GEWIN, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Danny Ray Works and Gaye William Brown were convicted under Count I of an indictment charging a conspiracy,1 from September 16 through September 21, 1975, to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).2 Appel[942]*942lants were also convicted under Count II of the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute LSD.3 Additionally, appellant Brown was convicted under Count III of the indictment, which charged him with assaulting federal officers.4 Both appellants- were sentenced to two years on both Counts I and II and Brown was sentenced to six years on Count III, all sentences to be served concurrently.5 We affirm. Since the factual setting and sequence of events are quite important in this case, we will set out below the occurrences in rather detailed fashion under each relevant date.
A. September 4, 1974
This date is not encompassed within the indictment time span. Nevertheless, Special Agent Grafton of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) testified without objection that on this date, in the course of a conversation, appellant Works informed him that “he sold a few pills.” 6
B. September 11, 1974
This date is not encompassed within the indictment time span. ATF Agent Grafton testified that on this date, “Danny Works advised me that he was taking 40,000 tabs of LSD hits — excuse me, Mescaline, to a friend of his named Alex in Durant, Oklahoma.” There was no objection to this testimony. Grafton also testified that he saw a pistol hanging on a wall in Works’ house, which is located in Fort Worth, Texas.
[943]*943C. September 16, 1974
On this date Agent Grafton and Special ATF Agent Larry Arnold met Works at his residence and accompanied him to a house occupied by one Don and his family. While there, Grafton testified over objection that “two high school-looking kids” came by and asked Don if he had any marijuana. After this testimony Works’ motion for a mistrial was denied, but he was granted his request that the jury be instructed to disregard this evidence.7
Grafton went on to testify that during the trip back to Works’ residence, there was some discussion of drugs among Arnold, Works and himself. Grafton testified that Arnold told Works that he (Arnold) would like to get a load of mescaline to take to Laurel, Mississippi because “hallucinating drugs were hard to get” in that area. Grafton further testified that Works said he would be receiving a load of mescaline from Austin by means of a “runner”, whom he would meet on a deserted farm south of Fort Worth. Works offered the drugs for 45 cents per “hit”,8 and Arnold and Grafton indicated their interest in obtaining two to four thousand “hits.” Works said the drugs could be expected in three or four days.
Agent Arnold confirmed Grafton’s account of the conversation, but added, over objection, two crucial factors. First, Arnold testified that Works said he was going to have a friend with a high-powered rifle guarding the farm where the mescaline was to be picked up.9 Secondly, Arnold testified that Works said his sister in high school sold mescaline for him and that she would take at least 1000 hits of it. Works’ attorney objected to this testimony as involving an extraneous offense and be[944]*944ing highly prejudicial and irrelevant, but the objection was overruled.10
D. September 20, 1974
Agent Grafton testified that at about 12:30 p. m. he and Agent Arnold went to Works’ residence where they spoke to Patricia Jean Works, Danny’s wife. Grafton testified that Mrs. Works said Danny “was out doing business; that the guy from Austin came up that morning and brought him some LSD. . . . ” She said Danny was out collecting money and would be back at any time. Grafton further testified11 that Mrs. Works told him that the “runner” had gone back to Austin to pick up some more narcotics, from which the agents’ 2000 “hits” would come. Grafton told Mrs. Works he would be back later.12 The agents then left the Works’ residence.
At 5:30 or 6:00 p. m. Agents Grafton and Arnold returned to the Works’ house. Danny Works was present then and Grafton asked him “had the drugs come in,” to which Works replied in the negative.13 Accordingly, the agents left the residence and returned in about an hour. The runner had still not arrived, however, so Grafton left his phone number and asked Works to call him when the source did arrive.
E. September 21, 1974
Before Agents Grafton and Arnold returned to the Works’ residence after midnight, other ATF agents and Houston policemen placed the location under surveillance. In the early morning hours of September 21, Grafton and Arnold arrived at the residence. Several persons, including the appellants, were at Works’ house at that time.
