Universal Underwriters Insurance Co v. John Swenson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 24-1939
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 24-1939 ____________

UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

JOHN SWENSON, Appellant

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3:21-cv-00259) District Judge: Honorable Julia K. Munley ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 2, 2025

Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 3, 2025)

OPINION* ____________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

John Swenson appeals the District Court’s summary judgment for Universal

Underwriters Insurance Company. We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by

the District Court in its cogent opinion.

I

While driving a truck for his employer, Kress Auto Wreckers, Swenson was

involved in a collision with an underinsured motorist. Because his injuries resulted in

costly medical bills, Swenson requested repayment from Kress’s insurer, Universal.

At the time of Swenson’s accident, Universal insured Kress employees against

bodily injuries caused by underinsured motorists. Kress’s 2008–2009 policy provided an

underinsured motorist coverage limit of $35,000, except for certain “designated

individuals” who would be covered up to $300,000. App. 584 (capitalization altered). But

unlike prior versions—which had identified Kress’s co-owners as “designated

individuals”—the 2008–2009 policy left the “list [of] designated individuals” section

blank. Id. (capitalization altered).

Because Kress’s policy did not list Swenson as a “designated individual,”

Universal offered the basic policy limit of $35,000. But Swenson pressed for more. In his

view, the policy’s silence as to “designated individuals” meant that all insureds were

entitled to $300,000 in coverage. To resolve this disagreement, Universal filed a

declaratory judgment action in the District Court. Following discovery, Universal moved

for summary judgment.

The District Court granted Universal’s motion. It reasoned that the insurance

2 policy unambiguously “provided coverage higher than $35,000 for designated

individuals, and [Swenson was] not listed as a designated individual.” Universal

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Swenson, 2024 WL 1683636, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2024).

The Court rejected Swenson’s contention that an empty list of “designated individuals”

entitled all insureds to $300,000 in coverage, noting that he “cited no authority” for this

alternative view. Id. So the Court granted Universal summary judgment and issued a

declaratory judgment. Swenson timely appealed.1

II2

Swenson makes largely the same argument on appeal that he made before the

District Court: because the 2008–2009 policy did not list any “designated individuals,”

all insureds are entitled to $300,000 in coverage. And to the extent that the policy is

ambiguous with respect to additional coverage, he says, the ambiguity should be resolved

against Universal, the policy’s drafter. Like the District Court, we are unpersuaded.

Under Pennsylvania law, the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous “if they

are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of

facts.” Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999).

As for Swenson’s claim, there is only one reasonable interpretation of the 2008–2009

1 The District Court also rejected Swenson’s “stacking” theory of coverage. He does not appeal that portion of the District Court’s opinion. 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is de novo. Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 939 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2019).

3 policy. “[D]esignated individuals” may access $300,000 in coverage; all other insureds

are limited to $35,000. App. 584 (capitalization altered). Because Swenson is insured but

not a “designated individual[],” his coverage is capped at $35,000. Id. (capitalization

altered).

Swenson’s alternative interpretation is untenable. It is strange that Kress

designated no beneficiaries for its additional coverage. But Swenson’s reading—that all

insureds are “designated individuals”—would be stranger still. On his view, the policy’s

exception would swallow the rule, completely nullifying the baseline coverage of

$35,000. We decline to “resort to [this] strained contrivance in order to find an

ambiguity.” Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment.