Unity Lodge, Amalgamated Local 405 v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co.

107 A.2d 251, 141 Conn. 499, 1954 Conn. LEXIS 220, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2640
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJuly 20, 1954
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 107 A.2d 251 (Unity Lodge, Amalgamated Local 405 v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Unity Lodge, Amalgamated Local 405 v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 107 A.2d 251, 141 Conn. 499, 1954 Conn. LEXIS 220, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2640 (Colo. 1954).

Opinion

Inglis, C. J.

On the trial of this case the named plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as the union, claimed that under the proper interpretation of two collective bargaining agreements, identical in terms so far as the issues involved were concerned but covering different periods of time, the defendant was bound to adjust the rates of pay of steam fitters and plumbers in its plant so as to equalize them with the “going rate” for steam fitters and plumbers in Hartford County. The union prayed a judgment for the specific performance of the agreements as so interpreted. The individual plaintiffs, who were steam fitters and plumbers employed by the defendant, sought to recover damages for a breach of the contracts in that the defendant had not adjusted their pay in accordance with the claimed interpretation of the agreements. The trial court rendered judgment for specific performance, but not to the extent requested by the union, and in favor of the defendant as against the individual plaintiffs. Prom that judgment all the plaintiffs have appealed.

[502]*502Although the plaintiffs have assigned error in the failure of the trial court to add thirty paragraphs of the draft finding, and in the finding of eighteen of the thirty-five paragraphs of the finding, no change in the finding of subordinate facts material to the determination of the issues is warranted.

The facts found are the following: On June 13, 1949, and again on November 30, 1950, the union, as the bargaining representative of the defendant’s employees, including the individual plaintiffs, entered into collective bargaining agreements with the defendant. In each of these contracts article 6, § 6, provided: “The Company shall continue its policy of making individual adjustments [of pay] in line with the efficiency and skill of individual employees. The formulation and administration of the job evaluation system are solely the functions and responsibilities of the Company. The classification of jobs under the job evaluation and the grading of individual employees are the subject matter of grievances to be dealt with under the grievance procedure.”

The job evaluation plan referred to was put into effect in the defendant’s plant in October, 1945, through the services of industrial engineers. Its purpose was the evaluation and classification of the jobs performed by the employees. In the application of this plan the first step was to score each job in the plant. A specified number of points were assigned to each of the grades established under each of the eight or nine factors by which all jobs were to be tested. A detailed description of every job in the plant was prepared, and on the basis of this description the grading of the job as to each factor was determined. In this way the total number of scoring points for each job was figured. That total would reflect the skill, knowledge, experience and [503]*503other elements requisite for the particular job as compared with other jobs. The next step was to place each job in one of the fourteen job levels established for the plant. This was done by assigning to each level a range of scoring points and placing each job in the level in which its total of scoring points was found. Minimum and maximum hourly rates of pay were prescribed for each job level, and these were changed from time to time as the result of negotiations with.the union. These rates determined the range of pay of each employee.

The explanation of the plan as promulgated contained this statement: “Job evaluation determines relative values only. The next step is to set up a wage scale using a minimum and maximum rate for a particular plant as determined by ‘going’ rates in the community or industry insofar as such rates can be determined.” It is upon the last sentence of this statement that the plaintiffs predicate their case. It is their contention that the rates of pay of steam fitters and plumbers in the defendant’s plant are and have been below the going rate and that they should have been adjusted to coincide with that rate.

When the plan was instituted in 1945, the defendant established a minimum rate for job level 1 and a maximum rate for job level 14 and, in doing so, inquired into the minimum and maximum rates in the various industrial plants in Hartford. Under the plan, the job level into which a job is placed is not determined by a predetermined rate to be paid for the job or by what some other employer pays for a job called by the same name. It is determined by the position which the job occupies in relation to other jobs between the minimum rate of pay for job level 1 and the maximum rate of pay for job level 14. There is no evidence that in maintaining [504]*504its job evaluation plan the defendant has considered the going rates of pay in the area as one of the factors in the determination of its rates of pay, apart from the fact that the going rates may have been reflected in several general wage increases for all employees which have been made as a result of negotiation with the union. These general wage increases, however, compare favorably in frequency and amount with those granted by other industrial employers in the Hartford area.

Job evaluation plans similar to that of the defendant are in common use in all the other large industrial plants in the Hartford area. The plans in some plants have nine job levels, others eleven, twelve or thirteen. They also differ among themselves with respect to the minimum rate for the lowest job level and the maximum rate for the highest job level. Bach employer writes a job description on the basis of the job to be done by an employee in its own plant, without regard to or comparison with the job descriptions and requirements of other employers. The descriptions of jobs of the same general name in the various plants differ because of the particular requirements of each employer. The functions and duties of maintenance workers, such as steam fitters and plumbers, in any particular plant differ from those of similar employees in other plants. Accordingly, they are placed in different job levels with consequent different rates of pay. Moreover, wage adjustments affecting all employees are made by employers in varying amounts and at varying times in the year. Because of these variables, there was no basis in the evidence for a determination of the going rate of pay in the area for the job designated by the defendant as “steam fitter and plumber.”

[505]*505The present dispute first arose in November, 1949. At that time the union filed a grievance stating: “Plumbers are scored improperly and unjustly. Area rates are considerably above Niles rates on plumbing. This job is out of balance in relation to other jobs in the maintenance department.” The adjustment asked was: “Proper and just scoring in Plumbers’ Classification in relation with area practice and in relation to other jobs in maintenance department.” Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement this grievance was finally submitted to arbitration, and on January 22, 1951, the arbitrator rendered his decision. The gist of his award was that he was powerless under the collective bargaining agreements to fix rates of pay for the employees but that the agreements required that “going rates in the area are to be considered a factor in establishing the rate of pay of [the] employees. This is not to say that such rates are the sole factor. . . .

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Bluebook (online)
107 A.2d 251, 141 Conn. 499, 1954 Conn. LEXIS 220, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2640, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/unity-lodge-amalgamated-local-405-v-niles-bement-pond-co-conn-1954.