On March 8, 2024, the bankruptcy court dismissed Debtors’ bankruptcy

case.

On June 3, 2024, Appellant, which is a judgment creditor of Debtors,

obtained title to the Property via a Sheriff’s deed. Appellant asserts that it

executed on the Property after domesticating into Pennsylvania a New York

judgment of $4.37 million against Debtors. Appellant’s Br. at 5, 8.

Upon Appellee’s request, the Sheriff listed the Property for a Sheriff’s

sale on September 13, 2024. On September 11, 2024, Appellant filed an

emergency petition to intervene as the owner of the Property and to stay the

sale, claiming that Appellee’s default judgment was void because Appellee

filed it while the automatic bankruptcy stay was in effect. The next day,

Appellee filed a notice continuing the Sheriff’s sale until November 8, 2024.

In the interim, Appellee sought relief in bankruptcy court. On November

1, 2024, the bankruptcy court granted Appellee’s motion to reopen the case

and ordered that “[t]the automatic stay of all proceedings, as provided in

Section 362 of the [Bankruptcy Code], is modified, nunc pro tunc, to February

9, 2024 with respect to [the Property].” In re: Pandya, Case No. 24-10440-

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amc, Order (Bankr. E.D. Pa. dated Nov. 1, 2024) (capitalization omitted). The

order explicitly permitted Appellee “to proceed with its state court remedies

as to the Property including, but not limited to causing the Property to be

offered at Sheriff’s [s]ale [and] permitting the Sheriff to issue deeds to any

purchasers at the Sheriff’s sale[.]” Id.

On November 8, 2024, the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas

entered an order granting Appellant’s emergency petition to intervene and

stay the Sheriff’s sale of the Property scheduled for the same day. 1 The court

postponed the sale to January 10, 2025. Relevant to issues on appeal, the

order additionally stated as follows: “No further continuance of Sheriff’s sale

shall be granted, and no further advertising or notice to lienholders required.”

Order, 11/8/24 (some capitalization omitted). The order also stated that

“[Appellee] shall provide a full payoff to Intervenors within 10 days from th[e

o]rder and shall accept that payoff from Intervenors[] if tendered prior to the

sale date.” Id.

On January 10, 2025, the day of the scheduled Sherriff’s sale, Appellee

requested a continuance of the sale to permit the bankruptcy court to address

Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the order granting nunc pro tunc

modification of the stay. Appellant avers that Appellee did not serve Appellant

with this filing. On the same day, utilizing Appellee’s preprinted order, the

Bucks County court postponed the Sheriff’s sale and set a new sale date of

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1 The Honorable Jeffery G. Trauger entered the November 11, 2024 order.

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February 14, 2025. The court mandated that the postponement be announced

at the January 10, 2025 Sheriff’s sale. Relevantly, the court struck language

of Appellee’s pre-printed order which would have expressly exempted Appellee

from future notice requirements related to the sale. 2

Following the federal bankruptcy court’s denial of reconsideration of its

order granting nunc pro tunc modification of the stay, Appellee purchased the

Property at the February 14, 2025 Sheriff’s sale for costs totaling $1,545.69.

On February 24, 2025, Appellant filed a petition to set aside the

February 14, 2025 Sheriff’s sale, asserting (1) that it had not received notice

of Appellee’s motion to continue the January 10, 2025 Sheriff’s Sale or (2)

Appellee’s notice of the new sale date of February 14, 2025, and (3) that

Appellee failed to advertise the February 2025 sale date, which Appellant

contended the January 10, 2024 order required. In the alternative, Appellant

sought a stay of the issuance of a Sheriff’s deed to Appellee pending

Appellant’s appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order denying reconsideration.

2 The Honorable Jordan B. Yeager entered the January 10, 2025 order. The following is the language that the court struck:

Ordered that no further notice or advertising of the sale of the Property, whether at the January 10, 2025 sale or any subsequent sale to which the January 10, 2025 sale of the Property is postponed, is required and that any further postponement can be made by [Appellee] by sending a letter, telecopy, facsimile, or electronic mail to the Bucks County Sheriff’s Office.

Order, January 10, 2025 (language struck from order).

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On March 12, 2025, the Bucks County court stayed proceedings

“pending the outcome of the appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s Order

denying [Appellant’s] Motion for Reconsideration[.]” Order, 3/12/25.