Danny Works and Agent Grafton stepped onto the porch to discuss their narcotics deal. Grafton “asked him [Works] had he received the drugs 14 and he stated that all he had was four or five hundred tabs of LSD left,” and, “told him we would take that and he advised us it was going to be 65 cents a tab rather than 45 cents and I told him we would pay the price for it.” Grafton [945]*945also saw the revolver that he had seen earlier that evening on the Works’ couch.
The actors then began negotiating the mechanics of the transaction: Works expressed the desire that one agent go with him and another with Brown, but the two agents insisted on staying together. Meanwhile, appellant Brown began walking across Works’ front yard.15 Brown then called to Works, telling him to “ ‘come here,’ ” but Grafton objected to Works’ going to Brown. Brown then walked to the house, simultaneously telling Works to come to him. When Brown reached the house he obtained the pistol from inside the front door and pointed it at the two agents. The agents were told by Brown to put their hands up. After various maneuverings a gun battle ensued, leaving Brown and several of the other civilians injured.16
Arnold testified that after investigating and securing the house, he returned to where Brown lay wounded on the ground and “asked him how he was and he said he was hit but he thought he was okay. And he said, ‘Did you get the stuff yet?’ and I said, ‘No, not yet.’ And he said, ‘It is by the bush.’ And. I walked over to the bush.” 17 The agents then recovered the LSD under that bush, which was located on the lot adjacent to Works’.18 Both appellants objected to the introduction of the narcotics evidence on the grounds of no proper predicate and failure to show a custodial or possessory nexus with the appellants. These objections were overruled, just as .defendants’ earlier motion to suppress had been denied. We turn now to consideration of the appellants’ arguments that their convictions should be reversed.
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GEWIN, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Danny Ray Works and Gaye William Brown were convicted under Count I of an indictment charging a conspiracy,1 from September 16 through September 21, 1975, to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).2 Appel[942]*942lants were also convicted under Count II of the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute LSD.3 Additionally, appellant Brown was convicted under Count III of the indictment, which charged him with assaulting federal officers.4 Both appellants- were sentenced to two years on both Counts I and II and Brown was sentenced to six years on Count III, all sentences to be served concurrently.5 We affirm. Since the factual setting and sequence of events are quite important in this case, we will set out below the occurrences in rather detailed fashion under each relevant date.
A. September 4, 1974
This date is not encompassed within the indictment time span. Nevertheless, Special Agent Grafton of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) testified without objection that on this date, in the course of a conversation, appellant Works informed him that “he sold a few pills.” 6
B. September 11, 1974
This date is not encompassed within the indictment time span. ATF Agent Grafton testified that on this date, “Danny Works advised me that he was taking 40,000 tabs of LSD hits — excuse me, Mescaline, to a friend of his named Alex in Durant, Oklahoma.” There was no objection to this testimony. Grafton also testified that he saw a pistol hanging on a wall in Works’ house, which is located in Fort Worth, Texas.
[943]*943C. September 16, 1974
On this date Agent Grafton and Special ATF Agent Larry Arnold met Works at his residence and accompanied him to a house occupied by one Don and his family. While there, Grafton testified over objection that “two high school-looking kids” came by and asked Don if he had any marijuana. After this testimony Works’ motion for a mistrial was denied, but he was granted his request that the jury be instructed to disregard this evidence.7
Grafton went on to testify that during the trip back to Works’ residence, there was some discussion of drugs among Arnold, Works and himself. Grafton testified that Arnold told Works that he (Arnold) would like to get a load of mescaline to take to Laurel, Mississippi because “hallucinating drugs were hard to get” in that area. Grafton further testified that Works said he would be receiving a load of mescaline from Austin by means of a “runner”, whom he would meet on a deserted farm south of Fort Worth. Works offered the drugs for 45 cents per “hit”,8 and Arnold and Grafton indicated their interest in obtaining two to four thousand “hits.” Works said the drugs could be expected in three or four days.
