Universal Credit Co. v. Big Sandy Auto Co.

63 S.W.2d 607, 250 Ky. 557, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 732
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedOctober 6, 1933
StatusPublished

This text of 63 S.W.2d 607 (Universal Credit Co. v. Big Sandy Auto Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Universal Credit Co. v. Big Sandy Auto Co., 63 S.W.2d 607, 250 Ky. 557, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 732 (Ky. 1933).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

Drury, Commissioner

'.Reversing.

•The appellant, which, we shall refer to as the credit ^company, seeks to reverse a judgment for $632.92 recovered against it by the appellee.

The appellee, which we shall call the dealer, was the local agent of the Ford Motor Company; it sold ■automobiles on credit, taking from the purchasers conditional sales contracts, which contracts - the dealer sold to the credit company and guaranteed the payment thereof.

Sis men who had purchased automobiles from the ■dealer wrecked their machines and defaulted in their •payments, and another defaulted without wrecking his •car, and, as the dealer refused to pay the balances due ■on these contracts, the credit company sued the dealer thereon to recover these balances, which aggregated ¡$1,340.33. The dealer answered and asserted divers ¡sums it claimed- were due it from the credit company, *559 bnt what ones and how many of these were allowed by the trial conrt is not disclosed by the record.

Plan of Dealing.

In their dealings with each other, these parties operated nnder a plan embodied in what is known as “Confidential Pamphlet ‘A.’ ” This pamphlet contained these provisions:

“While the statements as to the methods of settlement outlined herein are necessarily in technical form, the actual adjustments will be made on a basis which will be entirely fair to the dealer and always with the idea in mind of protecting the dealer to the greatest extent possible.”
“Loss resulting from collision will be deemed to exist only when the purchaser is unable to meet his obligation and the car is recovered as the direct result of a collision. In such case the purchaser is not protected, but the dealer is protected as outlined herein.”
“No protection against loss from conversion, confiscation and/or collision is in effect for dealers when any of the following conditions exist: (a). When these forms of dealer protection have been made known to the purchaser by the dealer or by any member of the dealer’s organization.”

From this it is evident this pamphlet was drawn solely in the interests of the credit company and the dealer. When an automobile was sold on time, there was added to the cash price a sum which we shall call the financing load, and we shall try to illustrate what that was for and how it was distributed by one of the transactions appearing in this record.

A 1%-ton truck was sold for ..$809.36

There was paid in cash . 498.36

Leaving a balance of .$311.00,

But the purchaser signe'd a contract for .$360.00

Thus there was a financing load of .$ 49.00.

This financing load was for these purposes: $9.67 was set aside in a reserve fund; $16.25 was paid for fire and theft insurance; $- was to cover risk of collision; $- was to cover risk of confiscation; $-was to cover risk of conversion; $-was to ©over interest.

*560 Refunds.....

The dealer in its answer, counterclaim, and cross-petition set up many things, and among these' it made six claims- of refund on account of financing loads aggregating $210.08. ,We‘. shall give one example which will he illustrative of the others:

A machine was sold to Charles H. Young, and into the conditional sales contract there was put a financing load of $44. After this machine had been run about 60 days, it was wrecked, and the dealer is claiming a return of $36.66, which it arrives at in this way: This financing was to cover a period of twelve months. In sixty days the machine- was wrecked; therefore there was, so it says, no financing for the other ten months, and hence it was entitled, so it claims, to a return- of ten twelfths of this $44, which is $36.66.

In this confidential pamphlet A there is this pro-yision:

“In every case where dealer himself makes a repossession. in place of U. C. C. and pays immediately the outstanding balance as shown by the books of U. C. C., he will be allowed credit for the anticipation refund which will be figured on the same basis as a purchaser’s prepayment réfund, shown in 'Handbook of Information’ under heading 'Refund for Anticipated Payments.’ If U. C. C. makes the repossession, U. C. C. will retain the anticipation refund. ’ ’

Thus it will be seen that a dealer, to be entitled to a refund, must do two things: He must repossess the ear, and-he must pay immediately the outstanding balance. In this case the dealer did maké some of the repossessions, but he did not pay the outstanding balances; hence he was not entitled to any refunds.

Towage.

The dealer claimed two items, one of $10 and another of $15, paid for towing in wrecked cars. In this confidential pamphlet A there "is this provision:

“If a car is recovered as a result of -a collision, dealer agrees to take the car into his place of business and provide shelter and protection from further damage without charge.- Dealer will notify U. C. O. immediately and repairs are not to be undertaken until the damages due to the collision and. *561 which caused the default have been determined and approved in writing for the repair work' given by a U. C. C. representative.”

Onr construction of this is that this requires the dealer to do three things without charge: To take the wreck to his place of business, to keep it there, and to immediately notify the credit company. The claim for towage cannot be allowed.

Advance Payments. .

The dealer had some five cars on its floors which it had obtained in this manner: It deposited with the credit company 10 per cent, of the list price of the cars, the credit company, paid the balance, and the cars were shipped to the latter by the Ford Motor Company, and the dealer obtained them from, it under a- trust agreement wherein, among other things, the dealer agreed:

“To take and hold the same, at my (our) sole risk as to loss or injury, for the purpose of' storing-said property; and I (we) hereby agree to keep said Motor Vehicles brand new and not to' operate them for demonstrating or otherwise.”
“I (we) hereby agree not to sell,' loan, deliver, pledge, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of any of said motor vehicles to any other person'until after payment of corresponding amount shown on Dealer’s Record of Purchase and Release of-like identification number herewith.” -

One of these cars upon which the dealer had made a payment of $54 had a balance of $492 due thereon. The dealer either sold it to Mr. K.- B. Collins or let Mr. Collins take it out, without first settling therefor. The credit company found this car in Prestonsburg, and it repossessed it and brought it to Paintsville. The dealer gave the credit company its check for $492. The check was not paid when presented; thereupon the credit company again repossessed the ear and sold it in Huntington, W.

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Related

White v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation
2 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Kentucky, 1932)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
63 S.W.2d 607, 250 Ky. 557, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 732, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/universal-credit-co-v-big-sandy-auto-co-kyctapphigh-1933.