Universal Electronics, Inc. v. United States

20 Ct. Int'l Trade 337
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMarch 7, 1996
DocketConsolidated Court No. 93-11-00740
StatusPublished

This text of 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 337 (Universal Electronics, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Universal Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 337 (cit 1996).

Opinion

Opinion

Goldberg, Judge:

This case comes before the Court following trial de novo. Plaintiff, Universal Electronics, Inc. (“Universal”), primarily argues that the subject remote controls and parts should be classified as “electrical machines and apparatus, having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere,” and as parts of the same, with a duty rate of 3.9 percent ad valorem. In the alternative, Universal argues that the subject merchandise should be classified as “electric sound or visual signaling apparatus,” and as parts of the same, with a duty rate of 2.7% ad valorem. On the other hand, defendant, the United States, argues that the United States Customs Service (“Customs”) properly classified many entries of the subject merchandise under the tariff provision for “boards, panels, and other bases for electric control,” with the rate of duty depending on the date of entry. In a counterclaim, defendant asserts that Customs should have classified the rest of the entries of the subject merchandise in a similar manner.

The Court exercises its jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a) and 1583 (1988). After review of the evidence presented at trial, the Court enters judgment in favor of defendant.

Background

The subject merchandise entered the United States in 1992. It consists primarily of the following Universal remote controls: (1) the “One For All 6,” models 4000 and 4300; (2) the “One For All 3 ‘Big Easy’,” model 2085; and (3) the “One For All 4,” models 2000, 2601, 2608, and 2644. The subject merchandise also consists of one entry of parts “designed, produced, intended, and otherwise dedicated for use with” the subject remote controls. (Pi’s First Amended Compl. at 13).

The remote controls at issue are hand-held. They work with different brands of appliances, such as Sony and Toshiba. In addition, they control different types of appliances, such as televisions and stereos.

Plaintiff and defendant agree that all of the remote controls at issue function in essentially the same manner. (Pi’s Pre-Trial Mem. at 7-8.) [338]*338Defendant’s expert in the area of control systems, Professor Richard Costello, testified that if a person wishes to change the channel on a television, the person pushes a specified button on the battery-powered remote control. The button is a switch, and when it is pressed, it completes an electrical circuit. When completed, the electrical circuit sends voltage to a designated “input,” i.e., point of connection through which electricity is received, on a microcontroller in the remote control. Voltage received through this particular point of connection informs the microcontroller of the user’s desire to change the channel. The micro-controller then initiates a set of instructions using electrical pulse signals, which are sent to an infrared light-emitting diode. The light-emitting diode converts the electrical pulse signals into infrared light signals. The infrared light signals are emitted from the remote control, and travel through the air as electromagnetic energy, until they reach an infrared receiver attached to a microcontroller in the television. There the infrared light signals are converted into a digital data stream, and then a digital command word, which causes the television microcontroller to send the necessary amount of electricity to the part of the television that causes the channel to change.

Discussion

A. The Presumption of Correctness:

Customs’ classification of merchandise usually enjoys a statutory presumption of correctness that the plaintiff must overcome. 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1988). This presumption of correctness does not attach to Customs’ classification, however, when Customs admits that its classification is erroneous. Tomoegawa USA, Inc. v. United States, 12 CIT 112, 114, 681 F. Supp. 867, 869 (1988), aff'd in part, 7 Fed. Cir. (T) 29, 861 F.2d 1275 (1988).

In this case, Customs classified many entries of the subject merchandise under subheading 8537.10.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States (“HTSUS”), which provides for boards, panels, and other bases for electric control. Customs classified the rest of the entries of the merchandise as parts of televisions, under HTSUS subheading 8529.90.45. Defendant now recognizes that in order to qualify as parts of televisions, under subheading 8529.90.45, items must use radio frequency signals to perform their functions. (D’s Pre-Trial Mem. at 2.) Defendant admits that Customs’ classification of the merchandise as parts of televisions is erroneous because the merchandise does not use radio frequency signals. In a counterclaim, defendant seeks to have the entries which Customs classified as parts of televisions reliquidated under the tariff provisions for boards, panels, and other bases for electric control, and parts thereof. Consequently, the Court finds that the presumption of correctness does not attach to Customs’ classification of entries of the merchandise as parts of televisions.

Plaintiff argues that the presumption of correctness should not attach to Customs’ classification of the other entries of the merchan[339]*339dise, under the tariff provision for boards, panels, and other bases for electric control, either. According to plaintiff, a lawyer who participated in classifying the merchandise under this provision failed to remember precisely what he reviewed before the merchandise was classified, and demonstrated only a rudimentary understanding of the merchandise. (Pi’s Pre-Trial Mem. at 14-20.) Plaintiff essentially argues that the failure of this representative of Customs to justify classification under subheading 8537.10.00 is tantamount to an admission that the classification is erroneous.

The Court disagrees with plaintiffs argument. The failure of a retired attorney who participated in the classification of merchandise to remember how he classified the merchandise does not amount to an admission that Customs’ classification of the merchandise is erroneous. This is especially true because the attorney did not act alone in classifying the merchandise under HTSUS subheading 8537.10.00. At trial, a Customs employee, Robert Slomovitz, testified that a Customs Import Specialist also classified the merchandise under subheading 8537.10.00. However, the Customs Import Specialist died before he could testify regarding his reasons for the classification. Consequently, the Court finds that the statutory presumption of correctness attaches to Customs’ classification of entries of the merchandise under the HTSUS provision for boards, panels, and other bases for electric control.

To determine whether plaintiff can overcome the presumption in favor of Customs, the Court will first consider whether the classification applied by Customs encompasses the subject merchandise. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 70, 75, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (1984). The Court will then consider whether any of the alternative classifications proposed by plaintiff better describe the merchandise. Id.

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Related

Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States
733 F.2d 873 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Tomoegawa U.S.A., Inc. v. The United States
861 F.2d 1275 (Federal Circuit, 1988)
Tomoegawa USA, Inc. v. United States
681 F. Supp. 867 (Court of International Trade, 1988)

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20 Ct. Int'l Trade 337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/universal-electronics-inc-v-united-states-cit-1996.