NIELDS, District Judge.
Hearing on issues raised by a special defense in answers to original bills in the nature of supplemental bills.
These supplemental bills aver that on January 14, 1936, plaintiff had “assigned its entire right, title and interest in and to the aforesaid invention and improvement, and in and to said letters patent” to Uni[847]*847versal Oil Products Company, a Delaware corporation, and prayed that the assignee be substituted “as plaintiff in place, and instead, of its assignor, Universal Oil Products Company, a Corporation of South Dakota,” plaintiff in these suits. Answers filed to these bills aver that the legal effect of a certain bill of sale and agreement entered into January 1, 1932, between said South Dakota corporation and said Delaware corporation, and the construction given said agreement by the parties, wrought an abatement of the original suits and deprived this court of jurisdiction to enter a decree awarding injunctions; and that the decrees themselves and the trial proceedings upon which they were based were nugatory.
Hereafter in this opinion Universal Oil Products Company, a • corporation of the state of South Dakota, shall be referred to as “South Dakota,” and Universal Oil Products Company, a corporation of the state of Delaware, shall be referred to as “Delaware.”
A brief outline of the steps in the suits may be helpful. In 1929 South Dakota filed its bill of complaint against Root Refining Company charging infringement of the Egloff patent, and in 1931 charging infringement of the Dubbs patent. In 1930 South Dakota filed its bill of complaint against Skelly Oil Company on the Egloff patent, and in 1931 on the Dubbs patent. The Root cases were consolidated for trial and were tried throughout the summer of 1932, accumulating a record of 3,904 pages with 1,500 pages of exhibits. In May, 1934, an interlocutory decree was entered finding validity and infringement of the Dubbs and Egloff patents and awarding an injunction and an accounting of profits and damages. In June, 1935, this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 78 F.(2d) 991. Petitions for rehearing and for writs of certiorari were presented and denied. 296 U.S. 626, 56 S.Ct. 149, 80 L.Ed. 445. In February, 1936, Delaware set up in its bills of complaint in the nature of supplemental bills, the assignment to it of the Egloff and Dubbs patents and claims for damages, and praying that it be substituted as plaintiff in place of South Dakota, the plaintiff herein. An order was entered granting such leave and supplemental bills were filed in both of the Root cases. In March, 1936, Root filed answers to the supplemental bills setting up an abatement of the causes of action in both Root cases on January 1, 1932, when the bill of sale and agreement between South Dakota and Delaware was entered' into. In its answer Root Refining Company prayed: •
“1. That all proceedings, including the entry of the interlocutory decree, had herein subsequent to January 1, 1932, and prior to the filing herein of the Bill of Complaint in the Nature of a Supplemental Bill be abated, set aside, and held for naught.
“2. That the Bill of Complaint in the Nature of a Supplemental Bill heretofore filed herein by the Universal Oil Products Company of South Dakota be dismissed for want of equity.”
In the Skelly cases there have been no trial proceedings. The cases are at issue. In February, 1936, an order was entered granting plaintiff leave to file supplemental bills substituting Delaware as sole party plaintiff in lieu of South Dakota. Answers were filed and the issues of abatement were by agreement consolidated for trial with the Root cases, it being stipulated that all evidence adduced in the Root cases was also adduced in the Skelly cases.
At the hearing in June, 1936, defendant Root Refining Company introduced the following in evidence:
Contract of January 1, 1932, between South Dakota and Delaware (reproduced at length in footnote).1 Certain interroga[848]*848tories propounded by defendant to plaintiff and the answers thereto. Affidavits of Hiram J. Halle filed in the case of Derby Oil Company v. Universal Oil Products Company in the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, Second Division. Affidavit of Sidney Neuman.
Defendant’s position is that the evidence above recited establishes that before the trial in the Root cases South Dakota had sold and conveyed to Delaware (with the exception of the Trumble patent) all of its property and assets, including the monopoly of the patents in suit and the right to any recovery thereon, and had parted with all its right to equitable relief upon which its standing in this court depended, and therefore the causes of action then [849]*849abated and the proceedings both in the Root and Skelly cases subsequent to January, 1932, and prior to February, 1936, were nugatory. A careful consideration of the evidence leads the court to conclude that it does not establish the position of the defendant above recited.
