United States v. Yandrey Negrin Rojas

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: April 10, 2026
• Docket: 24-12666
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 1 of 8

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12666 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

YANDREY NEGRIN ROJAS, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20438-RNS-4 ____________________

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Yandrey Negrin Rojas appeals his sentence of 97 months’ im- prisonment for one count of conspiracy to transport and harbor al- iens for profit and seven counts of transporting aliens for profit. He USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 2 of 8

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argues that the district court improperly considered acquitted con- duct at sentencing, which violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and led to the improper imposition of four sentencing en- hancements. Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm. I In August of 2022, a group of Cuban migrants boarded a go- fast boat headed for the United States. In the night, the boat trav- ersed the sea and dropped the migrants on an uninhabited key in the Florida Keys. For two days, they were left with nothing more than a cooler containing water and crackers until another vessel picked them up. These vessels were overcrowded and did not have enough life jackets for the number of migrants aboard. 1 When the second vessel came ashore, Mr. Negrin Rojas and his co-conspirators met the migrants and transported them to a house in Marathon, Florida. Mr. Negrin Rojas later transported some of them to a house in Hialeah, Florida. Once the migrants were in the house, Mr. Negrin Rojas (or one of his co-conspirators) would call the migrants’ relatives and/or friends in the United States and tell them that their relative or friend would not be re- leased unless they paid Mr. Negrin Rojas and his co-conspirators $15,000. There were always two individuals guarding the houses— often carrying firearms. Mr. Negrin Rojas testified that they could

1 We recite the facts as stated in Mr. Negrin Rojas’ admissions at his change of

plea hearing, his testimony at trial, and the factual statements in his presen- tence investigation report (to which he did not object). USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 3 of 8

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not allow the migrants to leave because the migrants would get arrested and deported to Cuba. There is no evidence that the smug- glers physically harmed any of the migrants to keep them in the houses. A friend of one of the migrants, who was being held in Hia- leah, contacted law enforcement. On September 2, 2022, the friend, accompanied by an undercover law enforcement officer, met with two of Mr. Negrin Rojas’ co-conspirators, rescued the migrant, and arrested the two co-conspirators. That migrant identified Mr. Negrin Rojas in a lineup as one of the individuals who was present when the boat arrived in the United States. Later that same day, law enforcement stopped a white SUV leaving the Hialeah house, rescued four more migrants, and arrested another one of Mr. Negrin Rojas’ co-conspirators. Mr. Negrin Rojas’ participation in this migrant smuggling operation began around June of 2022 and ended when his co-con- spirators were arrested on September 2, 2022. But Mr. Negrin Rojas was not apprehended until August 15, 2023. A grand jury indicted Mr. Negrin Rojas, charging him with conspiracy to transport and harbor aliens for profit, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) (Count 1); seven counts of transport- ing an alien for profit, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Counts 2–8); conspiracy to commit hostage taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (Count 9); and seven counts of hostage taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (Counts 10–16). Mr. Negrin Ro- jas, without a plea agreement, pled guilty to Counts 1 through 8. USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 4 of 8

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After a nine-day trial, a jury acquitted Mr. Negrin Rojas of Counts 9 through 16. Mr. Negrin Rojas had a criminal history category of I. The district court utilized a base offense level of 12 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(a)(3). The court then applied a 6-level enhancement for the number of victims pursuant to § 2L1.1(b)(2)(A) and a 4-level fire- arm brandishing enhancement pursuant to § 2L1.1(b)(5)(B). The court added a 2-level enhancement for substantial risk of serious bodily injury pursuant to § 2L1.1(b)(6). The court noted that “even if, technically, the conduct of leaving these people on an uninhab- ited key without food or water probably doesn’t meet that criteria, [it] would have varied two levels, giving the same sentencing rele- vant to that enhancement.” D.E. 282 at 41. The district court then applied a 2-level enhancement be- cause an alien was involuntarily detained in connection with a de- mand for payment pursuant to § 2L.1(b)(8)(A)(ii). The court also applied a 2-level vulnerable victim enhancement pursuant to § 3A1.1(b)(1). The court again noted that “even if this conduct or the victim’s status would not have technically met the legal criteria of the, quote, vulnerable victim,” the court “would have varied up- ward as the judge did in [United States v.] Angeles-Mendoza[, 407 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2005)].” D.E. 282 at 42. Finally, the court added a 2- level enhancement for Mr. Negrin Rojas’ leadership role in the con- spiracy pursuant to § 3B1.1(c). USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 5 of 8

