United States v. Wo Kee

21 C.C.P.A. 341, 1934 CCPA LEXIS 301
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 22, 1934
DocketNo. 3653
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 21 C.C.P.A. 341 (United States v. Wo Kee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Wo Kee, 21 C.C.P.A. 341, 1934 CCPA LEXIS 301 (ccpa 1934).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Government has appealed from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, Third Division, which sustained the protest of the importer, appellee, claiming the imported merchandise to be dutiable at 4cents per pound under paragraph 759 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as peanuts not shelled.

The merchandise was shipped from China and entered at the port of San Francisco, Calif.

While the protest claimed that the goods were dutiable at 4}{ cents per pound under said paragraph 759, it was alternatively claimed that they were dutiable at 10 or 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1558.

The collector classified the goods under the provision of paragraph 759 for “peanuts * * * blanched, salted, prepared, or preserved, not specially provided for”, and assessed the same with duty at 7 cents per pound.

Paragraph 759 of the Tariff Act of 1930 reads as follows:

Par. 759. Peanuts, not shelled, 4]4 cents per pound; shelled, 7 cents per pound; blanched, salted, prepared, or preserved, not specially provided for, and peanut butter, 7 cents per pound.

At the trial in the Customs Court, after the submission of the official sample, Exhibit 1, by the importer, the record shows the following:

Mr. Canty. If your honor please, on behalf of the Government we move in the appraiser’s report and submit on the record as made, the sample and the appraiser's report.
Mr. Gottfried. I object to the admission of the appraiser’s report because it states facts which were not under the observation of the appraiser at the time the merchandise was imported. The appraiser never saw the merchandise [343]*343prepared in the country of exportation, but he makes several statements concerning that, and until properly qualified I think the report should not be admitted.
Judge Tilson. Was that report made within the proper period?
Mr. Canty. Within the statutory time, if the court please. It is only moved in, of course, in regard to the facts recited therein, no law or anything like that.
Judge Tilson. I will sustain the objection as to things outside of the province or purview of the appraiser regarding which he has written. Only the absolute facts in that report will be considered.
Mr. Canty. That is all we want, your honor.
Judge Tilson. With that provision it is admitted.

The record is very indefinite as to what part, if any, of the appraiser’s report was excluded by the trial judge.

The so-called appraiser’s report obviously is a document printed in the record, styled “Answer to Protest”, and signed by the appraiser, the pertinent parts of which are as follows:

ANSWER TO PROTEST
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
Peanuts. — The merchandise covered by this protest is described in the invoice as salted peanuts in shell. The peanuts are unshelled, but they have been prepared and preserved by being boiled in salt water. They are therefore dutiable as prepared peanuts at 7(5 per pound under paragraph 759 as returned by this office. This classification is supported by the principle in T.D. 43890. (Last italics ours.)

It is assumed that the objection made by the importer’s counsel was directed toward the statement “but they have been prepared and preserved by being boiled in salt water”, it being contended, but not proved, that the appraiser had no knowledge of how they were prepared.

We do not regard it as important, under the circumstances of this case, to determine whether or not the last-quoted phrase is or is not before us for consideration. The merchandise was assessed at 7 cents per pound as “salted peanuts.” The importation was invoiced as “salted peanuts.”

The record also contains the report of the collector, the material part of which is as follows:

REPORT OP THE COLLECTOR
* * * * * *
Description of merchandise and assessment
7(5 lb. “Salted peanuts.” Appraiser’s advisory classification, “Prepared peanuts n.s.p.f.” Assessed under par. 759, act of 1930.

The appellee argues in this court as follows:

The ambiguity of this report is at once apparent in view of the fact that the paragraph under which the merchandise is classified contains provisions for “peanuts, unshelled; peanuts, shelled; * * * salted * * * prepared * * If the collector’s statment is to be construed as a reliance on the appraiser’s advisory [344]*344classification, there is no apparent basis for his statement that the merchandise is “salted peanuts.” If the collector disregarded the advisory classification and based his decision upon the conclusions of the appraiser as to the alleged method of preparation of the instant merchandise, then his classification is subject to impeachment on the same grounds to which the appraiser’s report was subject, and which objections were sustained by the trial judge. (R., 6.) In view of the fact that counsel for appellant conceded at the trial that these objections were well taken (R., 6) and failed to appeal from the decision of the trial judge (R., 1, 2), he cannot properly ask for a reversal of the decision of the court below on the basis of a presumption of correctness attaching to a decision of the collector, which decision is obviously based upon the same hearsay evidence.

In order to overcome tbe action of tbe collector it was tbe duty of tbe protestant at tbe trial below to show that tbe classification and assessment of duty by tbe collector was wrong and that its claim was correct. This tbe importer claimed to have done by introducing a sample of unshelled nuts, which sample is taken from or is representative of tbe importation.

The trial court, in its decision, called attention to tbe fact that tbe peanuts were unshelled; that they were smaller than the ordinary peanuts; and that “the kernel is rather dry and hard.” The opinion then recites:

* * * An inspection of the paragraph in question persuades one that peanuts have been provided for according as they have progressed from the crude to what might be called a finished state. The first clause provides for peanuts not shelled, the second clause for shelled peanuts, and the third clause for peanuts that have been further processed. Inasmuch as this was a shipment of unshelled peanuts we are of the opinion that they are more directly provided for in the first clause of the paragraph in question.

The Government here contends that regardless of their unshelled condition the peanuts have been salted, and that such salted peanuts are not specially provided for elsewhere, and that they are, therefore, specifically named and are dutiable under the second part of paragraph 759 at 7 cents per pound.

Invoice descriptions of imported merchandise in cases like the one at bar are admissions against interest and are presumptively correct. When such admissions are contradicted by a protest, however, the importer is not precluded from disproving the correctness of such description.

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Related

F. B. Vandegrift & Co. v. United States
56 Cust. Ct. 339 (U.S. Customs Court, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
21 C.C.P.A. 341, 1934 CCPA LEXIS 301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-wo-kee-ccpa-1934.