United States v. Zubeck

248 F. Supp. 2d 895, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25988, 2002 WL 32054544
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedOctober 25, 2002
Docket97-0138-03-CR-W-DW
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 248 F. Supp. 2d 895 (United States v. Zubeck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Zubeck, 248 F. Supp. 2d 895, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25988, 2002 WL 32054544 (W.D. Mo. 2002).

Opinion

ORDER

WHIPPLE, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is the United States’ motion to revoke Defendant’s supervised release. Evidence relating to the pending motion was presented by the parties at a hearing before the Court on March 15, 2002. The hearing was continued to allow the parties to develop evidence specifically addressing the reliability of the PharmChek sweat patch and its susceptibility to external contamination. The hearing was resumed on October 9, 2002. This Order supplements a portion of the Court’s ruling at the October 9, 2002 hearing. Specifically, this Order supplements the Court’s rejection of Defendant’s challenge to the results of tests performed on a PharmChem sweat patch indicating the presence of illegal drugs. For the following reasons in addition to those stated at the October 9, 2002 hearing, the Court rejects Defendant’s challenge to the reliability of the sweat patch and finds that the sweat patch is reliable evidence that Defendant used illegal drugs thereby vio *897 lating a condition of her supervised release.

On January 28, 1999, Defendant was sentenced after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. After granting a motion for downward departure filed by the United States, the Court sentenced Defendant to five (5) years of supervised release. The United States moves to revoke Defendant’s supervised release because, according to the United States, Defendant used methamphetamine while on supervised release. 1

The United States alleges that Defendant used methamphetamine in violation of the following condition on her supervised release: “[t]he defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.” Before the Court will revoke Defendant’s supervised release, the United States must show by a preponderance of evidence that Defendant violated a supervised release condition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). If the Court so finds, it can sentence Defendant to all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense for which Defendant was originally sentenced with or without credit for time served. See id.

The United States’ allegation is based on a PharmChem laboratory report which finds that a sweat patch applied to Defendant on October 31, 2001 and removed on November 8, 2001 tested positive for methamphetamine. Defendant counters that the sweat patch, in this case, was an unreliable indicator of drug use because it is susceptible of being contaminated by drugs from outside sources.

Specifically, Defendant argues that Martin Joyce, the Chemical Dependency Technician who applied the sweat patch, was unqualified to do so and did so in a sloppy manner. This conclusion is based on the testimony of Defendant’s expert Dr. Smith that Mr. Joyce’s understanding of a compromised patch is unduly narrow. Defendant also contends that Mr Joyce erred in leaving the sweat patch on Defendant for eight days as opposed to the seven days recommended by the manufacturer.

Defendant also takes issue with results contained in the PharmChem report arguing that inconsistencies in the report indicate that Defendant’s sweat patch should not be relied upon in this case. First, Defendant points out that the PharmChem litigation packet shows that a different specimen number was originally written in the space identifying the specimen tested on the first analysis. Defendant’s specimen number was written over the other number. Also, the results from the first analysis performed by PharmChem identified methamphetamine but failed to identify amphetamine. In order to be considered a positive test for methamphetamine, some amphetamine should be detected. Furthermore, when Defendant’s specimen was retested after PharmChem received Defendant’s request for the litigation packet, the results showed a larger concentration of methamphetamine than that which was present in the first test as well as sufficient amphetamine to justify a finding that Defendant used methamphetamine.

The aforementioned arguments notwithstanding, the bulk of Defendant’s argument was based on the testimony of her expert, Dr. Frederick P. Smith, that the sweat patch is susceptible to being contaminated from outside sources even if proper *898 ly applied. In 1999, Dr. Smith, along with Dr. David A. Kidwell, conducted a study on the sweat patch for the Naval Research Laboratory and wrote a report of his findings titled, “Susceptibility of PharmChek Drugs of Abuse Patch to Environmental Contamination.” The report, in relevant part, stated that the sweat patch becomes susceptible to outside contamination when the underside, or pad, of the patch is saturated with an acidic substance (a substance with a pH lower than seven (7)) and at the same time, a drug such as cocaine is dissolved in a basic substance (a substance with a pH higher than seven (7)), then applied to the outside of the patch. When this is done, the basic substance containing the drug may pass through the membrane on the outside of the patch and deposit some of the drug in the pad of the sweat patch. If the sweat patch is then tested, it will test positive for the presence of illegal drugs even though the wearer did not actually take any drugs.

Defendant testified that during the period of time that she was wearing the sweat patch she came into casual contact with methamphetamine although she did not use any herself. Defendant testified that during the time she wore the sweat patch she slept in the same bed where she had previously used methamphetamine and that the sheets had not been cleaned. Defendant also testified that during the time she was wearing the sweat patch, she wore clothes that she had previously worn while using methamphetamine. In light of Defendant’s testimony, Dr. Smith testified that it was likely that Defendant’s sweat patch was contaminated by an outside source of methamphetamine as opposed to ingestion by Defendant.

The United States presented testimony from its own expert, Dr. Kadehjian. Dr. Kadehjian agreed with much of Dr. Smith’s testimony. Specifically, Dr. Ka-dehjian did not dispute the results of experiments performed by Dr. Smith in which the sweat patch was contaminated by outside sources. Dr. Kadehjian did disagree with Dr. Smith, however, over whether those experiments are of any relevance to whether a sweat patch, if properly applied can become contaminated when worn as intended during day-to-day life.

In light of the evidence presented by the parties at the October 9, 2002 hearing, the Court finds as follows:

1. The Court accepts the testimony of Dr. Kadehjian that Martin Joyce was well-trained and properly qualified to apply the sweat patch to Defendant. He did so consistent with his training and took all reasonable steps to properly apply the sweat patch, including properly swabbing the area with an alcohol solution prior to application. The Court further finds that Joyce was properly qualified to remove the patch thus preserving the patch for testing by PharmChem. In removing the patch, Joyce properly inspected the patch to determine whether the patch had been compromised and finding that it had not, he properly packaged and preserved the patch.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Roy Carrion
457 F. App'x 405 (Fifth Circuit, 2012)
United States v. Donavon Swanson
301 F. App'x 576 (Eighth Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Meyer
485 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (N.D. Iowa, 2006)
United States v. Alfonso
284 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Massachusetts, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
248 F. Supp. 2d 895, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25988, 2002 WL 32054544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-zubeck-mowd-2002.