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These enhancements brought the adjusted offense level to 30, and after the subtraction of 2 levels for acceptance of responsi- bility, the final offense level was 28. In applying these enhance- ments, the court stated that it did not consider acquitted conduct. See D.E. 282 at 71. Mr. Negrin Rojas’ resulting advisory guideline range was 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mr. Negrin Rojas to the top end of the advisory guideline range and imposed a sentence of 97 months’ imprisonment. II Mr. Negrin Rojas argues that the district court erred by con- sidering acquitted conduct at sentencing. He contends that the court’s consideration of acquitted conduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Despite the district court’s assur- ances that it did not consider acquitted conduct, he maintains that the application of the enhancements involved conduct that is inex- tricably connected to the conduct for which the jury acquitted him. A We review constitutional sentencing issues de novo. See United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 978 (11th Cir. 2008)). We also review legal conclusions regarding the advisory guidelines de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600, 605 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2009)). USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 6 of 8

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B “Under our long-standing precedent, relevant conduct of which a defendant was acquitted nonetheless may be taken into account in sentencing for the offense of conviction, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct relied upon by a prepon- derance of the evidence.” United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted, citation omit- ted, and alteration adopted). See also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149, 155–56, 157 (1997) (holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct when fashioning a sentence if the con- duct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence). In November of 2024, after Mr. Negrin Rojas’ sentencing, Amendment 826 to the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Guideline Manual § 1B1.3 (Nov. 2024). Amendment 826 amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 by adding a new sub- section (c) for “Acquitted Conduct,” which reads: “Relevant con- duct does not include conduct for which the defendant was crimi- nally charged and acquitted in federal court, unless such conduct also establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of convic- tion.” See id. We have said that Amendment 826 is not retroactive. See United States v. Romeu, No. 25-10788, 2026 WL 36113, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026). See also United States v. Simpson, 138 F.4th 438, 455 (6th Cir. 2025) (stating that Amendment 826 is not a retroactive clarifying amendment). Although we are not bound by our un- published decision in Romeu, Mr. Negrin Rojas has not meaning- fully argued that Amendment 826 is a clarifying amendment which applies retroactively. See United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 7 of 8

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1184 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “clarifying amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines are to be given retroactive effect”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Amendment 826 does not apply, we must apply the law at the time of sentencing. We are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent and our existing precedents that foreclose Mr. Negrin Rojas’ acquitted conduct argument. See, e.g., Watts, 519 U.S. at 157; Faust, 456 F.3d at 1347. Indeed, Mr. Negrin Rojas acknowl- edges that Watts and its progeny control but contends that Watts was wrongly decided. We are bound by Watts’ holding that a sen- tencing court may properly consider acquitted conduct and its ap- plication in our precedents. See United States v. Rolle, 65 F.4th 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Only the Supreme Court may overturn its precedents.”) (alterations adopted, internal quotation marks omit- ted, and citation omitted). See also United States v. Touray, 151 F.4th 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2025) (“So long as the sentence imposed by the district court does not exceed the sentence authorized by the jury verdict and is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, it does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments to consider ac- quitted conduct at sentencing.”) (internal quotation marks and ci- tation omitted). Even so, this is not the case to determine the effect of Amendment 826 on our Sixth Amendment acquitted conduct sen- tencing precedents because we doubt that the district court consid- ered acquitted conduct. First, the court stated that it did not con- sider acquitted conduct. Second, because Mr. Negrin Rojas did not USCA11 Case: 24-12666 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2026 Page: 8 of 8

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object to most of the factual statements in the presentence investi- gation report, he “admit[ted] those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566, 572 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006)). We dis- cern no error in the district court’s consideration of Mr. Negrin Ro- jas’ admitted conduct to apply the four enhancements. 2 III We affirm Mr. Negrin Rojas’ sentence. AFFIRMED.

2 Because we discern no error, we need not reach the government’s alternative

ground for affirmance that any error was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 933 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom and Tjoflat, J.J., concurring); United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275, 1306 (11th Cir. 2025) (Jordan, J., concur- ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that there is no reason to decide “more than what is necessary to resolve [an] appeal”) (alterations adopted, internal quotation marks omitted, and citation omitted).