UNITED STEEL WORKERS v. Craig

Supreme Court of Alabama

UNITED STEEL WORKERS v. Craig

571 So. 2d 1101, 1990 WL 210315

CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

DecidedNovember 21, 1990

Docket88-1542

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 571 So. 2d 1101 (UNITED STEEL WORKERS v. Craig) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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UNITED STEEL WORKERS v. Craig, 571 So. 2d 1101, 1990 WL 210315 (Ala. 1990).

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Opinion

We hold that the duty, if any, on which the plaintiffs' claims rest, arises solely out of federal labor law (the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.; and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). The fact that the plaintiffs couched their suit in language indicative of state-law claims does not create a state-law cause of action where, as here, a state-law claim does not otherwise exist. In other words, but for the duty of fair representation implied in the union-employee relationship, inherent in federal labor law, no cause of action exists for legal malpractice against a nonlawyer, based on the nonlawyer's "failing to adequately represent the plaintiffs" in a litigated "discrimination" suit. See Erkins v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica, AFL-CIO-CLC, 723 F.2d 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,467 U.S. 1243, 104 S.Ct. 3517, 82 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984).

Therefore, because the plaintiffs concede that, if the preemptive effect of federal law is applicable, their claims are time-barred, we reverse the judgments appealed from and render judgment for the defendants. See InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Powell, 370 So.2d 987 (Ala. 1979).

REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.

HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.

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We hold that the duty, if any, on which the plaintiffs' claims rest, arises solely out of federal labor law (the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.; and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). The fact that the plaintiffs couched their suit in language indicative of state-law claims does not create a state-law cause of action where, as here, a state-law claim does not otherwise exist. In other words, but for the duty of fair representation implied in the union-employee relationship, inherent in federal labor law, no cause of action exists for legal malpractice against a nonlawyer, based on the nonlawyer's "failing to adequately represent the plaintiffs" in a litigated "discrimination" suit. See Erkins v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica, AFL-CIO-CLC, 723 F.2d 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,467 U.S. 1243, 104 S.Ct. 3517, 82 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984).

Therefore, because the plaintiffs concede that, if the preemptive effect of federal law is applicable, their claims are time-barred, we reverse the judgments appealed from and render judgment for the defendants. See InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Powell, 370 So.2d 987 (Ala. 1979).

REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.

HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.

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571 So. 2d 1101, 1990 WL 210315, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-steel-workers-v-craig-ala-1990.

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