Appellant, however, had not filed an appeal but rather a motion to extend

time for appeal, which the bankruptcy court denied.

On August 15, 2025, the trial court entered an order (1) granting

Appellee’s motion to remove the March 12, 2025 stay; (2) denying Appellant’s

petition to intervene; and (3) denying Appellant’s motion to set aside the

Sheriff’s Sale and ordered that “[t]he process of executing and recording a

Sheriff’s Deed as to [the Property] shall proceed[.]” Order, 8/15/25. On

August 25, 2025, Appellee recorded the Sheriff’s deed.

On September 17, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and violate [d]ue [p]rocess by refusing to set aside a Sheriff’s Sale where the owner of the Property obtained a postponement [o]rder that specifically struck language excusing further notice, and the foreclosing plaintiff admittedly failed to either re-advertise or serve the [o]wner with notice of the new sale date?

2. Is the Sheriff[’]s Sale void ab initio because the underlying [d]efault [j]udgment was entered on February 15, 2024, six days after [Debtors] filed for [b]ankruptcy protection, in knowing violation of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law by denying Appellant’s [p]etition to [i]ntervene, thereby denying standing to the record fee simple owner of the [P]roperty to protect its interest against defective execution procedures?

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Appellant’s Br. at 4.

Appellant first challenges the court’s refusal to set aside the February

14, 2025 Sheriff’s sale. The decision to set aside a Sheriff’s sale implicates a

court’s equitable powers, and thus, “this Court will not reverse the trial court’s

decision absent an abuse of discretion.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Lark, 73

A.3d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2013). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an

error of judgment[;]” rather, an abuse of discretion occurs only where a court

overrides or misapplies the law or where the judgment is manifestly

unreasonable or “the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown

by the evidence of record[.]” Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Zumar, 205 A.3d

1241, 1245 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Our Rules of Civil Procedure instruct that, prior to delivery of the

Sheriff’s deed, a “court may, upon proper cause shown, set aside [a Sheriff’s]

sale and order a resale or enter any other order which may be just and proper

under the circumstances.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 3132. Courts have set aside Sheriff’s

sales “where the validity of the sale proceedings is challenged, a deficiency

pertaining to the notice of the sale exists, or where misconduct occurs in the

bidding process.” Irwin Union Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d

1099, 1102 (Pa. Super. 2010). The party seeking to set aside a Sheriff’s sale

has the “burden of proving circumstances warranting the exercise of the

court’s equitable powers” and, in cases involving notice, that any alleged

inadequate notice resulted in prejudice. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota Nat’l

Ass’n v. Barron, 230 A.3d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

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Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.1-3129.3 set forth notice requirements related to

Sheriff’s sales “to protect fundamental rights of due process by insuring that

persons with an interest in real estate would receive adequate notice before

being deprived of their property.” Barron, 230 A.3d at 1272 (citation

omitted). Notice “must be reasonably calculated to inform interested parties

of the pending action[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Relevantly, Rule 3129

mandates the provision of new notice and advertising when a sale is

postponed except where (1) “a special order of the court” provides otherwise

or (2) the new sale date is within 130 days of prior scheduled sale, for which

the movant had provided proper notice. 3 Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.3.

Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

set aside the February 14, 2025 Sheriff’s sale, when Appellant “will lose its

property interest without ever having received notice or an opportunity to be

heard[,]” in violation of its due process rights. Appellant’s Br. at 22, 17-22.

Specifically, Appellant posits that Appellee had a duty to notify Appellant of

the revised sale date because Appellant was the Property’s owner of record.

Id. at 17-18. Addressing the November 8, 2024 order, Appellant rejects

Appellee’s claim that the order relieved Appellee of all advertising and notice

requirements, arguing instead that the order’s notice exemption related solely

3 It appears that the exemption for a postponement of less than 130 days is

not applicable in the instant case where the original sale date was September 13, 2024, 154 days prior to the sale on February 14, 2025.

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to the January 10, 2025 sale.4 Id. at 20-21. Turning to the January 10, 2025

order, Appellant argues that the court’s striking of Appellee’s proposed

language exempting Appellee from notice requirements “functions as an

explicit judicial command that the standard notice requirements of Pa.R.Civ.P.

3129.3 remained in force.” Id. at 19. Finally, Appellant contends that it

should have received notice as it was an intervenor, pursuant to the November

2024 order, and therefore a party requiring service pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.

