Universal Winding Co. v. Gibbs Machine Co.

179 F. Supp. 394, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2389
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedDecember 24, 1959
DocketCiv. A. Nos. C-90-G-58, C-91-G-58, C-235-G-58
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 179 F. Supp. 394 (Universal Winding Co. v. Gibbs Machine Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Universal Winding Co. v. Gibbs Machine Co., 179 F. Supp. 394, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2389 (M.D.N.C. 1959).

Opinion

JOHNSON J. HAYES, District Judge.

1. In these three cases a motion to dismiss for want of an indispensable party has been made by each of the defendants in the above cases. Warren A. Seem, Nicholas J. Stoddard, Fred Tecce and Harold P. Berger, co-partners, doing business under the name of Perma-twist, had pending in the United States Patent Office applications for the issu-. anee of patent bearing numbers: 401,-803; 401,951, and 401,952, upon which U. S. Letters Patent No. 2,803,105 has been granted by the United States Patent Office. The partnership above referred to will hereinafter be referred to as Permatwist without calling the names of the individual partners, and the Universal Winding Company will hereinafter be referred to as Universal.

2. On the 14th day of December, 1954, a written contract was entered into between Permatwist and Universal, comprising 19 pages, with a one-page exhibit attached and made a part thereof. The construction of this contract is necessary in the determination of whether Permatwist is an indispensable party in the three suits named above. It is the contention of the defendants that it is an indispensable party and Universal contends that it is not. Permatwist is not within the jurisdiction of this court and has not seen fit to come in voluntarily and make itself a party, and it has been stated by counsel for the plaintiff that Permatwist is not willing to come in voluntarily and become a party plaintiff.

3. If Permatwist by its contract of December, 1954, parted with all of its right, title and interest in and to the application, including the patent issued thereon, then it would not be an indispensable party. The defendants contend that the contract between the parties shows clearly that at most Universal is only an assignee to make and sell and license for use the devices and processes embodied in the applications and patent. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that Universal acquired the absolute title to the applications and patent issued thereon and that the contract between the parties merely covers the mode and amount of compensation which Universal would pay.

In the margin1 pertinent portions of the 1954 contract are set out.

[396]*396Three written documents deal with the subject matter; the over-all contract of December, 1954, the assignment of the patent in 1956, and the supplemental [397]*397contract of October, 1958. They deal with the “invention” owned by Perma-twist, the pending applications together with any patent issuing thereon or . on [398]*398improvements thereafter upon which patents are granted.

The assignment is an absolute transfer and in accordance with the 1954 agreement. The 1958 supplemental contract in no manner alters the substance of the 1954 agreement.

It is well settled that the owner of a patent may transfer the entire monopoly to make, use and sell the invention and any transfer of less than the whole monopoly leaves in the patentee such a substantial interest of ownership that he is an indispensable party. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 43 S.Ct. 254, 67 L.Ed. 516. The patent owner, whether in whole or in part, has such an interest therein that its validity ought not to be litigated in his absence. Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., D.C., 135 F.Supp. 505.

The name applied to the document of transfer is not decisive, but the legal effect of the terms used in the document will determine whether a transfer is an assignment or a license. E. W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 187, 192, 40 S.Ct. 455, 64 L.Ed. 852. Applying this test to the principal contract, and observing the meticulous care and scope of this lengthy agreement, certain deductions therefrom are inescapable, first of which is the fact that the author of the document was an experienced lawyer thoroughly familiar with patent law who understood patent language and terms. He knew the great distinction between a license and an assignment. While the terms, “license” and “licensees,” are used throughout the agreement in connection with those dealing with Universal with respect to the patent, never is Universal mentioned as a licensee of Permatwist, nor is the agreement mentioned as a license; on the contrary, the name “assignment” is repeated again and again.

The subject matter of the agreement is likewise significant. The invention; the applications thereon pending in the Patent Office, any patents granted thereon or on any improvements thereon resulting in subsequent patents. All of these rights are pointedly included in the agreement.

Then the language employed in respect to the above rights which appear in Paragraph 2 presumably mean what they so clearly state: “Permatwist does hereby sell, assign, transfer and set over all of its right, title and interest in, of and to” the invention, the applications and patents granted thereon or any improvement thereon. This language is repeated again in (a), (b) and (c) of Paragraph 2. If, by some magic in construction, we could obliterate the legal meaning of these words of. legal import that the “memory of man runneth not to the contrary,” the last sentence in the paragraph would still confront us: “That Permatwist covenants and agrees that they will execute and deliver to Universal such transfers, assignments, bills of sale and other documents as may be required to effectuate the provisions of this paragraph.” The foregoing language is utterly inconsistent with a li[399]*399cense and can be construed only as an outright sale and transfer of everything —right and interest — pertaining to the invention and to patents granted thereon.

This construction is further buttressed by the terms employed in Paragraph 3: “That in consideration of the transfers made in Paragraph ‘2’ hereof, Universal covenants and agrees to pay to Perma-twist, as the full purchase price thereof,” —then follows the sums and the method of calculation. It is clear that an assignment and not a mere license is the legal term employed and intended. The court is bound by the language employed in the document if its meaning is clear and unambiguous. It cannot make a contract nor substitute an intention or meaning which does violence to the plain and obvious meaning of words which were obviously employed to express and do express the intention of the contracting parties.

The defendants urge that the agreement only conveys the right to make, vend, and to license others to use, thus coming under the doctrine of Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 11 S.Ct. 334, 34 L.Ed. 923. There is no merit in this contention. Here the conveying terms include all the interests in and rights to the invention, the applications and patents granted thereon. Conveying the patent carries with it the rights to make, use and vend.

When the transferring instrument conveys, as it does here, the entire monopoly, its legal effect is not altered by the obligations imposed upon themselves; it is still an assignment, not a mere license.

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179 F. Supp. 394, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2389, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/universal-winding-co-v-gibbs-machine-co-ncmd-1959.