Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed May 13, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-1853 Lower Tribunal No. 21-4932-CA-01 ________________
Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant,
vs.
Yunia Alvarez, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara Areces, Judge.
Link & Rockenbach, PA, and Kara Rockenbach Link and David A. Noel (West Palm Beach), for appellant.
Giasi Law, P.A., and Melissa A. Giasi (Tampa), for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and GORDO and GOODEN, JJ.
GORDO, J. Universal Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Universal”)
appeals the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of Yunia Alvarez
(“Alvarez”) and the denial of its post-trial motions for directed verdict or a new
trial. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
Alvarez filed suit against Universal for breach of contract arising out of
a homeowners insurance claim regarding alleged wind damage to the roof
due to Hurricane Eta. Universal raised several affirmative defenses to the
suit, including Alvarez’s violation of her contractual post-loss obligations.
At the start of trial, the court ruled that the legal presumption of
prejudice was inapplicable to all Universal’s post-loss obligation defenses
except prompt notice. Universal opposed the ruling and continued to object
to it at the charge conference.
Universal entered into evidence at trial its document request letter it
sent to Alvarez and her attorney during claim adjustment. The letter
requested a sworn proof of loss, repair receipts, and proof of repairs from
Alvarez’s prior 2019 water damage claim. Alvarez testified that she did not
provide Universal with the documents, despite admitting she was aware of
Universal’s request that she provide them. She also confirmed her uncle
purchased materials and made repairs to the roof before giving Universal an
2 opportunity to inspect it. Universal’s corporate representative testified that
the requested documents were never received.
Based on the trial court’s ruling, the jury was instructed the
presumption of prejudice only applied to Universal’s prompt notice defense
and none of its other post-loss obligation defenses. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Alvarez and awarded her $20,000.00. After denial of
Universal’s post-trial motions and entry of final judgment, this appeal
followed.
“While a trial court's decision on jury instructions is generally reviewed
for abuse of discretion and should not be overturned on appeal absent a
showing of prejudicial error, whether a jury instruction represents an
accurate statement of law is a legal question reviewed by an appellate court
under a de novo standard.” Tower Hill Prime Ins. Co. v. Bermudez, 388
So. 3d 165, 170 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “An instruction to the jury on an affirmative defense is
proper when requested where sufficient evidence has been introduced from
which the jury could lawfully find that the defense has been proven.” Carr v.
Crosby Builders Supply Co., Inc., 283 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). “A
court must give a requested instruction on a party's theory of defense where
3 there is sufficient evidence to support that defense.” Sikora v. Pinebrook
Builders, Inc., 507 So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
On appeal, Universal contends the trial court erred by instructing the
jury that the presumption of prejudice was inapplicable to all of its post-loss
obligation defenses except prompt notice. We agree.
This Court addressed the issue of which party bears the burden to
demonstrate whether the insurer was prejudiced by its insured’s material
failure to satisfy a post-loss provision in American Integrity Ins. Co. v.
Estrada, 276 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). In Estrada, we held that “when
an insurer has alleged, as an affirmative defense to coverage, and thereafter
has subsequently established, that an insured has failed to substantially
comply with a contractually mandated post-loss obligation, prejudice to the
insurer from the insured's material breach is presumed, and the burden then
shifts to the insured to show that any breach of post-loss obligations did not
prejudice the insurer.” Id. at 916. In reversing the trial court, we instructed,
“If American Integrity establishes that Estrada failed to materially satisfy any
contractually mandated post-loss obligations, then the burden shifts to
Estrada to establish that American Integrity was not prejudiced by Estrada's
breach.” Id. at 917 (emphasis added).
4 In the instant case, Universal alleged as an affirmative defense that
Alvarez failed to substantially comply with the contractually mandated
post-loss obligation. In support of its affirmative defense, Universal provided
as evidence the document request letter it sent to Alvarez and her attorney
requesting a sworn proof of loss, repair receipts, proof of repairs from
Alvarez’s prior 2019 water damage claim, and more. Universal’s corporate
representative testified the requested documents were never received. This
evidence was buttressed by Alvarez’s own testimony admitting she was
aware Universal requested documents and that she did not provide them.
