United States v. Yancey

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 24-3328
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 3 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-3328 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 6:17-cr-00380-MC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* CHARLES YANCEY IV,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Charles Yancey IV appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges

the 30-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his probation. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Yancey argues that the district court procedurally erred by improperly

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). terminating his allocution and preventing him from presenting mitigating

arguments. He further contends the court erred by failing to consider the parties’

recommendations and focusing exclusively on the danger he posed to the public.

Finally, Yancey claims the court failed to adequately explain the sentence.

These claims are unavailing. The record reflects that the district court

invited Yancey to speak before imposing the sentence, and that he was afforded an

adequate “opportunity to make a statement and present any information in

mitigation.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E); see also United States v. Daniels, 760

F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2014). The record also shows that the court considered the

parties’ recommendations, including Yancey’s mitigating circumstances, and was

aware that it could impose a sentence within the 8-14 month range provided in the

Chapter 7 policy statement. Instead, it reasonably elected to sentence Yancey

under the 63-78 month range governing his original conviction, see United States

v. Plunkett, 94 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1996), and explained why a 30-month

prison sentence was appropriate in light of his squandered opportunities to comply

with the conditions of probation, his poor decision-making, and his inability to get

his drug use under control. This explanation belies Yancey’s assertion that the

court unduly focused on dangerousness and is sufficient to permit meaningful

appellate review. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc).

2 24-3328 Yancey also asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. He has

not shown, however, that the district court abused its discretion. See Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 30-month sentence is substantively reasonable

in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the

circumstances, including the nature of Yancey’s violation conduct. See Gall, 552

U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-3328