Universal Rim Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

7 F.2d 24, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJuly 18, 1925
DocketNo. 4186
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 7 F.2d 24 (Universal Rim Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Universal Rim Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 7 F.2d 24, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472 (6th Cir. 1925).

Opinion

DENISON, Circuit Judge.

This is the usual patent infringement suit, based on claims 1 and 9, and 2 and 6, of patent No. 1,095,775, for a demountable rim, issued to Universal Rim Company, as assignee of Baker, on May 5, 1914, upon an application filed June 13, 1910. The specified claims are quoted in the margin.1 The District Court dismissed the bill.

As the automobile art had developed some little time before 1910, the pneumatic tires in common use were of two classes — those in which the beads were elastic and those which had nonextensible beads. The rims which carried these tires necessarily had inside and outside flanges to prevent the tires from slipping off. Where the beads were elastic, and when it was necessary to remove a tire from the rim, the tire could be stretched over the outside flange; but with the nonextensible beads this could not be done. Hence it was necessary to make the outer flange removable, and it became a ring separable •from the rim of which it was functionally a part. This was the situation of the art when it was observed that the tire could be carried upon an independent or demountable rim, distinct from the permanent or felly rim, and in this way a spare tire could be carried, inflated and ready for quick substitution when necessary. This demountable rim was held in position upon the felly by various methods. One means, well known before the invention of the patent in suit, consisted in making the demountable rim substantially larger than the felly band, providing wedges or wedge connections between [25]*25the two, and then by bolts and nuts tightening the wedge connection until there was a rigid holding. This was known as the “bolted-on construction,” and is what is thus referred to in the claims.

Obviously there was the same problem as with a permanent rim in getting the tire past or over the outer rim flange; and, in view of the fact that the nonextensible form of head had many advantages appealing for general use, and that a separate ring flange upon a demountable rim was more or less impracticable, other means were desirable for getting the tire onto the rim. This had been done by making the rim collapsible, and either making two or three joints so that sections of the rim could be turned inwardly, or making one split, tranversely through the rim, leaving two opposed free ends, one of which could be permitted to slip under the other, and the rim, on account of its spring tension construction, Would then collapse sufficiently to allow the tire to pass over the outer flange. These free ends were then restored to their opposed position and suitably held there. Baker’s invention pertained to the class of rim with the single transverse split.

Upon this record Baker was the first man in the United States who ever made a split rim and attached it with wedge bolts, without any dependence upon outside restraining means. The record also indicates that the enormous and well-nigh universal adoption of the idea thus broadly stated is fairly to be credited, in a commercial sense, to Baker and to his commercial efforts. Under such circumstances, the ease for the patentee is a strong one, and his claims cannot be narrowly construed, or held void for lack of invention unless these defenses are most clearly made out; but no amount of commercial success will justify sustaining a monopoly, where it is made clearly and certainly to appear that the step taken by the patentee did not involve any inventive merit.

It is quite plain that some of the claims (it is sufficient to specify claim 1) contain language which is ambiguous, in the sense that without distortion it will read upon a great variety of structures, including defendant’s form, and yet, by referring to the specifications and drawings for interpretation, may be much restricted. For example, claim 1 calls for “a plate extending across said split.” Even if given a somewhat liberal construction, this might be interpreted as confined to a plate of the general type and function shown in the drawing, or it might be read still more broadly as covering any suitable gap-spanning bridge. Hence it is desirable to know the state of the art, as affecting the breadth of construction which can rightly be given, and to know the defendant’s form of device, as indicating the breadth of construction which must be given in order to reach the particular defendant now sued. A conclusion in favor of a defendant may rest upon a holding that there was no invention involved, or a holding that, under a proper construction of the claims, defendant does not infringe, or a holding that, if the claims are given a construction which supports the finding of infringement, they will be too broad to be valid. Which line is best to be followed will depend upon the facts of the case.

The devices of the patent drawing and of the defendant, said to infringe, are shown in the following cuts. Plaintiff’s different forms, which have had commercial success, approximate that of defendant more than they do ihat of the patent drawing:

Taking up the prior art: The conclusions of the District Court were based largely upon a French patent to Boquillon, and the [26]*26argument in this court has been largely devoted to that patent. The questions are whether Boquillon antedated Baker’s invention, whether the French patent substantially disclosed the characteristic thought of Baker, and whether certain language in the French specifications as to permissible variations was a sufficient prophecy of Baker’s final step. We think best to pass by all these questions without intimation of opinion, and rest our conclusion upon what seem to us compelling reasons, found at home.

Baker’s application was filed in June, 1910. He does not undertake to put his conception of the broad thought of his invention — that is, a combination of the single split rim, the bolted-on construction, and the rim ends interholding means — earlier than the fall of'1908. Before that date there were two existing United States applications for patents which are material. They were that of Shaw, filed May 25, 1907, which resulted in patent 971,318, issued September 27, 1910, and that of Hawley and Baker (the same Baker) filed April 11, 1908, and issued March 23, 1909, No. 915,954. In accordance with our established view, it must be held that Baker cannot be the first inventor of anything which had previously been completely invented and constructively reduced to practice by Shaw, even though Shaw’s patent did not get issued until after Baker’s application was filed, and likewise that Baker must disclose an inventive advance over Shaw. The same considerations apply to the earlier application of Hawley and Baker. If the Hawley and Baker application and patent disclosed only a specific application of Baker’s now alleged generic idea, it would be theoretically .possible that the Hawley and Baker application would be immaterial upon the subject of whether Baker had' already taken a step involving invention; not so, where his step was taken after the Hawley and Baker application. He cannot be the first inventor of something which is not patentably distinguishable from what Hawley and Baker had already jointly invented.

The record shows that some Hawley and Baker device, apparently some modification of 915,954, was quite extensively on the market before Baker claims to have developed, to a substantial extent, his idea of the patent in suit.

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Bluebook (online)
7 F.2d 24, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/universal-rim-co-v-firestone-tire-rubber-co-ca6-1925.