She further confirmed that her uncle purchased materials and made repairs
to the roof before Universal inspected it. The evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to have required the trial court to instruct the jury on Universal’s
presumption of prejudice to all its post-loss obligation defenses. See
Shivdasani v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 306 So. 3d 1156, 1161-62
(Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“[W]hen an insurer has alleged, as an affirmative
defense to coverage, and thereafter has subsequently established, that an
insured has failed to substantially comply with a contractually mandated
post-loss obligation, prejudice to the insurer from the insured's material
breach is presumed, and the burden then shifts to the insured to show that
any breach of post-loss obligations did not prejudice the insurer.” (quoting
5 Estrada, 276 So. 3d at 916.)); Nunez v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 325
So. 3d 267, 273-75 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (finding the insured’s failure to submit
to insurer’s requested examination under oath constituted a willful and
material breach of the insurance contract post-loss provisions, shifting the
burden to insured to prove that insurer was not prejudiced by breach); Dias
v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 330 So. 3d 38, 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)
(“[The] insureds provided the sworn proof of loss well prior to the filing of the
suit but after the claim had been denied. They also provided significant other
documentation. Nevertheless, they did not strictly comply with the policy
provisions. Therefore . . . insurer was entitled to the presumption of
prejudice.” (citation omitted)).
The trial court failed to properly instruct the jury. Instead it instructed
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed May 13, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-1853 Lower Tribunal No. 21-4932-CA-01 ________________
Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant,
vs.
Yunia Alvarez, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara Areces, Judge.
Link & Rockenbach, PA, and Kara Rockenbach Link and David A. Noel (West Palm Beach), for appellant.
Giasi Law, P.A., and Melissa A. Giasi (Tampa), for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and GORDO and GOODEN, JJ.
GORDO, J. Universal Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Universal”)
appeals the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of Yunia Alvarez
(“Alvarez”) and the denial of its post-trial motions for directed verdict or a new
trial. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
Alvarez filed suit against Universal for breach of contract arising out of
a homeowners insurance claim regarding alleged wind damage to the roof
due to Hurricane Eta. Universal raised several affirmative defenses to the
suit, including Alvarez’s violation of her contractual post-loss obligations.
At the start of trial, the court ruled that the legal presumption of
prejudice was inapplicable to all Universal’s post-loss obligation defenses
except prompt notice. Universal opposed the ruling and continued to object
to it at the charge conference.
Universal entered into evidence at trial its document request letter it
sent to Alvarez and her attorney during claim adjustment. The letter
requested a sworn proof of loss, repair receipts, and proof of repairs from
Alvarez’s prior 2019 water damage claim. Alvarez testified that she did not
provide Universal with the documents, despite admitting she was aware of
Universal’s request that she provide them. She also confirmed her uncle
purchased materials and made repairs to the roof before giving Universal an
2 opportunity to inspect it. Universal’s corporate representative testified that
the requested documents were never received.
Based on the trial court’s ruling, the jury was instructed the
presumption of prejudice only applied to Universal’s prompt notice defense
and none of its other post-loss obligation defenses. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Alvarez and awarded her $20,000.00. After denial of
Universal’s post-trial motions and entry of final judgment, this appeal
followed.
“While a trial court's decision on jury instructions is generally reviewed
for abuse of discretion and should not be overturned on appeal absent a
showing of prejudicial error, whether a jury instruction represents an
accurate statement of law is a legal question reviewed by an appellate court
under a de novo standard.” Tower Hill Prime Ins. Co. v. Bermudez, 388
So. 3d 165, 170 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “An instruction to the jury on an affirmative defense is
proper when requested where sufficient evidence has been introduced from
which the jury could lawfully find that the defense has been proven.” Carr v.
Crosby Builders Supply Co., Inc., 283 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). “A
court must give a requested instruction on a party's theory of defense where
3 there is sufficient evidence to support that defense.” Sikora v. Pinebrook
Builders, Inc., 507 So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
On appeal, Universal contends the trial court erred by instructing the
jury that the presumption of prejudice was inapplicable to all of its post-loss
obligation defenses except prompt notice. We agree.
This Court addressed the issue of which party bears the burden to
demonstrate whether the insurer was prejudiced by its insured’s material
failure to satisfy a post-loss provision in American Integrity Ins. Co. v.
Estrada, 276 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). In Estrada, we held that “when
an insurer has alleged, as an affirmative defense to coverage, and thereafter
has subsequently established, that an insured has failed to substantially
comply with a contractually mandated post-loss obligation, prejudice to the
insurer from the insured's material breach is presumed, and the burden then
shifts to the insured to show that any breach of post-loss obligations did not
prejudice the insurer.” Id. at 916. In reversing the trial court, we instructed,
“If American Integrity establishes that Estrada failed to materially satisfy any
contractually mandated post-loss obligations, then the burden shifts to
Estrada to establish that American Integrity was not prejudiced by Estrada's
breach.” Id. at 917 (emphasis added).