However, the important question whether the agreement of January 1, 193. completely divested South Dakota of all title and interest in the patents and in the pending suits so that the suits abated and all proceedings were nugatory. Defendant does not question the procedure to substitute Delaware as plaintiff or its right to be so substituted and to have the benefit of all proceedings and of all decrees, provided the defense of abatement is not sustained.
[850]*850When the suits were instituted in 1929, 1930, and 1931, South Dakota was the only proper plaintiff. In 1932 Delaware was formed by United Gasoline Corporation, owner of all the capital stock of South Dakota. Since December, 1934, Delaware has owned all the stock of South Dakota except one director’s qualifying shares. At all times the directors (except the resident director of South Dakota), the officers, and the stockholders of South Dakota and Delaware have been the same. There never has been any possibility of defendant being required to answer to more than one person for infringements. If Delaware be substituted, it will be the only party capable of prosecuting the suit.
The defense of abatement cannot be sustained unless the agreement of January 1, 1932, is construed to be an assignment of the patents in suit and of the entire interest of South Dakota therein. Unless the agreement of January 1, 1932, be-construed to be an assignment, there was no abatement of the suit before the actual assignment of January 14, 1936. Apparently defendant fully acquiesces in this position. [851]*851Yet, abatement only occurs in an equity suit where the sole plaintiff has disposed of his entire interest. If South Dakota retained any interest in the patents, the suits never abated.
The Supreme Court holds that an assignment of a patent may be effected:
“(1) the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention throughout the United States; or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States. ^ ‡ ‡
"A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers. In the second case, jointly with the assignor.
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NIELDS, District Judge.
Hearing on issues raised by a special defense in answers to original bills in the nature of supplemental bills.
These supplemental bills aver that on January 14, 1936, plaintiff had “assigned its entire right, title and interest in and to the aforesaid invention and improvement, and in and to said letters patent” to Uni[847]*847versal Oil Products Company, a Delaware corporation, and prayed that the assignee be substituted “as plaintiff in place, and instead, of its assignor, Universal Oil Products Company, a Corporation of South Dakota,” plaintiff in these suits. Answers filed to these bills aver that the legal effect of a certain bill of sale and agreement entered into January 1, 1932, between said South Dakota corporation and said Delaware corporation, and the construction given said agreement by the parties, wrought an abatement of the original suits and deprived this court of jurisdiction to enter a decree awarding injunctions; and that the decrees themselves and the trial proceedings upon which they were based were nugatory.
Hereafter in this opinion Universal Oil Products Company, a • corporation of the state of South Dakota, shall be referred to as “South Dakota,” and Universal Oil Products Company, a corporation of the state of Delaware, shall be referred to as “Delaware.”
A brief outline of the steps in the suits may be helpful. In 1929 South Dakota filed its bill of complaint against Root Refining Company charging infringement of the Egloff patent, and in 1931 charging infringement of the Dubbs patent. In 1930 South Dakota filed its bill of complaint against Skelly Oil Company on the Egloff patent, and in 1931 on the Dubbs patent. The Root cases were consolidated for trial and were tried throughout the summer of 1932, accumulating a record of 3,904 pages with 1,500 pages of exhibits. In May, 1934, an interlocutory decree was entered finding validity and infringement of the Dubbs and Egloff patents and awarding an injunction and an accounting of profits and damages. In June, 1935, this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 78 F.(2d) 991. Petitions for rehearing and for writs of certiorari were presented and denied. 296 U.S. 626, 56 S.Ct. 149, 80 L.Ed. 445. In February, 1936, Delaware set up in its bills of complaint in the nature of supplemental bills, the assignment to it of the Egloff and Dubbs patents and claims for damages, and praying that it be substituted as plaintiff in place of South Dakota, the plaintiff herein. An order was entered granting such leave and supplemental bills were filed in both of the Root cases. In March, 1936, Root filed answers to the supplemental bills setting up an abatement of the causes of action in both Root cases on January 1, 1932, when the bill of sale and agreement between South Dakota and Delaware was entered' into. In its answer Root Refining Company prayed: •
“1. That all proceedings, including the entry of the interlocutory decree, had herein subsequent to January 1, 1932, and prior to the filing herein of the Bill of Complaint in the Nature of a Supplemental Bill be abated, set aside, and held for naught.
