United Steelworkers of America v. Brenntag

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 31, 2024
• Docket: 880 MDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A11016-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AMERICA, LOCAL 285 : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellant : : : v. : : : No. 880 MDA 2023 BRENNTAG NORTH AMERICA, INC. :

Appeal from the Order Entered May 11, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No: 22-14775

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2024

Appellant, United Steelworkers of America, Local 285, appeals from the

May 11, 2023 order striking its complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

The record reveals that attorney George Chada previously represented

Appellant in an action against Appellee, Brenntag North America, Inc., alleging

causes of action for, among other things, the medical monitoring1 of union

steelworkers working for Appellee (the “Previous Action”). Appellant

commenced the Previous Action in December of 2013. Chada entered his

appearance on behalf of Appellant in September of 2014 and filed several

amended complaints. The Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas struck

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1 Our Supreme Court recognized the medical monitoring cause of action in Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 239-40 (Pa. 1996). J-A11016-24

the fourth amended complaint, criticizing Chada for repeatedly filing amended

complaints that did not address Appellee’s preliminary objections. Per the

trial court’s opinion in the instant matter, the Lancaster County Court of

Common Pleas issued an order on September 4, 2018, disqualifying Chada as

counsel from the Previous Action for his continued dilatory conduct and

disregard of court orders, resulting in prolonged and expensive litigation and

a denial of due process to both parties. Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/23, at 2-4.

Appellant, again represented by Chada, commenced the current action

in Berks County on October 25, 2022. Appellee filed preliminary objections

on December 5, 2022, alleging that the statute of limitations2 for the alleged

injuries had passed and that an entity such as a labor union cannot suffer the

injuries (exposure to hazardous substances)3 alleged in the complaint. On

January 4, 2023, the trial court sustained the preliminary objections and

dismissed Appellant’s complaint without prejudice. The trial court directed

that an amended complaint must identify workers exposed to hazardous

substances and the date or dates of their exposure. After the original deadline

for an amended complaint lapsed, the trial court directed Appellant to file an

amended complaint by February 15, 2023. Appellant filed the amended

2 We are cognizant that statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to be raised in a new matter rather than in a preliminary objection. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a).

3 A labor union’s lack of capacity to sue is an appropriate ground for a preliminary objection. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(5).

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complaint on February 14, 2023, but the complaint did not comply with the

court’s directive to identify workers and the dates of their exposure to

hazardous substances. On March 9, 2023, Appellant filed a document titled

“Praecipe to Attach Exhibit 1” to its amended complaint. That Exhibit listed

names and dates of employment (though not dates of alleged exposure) for

various union members.

On March 13, 2023, the trial court sua sponte4 entered a show cause

order directing Chada to explain why he had not violated Rule 1023.1 of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides that an attorney, by

signing and filing a document with the court, certifies, among other things,

that the document is not offered for an improper purpose, that the claims

therein are not frivolous, are warranted by law, and have factual support.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1023.1(c). The Rule authorizes the trial court to impose sanctions

for violations after notice and an opportunity to respond. Pa.R.Civ.P.

1023.1(d). Among the permitted sanctions is the striking of the offending

document. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1023.4(a)(2)(i).

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 10, 2023, at

which Chada presented no evidence. Appellee presented documentation in

support of its claim that the applicable statute of limitations had expired and

4 Rule 1023.3 permits the trial court, on its own initiative, to enter an order directing a party to show cause why it has not violated Rule 1023.1. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1023.3.

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argued that a labor union does not have standing to commence a medical

monitoring action. On May 11, 2023, the trial court issued the order on

appeal, dismissing the offending document—the amended complaint—with

prejudice. The only question before us in this timely appeal is whether the

trial court erred in doing so.

We review the trial court’s order under Rule 1023.4 for an abuse of

discretion. U.S. Coal Corp. v. Dinning, 222 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. Super.

2019), appeal denied, 237 A.3d 888 (Pa. 2020). Summarizing the rules

addressed just above, this Court has held that a trial court may sua sponte

address a violation of Rule 1023.1 so long as the court enters a rule to show

cause directed to the attorney in question, and so long as any sanctions are

nonmonetary and/or direct the attorney to pay a monetary penalty to the

court (not to a party). Lowe v. Lowe, 110 A.3d 211, 215 (Pa. Super. 2015).

As we already have explained, the trial court followed the appropriate

steps under the rules, as summarized by Lowe. It issued a rule to show cause

on Chada and then imposed nonmonetary sanctions, in the form of striking

the offending document, an amended complaint asserting a cause of action

for medical monitoring.5 The explanatory comment to Rule 1023.1 provides

guidance on the considerations for imposing sanctions:

5 The elements of that cause of action are as follows:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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The rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should consider in deciding whether to impose a sanction or what sanctions would be appropriate in the circumstances. The factors that a court may consider include the following:

• whether the improper conduct was willful or negligent;

• whether it was part of a pattern of activity or an isolated event;

[…]

• whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in related litigation;

The court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions should not be more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1023.1, Explanatory Comment 2003.