440. Id. at 21.

After review, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to set aside the February 2025 Sheriff’s sale. The court found

Appellant’s claims based on lack of notice unavailing. It emphasized that

Appellant had “discovered” the originally scheduled September 2024 Sheriff’s

sale, as it sought emergency intervention, and was aware of the November

date as it requested to stay that sale. Trial Ct. Op. at 12-13. The court

recounted that the postponement to January 2025 resulted from Appellant’s

own filing in federal bankruptcy court related to the sale proceedings. The

court faulted Appellant for failing to act with diligence noting that “Appellant

had every reason to stay aware of any continuance of the Sheriff’s Sale

because their opportunity to payoff the note was set to expire if the Property

4 Appellant asserts that the November 8, 2024 order explicitly provided that

“no further advertising or notice to lienholders will be required for the January 10, 2025 sale date.” Appellant’s Br. at 9, 20. A review of the order, however, reveals that the relevant sentence does not include the relevant phrase “for the January 10, 2025 sale date.” Order, 11/8/24.

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was sold.” Id. at 13, 15-16. The court also emphasizes that Appellant

“bought the property subject to [Appellee’s] mortgage” and that it “had ample

time to pay off the mortgage if it wished to retain the Property[.]” Id. at 19.

We conclude that the record supports the court’s findings and reveals

Appellant’s active involvement in the relevant proceedings, such that it was

not prejudiced by the lack of formal notice. Barron, 230 A.3d at 1272. Thus,

Appellant failed to meet its burden of showing the trial court’s equitable

determination was “manifestly unreasonable” or “the result of partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Zumar, 205 A.3d at 1245 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, this issue warrants no relief. 5

Appellant’s second issue invokes Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code,

which provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay” of

“the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other

action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been

commenced before the commencement of the case under [the Bankruptcy

Code.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Nevertheless, “it is well established that a

bankruptcy court has the power to modify a stay.” Graziani v. Randolph,

887 A.2d 1244, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2005); see generally 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Indeed, “a bankruptcy court may afford retroactive relief from the automatic

5 As we find the court’s analysis of prejudice sufficient, we do not address the

court’s other rationales based upon the coordinate jurisdiction rule and law of the case. Id. at 13-14.

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stay even as to litigation initiated after the filing of a bankruptcy petition.”

Graziani, 887 A.2d at 1247.

Appellant claims that the February 15, 2024 default judgment entered

in Appellee’s favor was void ab initio because it occurred while the automatic

bankruptcy stay was in effect. Appellant’s Br. at 23-27. Appellant contends

that the federal bankruptcy court’s grant of nunc pro tunc modification of the

stay cannot remedy the state judgment that was void when it was entered.

Id. at 25. Appellant asserts that the Sheriff’s sale is a “nullity” because the

underlying default judgment is void ab initio. Id. at 27.

We reject Appellant’s argument. As noted above, a bankruptcy court

has the authority to “afford retroactive relief from the automatic stay.”

Graziani, 887 A.2d at 1247. In the instant case, the bankruptcy court

explicitly utilized that authority to modify the automatic stay to permit

Appellee “to proceed with its state court remedies as to the Property including

but not limited to causing the Property to be offered at Sheriff’s Sale.” In re:

Pandya, Case No. 24-10440-amc, Order (Bankr. E.D. Pa. dated Nov. 1,

2024). Appellant’s grievance lies not with the state court’s order refusing to

set aside the Sheriff’s sale but with the bankruptcy court’s order modifying

the stay—an order which Appellant failed to appeal timely. Accordingly, we

deny Appellant relief on this issue.

Appellant’s final issue addresses the trial court’s purported denial of

intervention. Appellant’s Br. at 28-30. We need not address the merits as we

conclude that Appellant waived this issue by failing to include it in the twenty

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questions raised in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)

(mandating waiver of issues not raised in the statement). 6

As none of Appellant’s issues warrant relief, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Date: 7/24/2026

6 Moreover, we recognize that, while the court denied intervention in the August 15, 2025 order, it had previously granted Appellant‘s petition to intervene on November 8, 2024, the docket sheet lists Appellant as “Intervenor,” and Appellant was actively involved in this litigation. Thus, Appellant did not suffer any prejudice from the August 15, 2025 denial of intervention.

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