“2. That the Bill of Complaint in the Nature of a Supplemental Bill heretofore filed herein by the Universal Oil Products Company of South Dakota be dismissed for want of equity.”
In the Skelly cases there have been no trial proceedings. The cases are at issue. In February, 1936, an order was entered granting plaintiff leave to file supplemental bills substituting Delaware as sole party plaintiff in lieu of South Dakota. Answers were filed and the issues of abatement were by agreement consolidated for trial with the Root cases, it being stipulated that all evidence adduced in the Root cases was also adduced in the Skelly cases.
At the hearing in June, 1936, defendant Root Refining Company introduced the following in evidence:
Contract of January 1, 1932, between South Dakota and Delaware (reproduced at length in footnote).1 Certain interroga[848]*848tories propounded by defendant to plaintiff and the answers thereto. Affidavits of Hiram J. Halle filed in the case of Derby Oil Company v. Universal Oil Products Company in the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, Second Division. Affidavit of Sidney Neuman.
Defendant’s position is that the evidence above recited establishes that before the trial in the Root cases South Dakota had sold and conveyed to Delaware (with the exception of the Trumble patent) all of its property and assets, including the monopoly of the patents in suit and the right to any recovery thereon, and had parted with all its right to equitable relief upon which its standing in this court depended, and therefore the causes of action then [849]*849abated and the proceedings both in the Root and Skelly cases subsequent to January, 1932, and prior to February, 1936, were nugatory. A careful consideration of the evidence leads the court to conclude that it does not establish the position of the defendant above recited.
However, the important question whether the agreement of January 1, 193. completely divested South Dakota of all title and interest in the patents and in the pending suits so that the suits abated and all proceedings were nugatory. Defendant does not question the procedure to substitute Delaware as plaintiff or its right to be so substituted and to have the benefit of all proceedings and of all decrees, provided the defense of abatement is not sustained.
[850]*850When the suits were instituted in 1929, 1930, and 1931, South Dakota was the only proper plaintiff. In 1932 Delaware was formed by United Gasoline Corporation, owner of all the capital stock of South Dakota. Since December, 1934, Delaware has owned all the stock of South Dakota except one director’s qualifying shares. At all times the directors (except the resident director of South Dakota), the officers, and the stockholders of South Dakota and Delaware have been the same. There never has been any possibility of defendant being required to answer to more than one person for infringements. If Delaware be substituted, it will be the only party capable of prosecuting the suit.
The defense of abatement cannot be sustained unless the agreement of January 1, 1932, is construed to be an assignment of the patents in suit and of the entire interest of South Dakota therein. Unless the agreement of January 1, 1932, be-construed to be an assignment, there was no abatement of the suit before the actual assignment of January 14, 1936. Apparently defendant fully acquiesces in this position. [851]*851Yet, abatement only occurs in an equity suit where the sole plaintiff has disposed of his entire interest. If South Dakota retained any interest in the patents, the suits never abated.
The Supreme Court holds that an assignment of a patent may be effected:
“(1) the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention throughout the United States; or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States. ^ ‡ ‡
"A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers. In the second case, jointly with the assignor. In the first and third cases, in the name of the assignee alone. Any assignment or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his own name for an infringement.” Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255, 11 S.Ct. 334, 335, 34 L.Ed. 923.
This court has said: "An assignment of a patent may be made only by an instrument in writing. R.S. § 4898 (Comp. St. § 9444 [35 U.S.C.A. § 47]). Conceding that no particular form of words is essential to effect an assignment of a patent (American Tobacco Co. v. Ascot Tobacco Works [C.C.] 165 F. 207), yet to constitute an assignment the instrument must be substantially a transfer, actual or constructive, with the clear intent at the time to part with the legal interest, in whole or in part, in the thing transferred, and with the full knowledge of the rights so transferred: Ormond v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 145 N.C. 140, 58 S.E. 997, 998. An instrument which does not purport to convey any present interest in an existing patent, or in one for which an application is pending, is not an assignment within the contemplation of R.S. § 4898. National Cash Register Co. v. New Columbus Watch Co., 129 F. 114, 116, 63 C.C.A. 616. There must be some operative words, expressing at least an intention to assign, in order to constitute an assignment.” Minerals Separation, Ltd., v. Miami Copper Co. (D.C.) 275 F. 572, 575.