Agent Arnold confirmed Grafton’s account of the conversation, but added, over objection, two crucial factors. First, Arnold testified that Works said he was going to have a friend with a high-powered rifle guarding the farm where the mescaline was to be picked up.9 Secondly, Arnold testified that Works said his sister in high school sold mescaline for him and that she would take at least 1000 hits of it. Works’ attorney objected to this testimony as involving an extraneous offense and be[944]*944ing highly prejudicial and irrelevant, but the objection was overruled.10
D. September 20, 1974
Agent Grafton testified that at about 12:30 p. m. he and Agent Arnold went to Works’ residence where they spoke to Patricia Jean Works, Danny’s wife. Grafton testified that Mrs. Works said Danny “was out doing business; that the guy from Austin came up that morning and brought him some LSD. . . . ” She said Danny was out collecting money and would be back at any time. Grafton further testified11 that Mrs. Works told him that the “runner” had gone back to Austin to pick up some more narcotics, from which the agents’ 2000 “hits” would come. Grafton told Mrs. Works he would be back later.12 The agents then left the Works’ residence.
At 5:30 or 6:00 p. m. Agents Grafton and Arnold returned to the Works’ house. Danny Works was present then and Grafton asked him “had the drugs come in,” to which Works replied in the negative.13 Accordingly, the agents left the residence and returned in about an hour. The runner had still not arrived, however, so Grafton left his phone number and asked Works to call him when the source did arrive.
E. September 21, 1974
Before Agents Grafton and Arnold returned to the Works’ residence after midnight, other ATF agents and Houston policemen placed the location under surveillance. In the early morning hours of September 21, Grafton and Arnold arrived at the residence. Several persons, including the appellants, were at Works’ house at that time.
Danny Works and Agent Grafton stepped onto the porch to discuss their narcotics deal. Grafton “asked him [Works] had he received the drugs 14 and he stated that all he had was four or five hundred tabs of LSD left,” and, “told him we would take that and he advised us it was going to be 65 cents a tab rather than 45 cents and I told him we would pay the price for it.” Grafton [945]*945also saw the revolver that he had seen earlier that evening on the Works’ couch.
The actors then began negotiating the mechanics of the transaction: Works expressed the desire that one agent go with him and another with Brown, but the two agents insisted on staying together. Meanwhile, appellant Brown began walking across Works’ front yard.15 Brown then called to Works, telling him to “ ‘come here,’ ” but Grafton objected to Works’ going to Brown. Brown then walked to the house, simultaneously telling Works to come to him. When Brown reached the house he obtained the pistol from inside the front door and pointed it at the two agents. The agents were told by Brown to put their hands up. After various maneuverings a gun battle ensued, leaving Brown and several of the other civilians injured.16
Arnold testified that after investigating and securing the house, he returned to where Brown lay wounded on the ground and “asked him how he was and he said he was hit but he thought he was okay. And he said, ‘Did you get the stuff yet?’ and I said, ‘No, not yet.’ And he said, ‘It is by the bush.’ And. I walked over to the bush.” 17 The agents then recovered the LSD under that bush, which was located on the lot adjacent to Works’.18 Both appellants objected to the introduction of the narcotics evidence on the grounds of no proper predicate and failure to show a custodial or possessory nexus with the appellants. These objections were overruled, just as .defendants’ earlier motion to suppress had been denied. We turn now to consideration of the appellants’ arguments that their convictions should be reversed.
Appellants’ major point of contention is that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing into evidence the testimony of Agents Grafton and Arnold about narcotics other than LSD (mescaline and marijuana). We have concluded that, although the admission of some or possibly all of this evidence was indeed error, under the facts and in the circumstances revealed by the record in this case that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the convictions are affirmed pursuant to the concurrent sentence doctrine.19
[946]*946Appellants first argue that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after Grafton’s testimony about the conversation between Don and the two boys concerning a marijuana deal.20 Works was present at this conversation, but was not a participant therein and apparently had nothing to do with the transaction. This evidence was conceded by the government to be inadmissible and it should not have come in. However, the trial judge did immediately and lucidly instruct the jury that this evidence should not be considered by them for any purpose. In these circumstances, the failure to declare a mistrial is not reversible error. Although this testimony was not admissible, the government proved its case solidly with admissible evidence,21 rendering the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see United States v. Bowdach, 501 F.2d 220, 227 — 28 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 426 (1975). Disposition of a motion for mistrial is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the district court did not abuse that discretion here in concluding that any prejudicial effects of this testimony could be cured by its immediate instruction, see, e. g., United States v. Cox, 487 F.2d 634, 636 — 37 and n.2 (5th Cir. 1973). The questioned testimony fits snugly under the aegis of the general rule that an error in admitting evidence can, in many circumstances, be cured by withdrawing it from the jury and giving curative instructions, e. g., United States v. Smith, 517 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Troise, 483 F.2d 615, 618 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1066, 94 S.Ct. 574, 38 L.Ed.2d 471 (1973).