(1) exposure greater than normal background levels;

(2) to a proven hazardous substance;

(3) caused by the defendant’s negligence;

(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease;

(5) a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of the disease possible;

(6) the prescribed monitoring regime is different from that normally recommended in the absence of the exposure; and

(7) the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific principles.

Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army & Dep't of Def. of the U.S., 696 A.2d 137, 145–46 (Pa. 1997).

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Given Chada’s disregard of court orders in the Previous Action and in

the present one, the trial court had reason to conclude that Chada’s conduct

was willful rather than negligent, that it was part of a pattern of activity, and

that Chada has engaged in similar conduct in the past, in accord with the

comment to Rule 1023.1. Indeed, the trial court put Chada on notice that the

focus of the evidentiary hearing in this matter would be the statute of

limitations,6 an examination of whether the claims raised herein were fully and

finally resolved in the Action,7 and whether a labor union has the capacity to

raise a claim of medical monitoring. Despite this, Chada put on no evidence

at the hearing on the matter.

Appellant argues in its brief that the trial court’s analysis amounted to

an end run around Appellee’s preliminary objections, dismissing the amended

complaint under Rule 1023.4 without actually addressing any issue on the

merits. Appellant’s argument ignores both his prior conduct and the language

of Rule 1023.1(c)(2), which requires that any claim be warranted by existing

6 While the statute of limitations is not a proper ground for a preliminary objection, we discern nothing improper about examining that issue to determine whether a complaint is frivolous or unwarranted by law within the meaning of Rule 1023.1.

7 After Chada was disqualified from representing Appellant in the Previous Action, Appellant was given time to obtain new counsel. The Previous Action was non prossed in 2018 after Appellant failed to take further action following Chada’s disqualification. N.T. Hearing, 4/10/23, at 23. The trial court did not rely on the ultimate outcome of the Previous Action in support of its order, and Appellee does not press that issue on appeal.

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law or a good faith argument for extension thereof. In response to the show

cause order, Appellant failed to produce any evidence to support a conclusion

that the claims set forth in its complaint have any basis in law. Likewise,

Appellant did not even attempt, pursuant to the show cause order, to

demonstrate that its factual allegations have evidentiary support or are likely

to have evidentiary support, as per Rule 1023.1(c)(3).

Chada introduced no documents and produced no witnesses at the

hearing on the show cause order. N.T. Hearing, 4/10/23, at 20. Chada was

evasive on the trial court’s questions regarding when the statute of limitations

began to run in this case. Id. at 12-17. Appellee introduced 24 exhibits

supporting their theory that claims involved in the present litigation were the

same claims that were involved in the Previous Action ten years earlier.

Chada was unable to produce a case from any state or federal court

permitting a labor union, rather than individual plaintiffs, to prosecute a

medical monitoring case. Id. at 37. Despite the show cause order putting

him on notice of that issue, Chada said he did not research it. Id. This despite

having raised the same claim on behalf of Appellant in the Previous Action.

Id. Appellee argued, correctly, that the Redland Soccer case noted above

named dozens of individual plaintiffs in the caption. The same is true of other

medical monitoring cases. See, e.g., Walter v. Magee-Women’s Hosp.,

876 A.2d 400 (Pa. Super. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2006); Barnes v.

The Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 161 F.3d 127 (3d. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526

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U.S. 1114 (1999). And, indeed, the elements of the medical monitoring cause

of action (see note 5, supra) apply to individuals, not legal entities.

Appellee’s counsel explained:

The medical monitoring requires individualized proofs of exposure, causation, the adequacy of the medical monitoring regime. And the reason is that we need to know who has been exposed, when, how long, and – in order to determine whether or not the exposure causes a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease and whether there was an adequate medical monitoring regime for that particular person, and whether that regime is reasonably necessary for contemporary scientific principles.

Id. at 25. Appellant never named any individual plaintiffs as parties nor, in

this action or the Previous Action, did it allege facts specific to the elements

of the cause of action or the questions Appellee’s counsel posed at the hearing.

Given the deficiencies of Appellant’s complaint and amended complaint,

Chada’s wholesale failure to address those deficiencies as directed by the trial

court, and mindful of Chada’s previous misconduct and mishandling of the

same claims on behalf of the same plaintiff against the same defendant in the

Previous Action, the trial court struck the amended complaint in accord with

Rule 1023.4(a)(2)(i). In doing so, the trial court acted well within its

permissible discretion.

Moreover, Appellant is wrong to argue that the trial court made an end

run around deciding Appellee’s preliminary objections on the merits. The trial

court’s examination of the dubious legal and factual foundation of the

amended complaint was appropriate under Rule 1023.1(c). Because the trial

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court’s actions were procedurally appropriate, and because Appellant has

failed to articulate any substantive basis for disturbing the trial court's order,

we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/31/2024

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