[852]*852In considering the agreement of January 1, 1932, the above language that “operative words, expressing at least an intention to assign, in order to constitute an assignment,” are most significant.
It is important to recall the purpose of the parties, who have the same officers and directors, in making the agreement. It was deemed impossible for Delaware in January, 1932, to take over the business and property of South Dakota in its entirety. Accordingly, there was specifically reserved to South Dakota all of its patents as well as its right to damages for infringement thereof. There was a specific covenant to subsequently assign the patents. It is clear that it was not the intention of the parties that the ownership of patents should be transferred in praesenti to Delaware.
Defendant contends that the parties put a practical construction upon the agreement and that everything but the “mere naked legal title” to the patents was transferred to Delaware. A practical construction of the agreement from the conduct of the parties leads to an opposite conclusion. It is apparent from Halle’s first affidavit in the Kansas suit that this contention is unsound. In that affidavit he said: “As the owner of the various patents, Universal of South Dakota has commenced certain suits for infringement,” etc. That the parties to the instrument did not treat it as an assignment appears from what they did. They proceeded on the theory that the agreement of January 1, 1932, did not affect the title of South Dakota to the patents and that the change in this situation did not occur until the assignments of January 14, 1936, were executed and delivered.
The terms of the agreement of January, 1932, negative an assignment. ' The agreement expressly negatives a present transfer of the patents. It excepts from what is to be sold and transferred to Delaware—
“(a) all Letters Patent issued by the United States of America or any other government or political division thereof and all pending applications for Letters Patent owned or controlled by the Old Company at the date hereof, (b) all the Old Company’s right, title and interest in, to and under suits instituted by it for damages sustained by reason of infringement of any of its Letters Patent by whatsoever government issued, and all its right, title and interest in and to any and all claims or causes of action or accrued rights of action for past damages and profits including any and all causes of action for infringement of any of its patents, (c) all its right, title and interest in, to and under patent interference or annulment, revocation and opposition proceedings in the United States or elsewhere, (d) all existing license agreements under which the Old Company has granted rights in respect of Letters Patent owned by it * *
The above language manifests a clear intention not to part with the legal interest in the patents and does not purport to convey any present interest therein. In paragraph 4 óf the agreement there is contained a covenant to subsequently transfer the patents which reads: “The Old Company hereby agrees .that as soon as it shall have obtained the several consents of all of the Present Licensees to the transfer and assignment of their respective License Agreements to the New Company, it will, at the request of the New Company, assign, transfer, convey and deliver to the New Company all Letters Patent and reissues thereof issued by the United States of America or any other government or political division thereof, all pending applications for Letters Patent * *
South Dakota reserved not only the existing patents and all rights to recovery for infringement thereof, and all existing license agreements in respect to the patents, but also the right to grant in the future such licenses “as it shall be obligated to grant by the terms of any of its license agreements with its present licensees.” An instrument cannot be construed as an assignment of a patent which in terms reserves to the assignor the title to the patents, the right to sue for infringements and to retain the proceeds of suits, the right to grant certain licenses, and specifically provides for the transfer of the patents upon the happening of a contingency in the future. All that Delaware had before the assignment of January 14, 1936, was an inchoate right to the patents in suit and a right to grant future licenses. The power to institute suits to enjoin infringements was expressly reserved to and remained exclusively in South Dakota.
The agreement of January 1, 1932, does not purport to give to Delaware the right to make, use, and sell, but only “the sole and exclusive right and power to grant future licenses,” with reservation that South Dakota shall have the right to grant licenses when obligated to do so by the terms of any of its existing agreements. Defendants say that the exclusive right to grant licenses is tantamount to a grant to [853]*853Delaware to make, use, and sell because it may grant itself a license. But this would be manifestly contrary to the intention of the parties. The clear purport of the agreement and the reason for creating Delaware was that Delaware was eventually to take over the business of South Dakota which Halle’s first affidavit in the Kansas suit, stated to be “the granting of licenses under patents.” Delaware, in reality, merely received a license to license.
Since the legal title to the patents and the right to prosecute suits for infringement at all times remained in South Dakota, the suits did not abate.
A decree in conformity with this opinion may be submitted.