Secondly, appellants contend that the admission of the testimony about dealings in mescaline, especially that pertaining to Works’ high school sister, was immaterial and highly prejudicial,22 because, appellants assert, they were indicted for illicit LSD activities, not for illegal dealings in mescaline.23 The government responds by contending that the evidence establishes that the transactions between the agents and Works establish a mutual intent to deal in any kind of hallucinogenic drugs; that Works’ comment about his sister selling mescaline was dealer’s “puffing” designed to convince his “buyers” of his [947]*947drug dealing abilities, and that appellants never specifically objected to this testimony on the ground of variance. Therefore, the government argues, this evidence was material to the conspiracy charge and its admission was not, in any event, clear error.
We find that the positions of both parties contain some merit,24 but it is unnecessary for us to resolve this issue. The clearly admissible evidence of the September 20 — 21 transactions is more than sufficient to support the convictions under Count II, which charged appellants with the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute LSD. This evidence overwhelmingly establishes that appellants possessed the seized LSD with intent to distribute it. Works was obtaining LSD and selling it to others and attempting to sell it to the agents. Brown went to get the LSD and told the agents where it was located. The dominion that both appellants exercised over the LSD establishes their actual or constructive possession of it.25 Unquestionably then, the competent evidence relating to the September 20-21 occurrences clearly established appellants’ guilt under Count II of the indictment. Thus, with respect to this count, any error in admitting evidence about other drugs was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, e. g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Bokine, 523 F.2d 767, 773 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975) [1975] (introduction of evidence relating to marijuana harmless beyond reasonable doubt in Schedule III barbiturate prosecution where valid evidence of guilt was overwhelming).
Moreover, Brown’s guilt under Count III, pursuant to which he was sentenced to a concurrent six year sentence, was clearly established by appropriate evidence. Any error in admitting the evidence as to the friend with a rifle26 or the evidence concerning other drugs was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Brown’s actions on the morning of September 21. The testimony of both the agents and Brown established that Brown aimed a pistol at them and continued to do so, accompanied by a command to put their hands up, despite a clear identification of the men as federal officers. We find unpersuasive Brown’s assertion that he did not know the men were federal agents and that he merely intended to come to Works’ aid by repelling intruders. Brown’s only substantive defense to this count was his asserted lack of knowledge that the persons assaulted were federal agents. However, it is clear that such knowledge is [948]*948not required in a § 111 prosecution, e. g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975), and even a mistaken belief that the intended victim is a fleeing felon has been held not to excuse such an assault, United States v. Hillman, 522 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1975).
In view of all of the foregoing we are firm in our conclusion that admissible evidence of the guilt of both appellants under Count II is overwhelming and that the admission of the arguably tainted pre-September twentieth evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. This conclusion applies with equal force to Brown’s conviction under Count III.
Both appellants were convicted under Counts I and II and sentenced to concurrent two year sentences under each. Brown was sentenced to a concurrent six year sentence under Count III. In light of our conclusion that with respect to Counts II and III the admission of the complained-of testimony was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, appellants’ convictions on at least one count are valid. Since concurrent sentences were imposed we choose to exercise our discretion and not reach the issues raised by the questioned testimony with respect to Count I, the conspiracy count. Under the concurrent sentence doctrine, this is an appropriate disposition of this case, e. g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 848 & n.16, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2364 & n.16, 37 L.Ed.2d 380, 387 & n.16 (1973); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943); United States v. Bowdach, 501 F.2d 220, 228 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 426 (1975); United States v. Johnson, 496 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972, 95 S.Ct. 1391, 43 L.Ed.2d 651 (1975).
We have carefully considered the remaining contentions of appellants as disclosed by the record, the briefs and at oral argument and we find them to be without merit. The judgments of conviction are affirmed.