United Traction Co. v. Monohan

116 Misc. 609
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1921
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 116 Misc. 609 (United Traction Co. v. Monohan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Traction Co. v. Monohan, 116 Misc. 609 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1921).

Opinion

Hinman, J.

The respondent Frank Broomhead is charged with criminal contempt of court in having wilfully violated an order of this court signed by me in the above-entitled action restraining the respondent and his co-defendants from illegally operating so-called “ jitneys ” in competition with the plaintiff. The respondent was brought before me in a similar proceeding on September tenth last and at that time pleaded guilty to a violation of the same order. A fine of $100 was imposed and the respondent and a number of others who pleaded guilty at the same time were admonished by the court that a repetition of the offense would be more severely dealt with.

The court recognized the state of mind which had been permitted to prevail amongst the so-called jitney operators that even though the Appellate Division had held their acts to- be a crime, the processes of the criminal law were inadequate to punish them and that somehow they were above the law. So they continued to openly and flagrantly violate the law and held it in almost perfect contempt until it became apparent that the lawless of this section of the state were being schooled to become more lawless, the thoughtless [611]*611amongst us to lose what respect they may have had for law and order and the sober-minded and farsighted to feel uneasy for the future when the law could be so flagrantly defied with impunity. The fact that there has been a strike here, with the lines of sympathy and prejudice drawn tightly, has unfortunately dulled the sensibilities of many as to the effect of toleration of lawlessness, but judges of the courts are chosen to deal dispassionately with all parties and to enforce the law with even-handed justice, protecting the rights of all under the law, the popular and the unpopular.

It thus becomes painfully evident that if justice is to be done in this community and the supremacy of the law upheld, it is the duty of this court to exercise its powers fully in that behalf. It was clear that the bold and fearless operators of jitneys must be taught that there is a remedy which is capable of reaching them without failure and without great delay. The fine promptly imposed, though moderate, was sufficient to carry this thought sharply to the minds of. the offenders.

It is the policy of the law to deal more gently with first offenses wherever possible, but the wilful renewal of the offense cannot be tolerated. It must be dealt with sternly and the charge made here against the respondent Broomhead is that he has repeated the offense at least twice since receiving punishment and kindly admonition. If guilty, it is my duty to impose a more severe penalty this time as punishment to him and as a warning to others.

Cases arise in the courts where circumstances point to the guilt of a party but where evidence of such mis- . conduct is difficult to secure except by paid witnesses. This is one of those cases. The courts “* * * must take such evidence as the nature of the case per[612]*612mits, circumstantial, direct or positive, and bringing to bear upon it the experiences and observations of life and thus weighing it with prudence and care, give effect to its just preponderance.” Yates v. Yates, 211 N. Y. 163, 170.

The witnesses for the complainant have been called private detectives by counsel for the respondent in an effort to discredit their testimony. While courts and juries have been justified on different occasions in looking with suspicion upon the evidence of private detectives, “ it has not been determined as matter of law that such evidence cannot be considered # * * but rather has declared that in the consideration of the same only such weight should be given to that class of evidence as the conscience of the judge or jurors shall determine the same entitled to receive.” Yates v. Yates, supra, 172. But even that rule has been applied to that class of persons who have held themselves out to the public -as engaged in the detective business. In this case, the complainant has utilized its own employees and the wives of its own employees who when they have disclosed the nature of their occupation by openly testifying in court can no longer continue such work. They are paid witnesses to be sure but they come within the rule which recognizes employees as mere interested witnesses. They are not in the private detective class since they do not make their regular livelihood in such business. But as interested witnesses they are classed with parties themselves and relatives of parties, such as the wife, mother and sister of the respondent Broomhead.

This does not mean that such witnesses do not tell the truth. It means that the court or jury is to determine whether or not the interest of the parties or their employees or relatives is such that they are liable, unintentionally or otherwise, to color their testimony [613]*613for their own benefit or for the benefit of the party by whom they are produced as witnesses.

So in reviewing the testimony in the case, the law gives as great weight to the testimony of the complainant’s witnesses as it does to the respondent Broomhead himself or to his relatives and leaves to the court the duty to test the evidence of all of them by the usual rules as to credibility, namely, to determine from their appearance on the stand and from their whole testimony and from all the facts and circumstances, what witness is worthy of belief and what witness, if any, is unworthy of belief.

I am satisfied that the respondent Broomhead was not telling the truth. In many particulars his testimony was clearly false. He positively asserted that he had not been violating the jitney law at any time but had always charged for his car by the hour or charged according to the distance, charging one dollar and twenty-five cents to go from Cohoes to Troy whether he had one passenger or more and collected the fare from one person only. Yet he pleaded guilty to a former offense and paid his fine. And on the morning of September twenty-third when he was served with the order to appear before me to answer to the present charges, he admits that he had at least two passengers in his car that he had picked up at two different points. He says he was giving them a free ride, but while he says he didn’t know the lady and at first said he didn’t know the man, his subsequent testimony convinced me that he did. Nevertheless, the man is not brought to court to substantiate his story although he knew that the question of his treatment of the order served on him in the presence of that man had been presented to the court by the affidavit of the person who served the order.

He was able to identify on the witness stand the [614]*614paper served upon him by reference to its appearance, its color and as to how it was folded, but in his affidavit he says he thought it was an advertising pamphlet.

He admits that he carried the process server on his running board for a considerable distance and didn’t even then stop his ear to let him get off, but threw open his door and told him to get off, that he didn’t want any of his junk, and claims that the opening of the door caused the paper to blow out of the car. Who can believe that if he thought it was only an advertisement he would not have stopped at once and certainly eventually to let the fellow off? He was not in such a hurry that he could not stop to take on the man passenger and again to take on the lady and according to his story he did it to give each of them a free ride.

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Bluebook (online)
116 Misc. 609, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-traction-co-v-monohan-nysupct-1921.