United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

2 Mass. L. Rptr. 197
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedJune 9, 1994
DocketNo. 87-7172
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 197 (United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 197 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

Murphy, J.

The plaintiffs, United Technologies Corporation and several of its wholly owned subsidiaries and divisions (collectively, “UTC”), bring this action for contract damages and for a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under certain general liability insurance agreements with respect to the plaintiffs’ past, present, and future liabilities. UTC’s liabilities arise from environmental claims resulting from their manufacturing operations and hazardous waste disposal practices at one hundred and nineteen (119) sites across the United States.

This memorandum is the second decision issued by the court concerning this dispute. In August of 1993, the court issued “Memorandum I”3 which discussed fifteen (15) sites, all located in New England, for which UTC sought insurance coverage for environmental contamination. In Memorandum I, the court discussed the history of the relationship between the parties and reviewed applicable state and federal law concerning the issues pertinent to this conflict.4 Those discussions will only be repeated where necessary. This memorandum (Memorandum II) will examine the thirty-nine (39) sites to which Liberty Mutual has moved for summary judgment and to which UTC has offered opposition. In addition, this memorandum will respond to UTC’s assertion that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be denied because UTC has not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. A later memorandum (Memorandum III), will discuss the sixty-two (62) sites for which Liberty Mutual moves for summary judgment and to which UTC offers no opposition.

I. BACKGROUND

UTC is a diversified corporation with business operations located throughout the United States. It is a broad-based designer and manufacturer of high-technology products operating approximately three hundred (300) plants and maintaining sales and service offices in fifty-seven (57) countries around the world.

UTC has incurred various environmental liabilities at many locations throughout the United States. In recent years, UTC has been notified by federal and numerous state environmental agencies that they may be liable as potentially responsible parties (PRP’s) for groundwater, surface water, and soil contamination at one hundred and nineteen (119) sites. UTC seeks coverage for cleanup, remediation, and other costs under the primary and excess insurance policies issued to them by the defendants. In particular, UTC seeks coverage from its primary insurer, the defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), which at various times from 1951 to 1985 issued commercial general liability insurance policies to UTC. However, all insurance policies issued by Liberty Mutual to UTC after 1970 included a pollution exclusion clause. The pollution exclusion clause limits insur-[198]*198anee coverage to contamination which is caused by a sudden and accidental event.

II. Principles of Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983); Community National Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553 (1976); Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a triable issue, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). Where the party moving for summary judgment does not have the burden of proof at trial, this burden may be met either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opponent’s case or “by demonstrating that proof of that element is unlikely to be forthcoming at trial.” Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat the motion. Pederson, 404 Mass. at 17.

“A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial and mandates the award of summary judgment.” Kourouvacilis, 410 Mass. at 711, citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

III. UTC Is Not Entitled To Additional Discovery

On October 12, 1990, the court entered a case management order which indefinitely stayed discovery on all non-New England sites. That stay remains effective. UTC contends that they cannot adequately respond to Liberty Mutual’s motion for summary judgment until the stay of discovery is lifted and formal discovery can progress. As to the majority of the sites discussed supra, the court does not agree.

The determination of whether a continuance is to be granted under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(f), to the non-mov-ant, is purely a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 409 Mass. 302, 307-09 (1991); Blake Brothers Corp. v. Roche, 12 Mass.App. 556, 560 (1981). In making such a determination, the court may consider multiple factors, including whether the information purportedly sought to be developed was already available to the non-movant. Id.

This litigation began in 1987, when UTC filed a declaratory judgment action seeking insurance coverage for cleanup costs incurred after UTC was found responsible for the environmental contamination of the sites discussed supra In order to prevail, UTC must set forth facts which indicate that they are entitled to such coverage. However, most agreements between Liberty Mutual and UTC contain a pollution exclusion clause which bars insurance coverage for contamination unless the contamination was caused by a “sudden and accidental” event. Therefore, UTC is only entitled to coverage if they can establish that the pollution exclusion clause is inapplicable. The court assumes that UTC’s complaint is not frivolous and that when filed, UTC was aware of facts sufficient to indicate that they were entitled to coverage. Further, on November 13, 1990, UTC filed a Second Amended Complaint, which alleged:

Upon information and belief, the environmental contamination and personal injury for which UTC Plaintiffs are alleged to be responsible in connection with the underlying environmental claims either commenced prior to the time when the insurance policies at issue contained any so-called pollution exclusion, or were “sudden and accidental” within the meaning of any such exclusion, or otherwise were outside the scope of any so-called pollution exclusion purportedly applicable to such contamination and personal injury.

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, at para. 549. The court assumes that when this Second Amended Complaint was filed, UTC was privy to facts sufficient to support the allegations made.

In February of 1991, UTC informed the court that it was ready for trial on all sites and urged timely litigation.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Mass. L. Rptr. 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-technologies-corp-v-liberty-mutual-insurance-masssuperct-1994.