4 In the instant case, Universal alleged as an affirmative defense that
Alvarez failed to substantially comply with the contractually mandated
post-loss obligation. In support of its affirmative defense, Universal provided
as evidence the document request letter it sent to Alvarez and her attorney
requesting a sworn proof of loss, repair receipts, proof of repairs from
Alvarez’s prior 2019 water damage claim, and more. Universal’s corporate
representative testified the requested documents were never received. This
evidence was buttressed by Alvarez’s own testimony admitting she was
aware Universal requested documents and that she did not provide them.
She further confirmed that her uncle purchased materials and made repairs
to the roof before Universal inspected it. The evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to have required the trial court to instruct the jury on Universal’s
presumption of prejudice to all its post-loss obligation defenses. See
Shivdasani v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 306 So. 3d 1156, 1161-62
(Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“[W]hen an insurer has alleged, as an affirmative
defense to coverage, and thereafter has subsequently established, that an
insured has failed to substantially comply with a contractually mandated
post-loss obligation, prejudice to the insurer from the insured's material
breach is presumed, and the burden then shifts to the insured to show that
any breach of post-loss obligations did not prejudice the insurer.” (quoting
5 Estrada, 276 So. 3d at 916.)); Nunez v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 325
So. 3d 267, 273-75 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (finding the insured’s failure to submit
to insurer’s requested examination under oath constituted a willful and
material breach of the insurance contract post-loss provisions, shifting the
burden to insured to prove that insurer was not prejudiced by breach); Dias
v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 330 So. 3d 38, 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)
(“[The] insureds provided the sworn proof of loss well prior to the filing of the
suit but after the claim had been denied. They also provided significant other
documentation. Nevertheless, they did not strictly comply with the policy
provisions. Therefore . . . insurer was entitled to the presumption of
prejudice.” (citation omitted)).
The trial court failed to properly instruct the jury. Instead it instructed
the jury that the legal presumption of prejudice was inapplicable to all
Universal’s post-loss obligation defenses except prompt notice. Because the
instruction was an inaccurate statement of the law, the trial court committed
reversible error. See Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d
1201, 1214 (Fla. 2017) (“Reversible error occurs when an instruction is not
only an erroneous or incomplete statement of the law, but is also confusing
or misleading.” (quoting Gross v. Lyons, 721 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998))).
6 Alvarez contends that Universal failed to preserve its argument and
waived it by explicit agreement to the jury instruction or through invited error.
The transcript belies that argument. Universal only agreed to the jury
instructions subject to its objection and claimed renewal of its objection to
the trial court’s ruling. The trial court also recognized on the record that
Universal did not waive its objection. Universal’s argument was therefore
properly preserved.
We reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
GOODEN, J., concurs.
7 Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Yunia Alvarez, 3D24-1853
SCALES, C.J., concurring.
I concur with the majority that reversal and a new trial is warranted here
because the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on Universal’s
affirmative defenses with respect to Alvarez’s contractual post-loss
obligations. See Am. Integrity Ins. Co. v. Estrada, 276 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2019). As the majority points out, this Court’s Estrada decision is clear
that “for an insurer to successfully establish a coverage defense based upon
an insured’s failure to satisfy post-loss obligations such that an insured
forfeits coverage under a policy, the insurer must plead and prove that the
insured has materially breached a post-loss policy provision.” Id. at 912. “If
the insurer establishes such a material breach by the insured, the burden
then shifts to the insured to prove that any breach did not prejudice the
insurer.” Id.
I write separately simply to note that the jury instruction error was
exacerbated here by the jury verdict form’s compound question, to which the
jury answered “No”:
Did Universal prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Plaintiff failed to substantially comply with the following post loss duties, such that it prejudiced Universal: a) keep accurate record
8 of repair expenses b) submit requested documents, or c) submit sworn proof of loss?
The compound nature of the question makes it impossible to determine
whether the jury found, as a factual matter, that Alvarez had materially
breached her post-loss obligations, or whether, if she did, that Universal had
suffered no prejudice.
Because Estrada employs a burden-shifting inquiry, a similar
compound question should not be presented to the jury on remand. That is,
on the verdict form, the jury should first be asked whether Universal proved,
by the greater weight of the evidence, that Alvarez failed to substantially
comply with one of her contractual post-loss obligations (i.e., materially
breaching the policy). And if the jury answers “yes” to this threshold material
breach question, then the jury separately should be asked whether Alvarez
proved, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Universal was not
prejudiced by Alvarez’s failure to comply with her contractual post-loss
obligation.