United States v. Willie Earl Jackson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-3304
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0097n.06

No. 24-3304

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Feb 19, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO WILLIE EARL JACKSON, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )

Before: MOORE, KETHLEDGE, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Willie Earl Jackson, a former college

athlete and semi-professional basketball player, was charged with dealing firearms without a

license and trafficking firearms after an undercover investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms. During the investigation, Jackson sold more than 30 firearms and

accessories, including to individuals who stated that they were convicted felons or planned to

transport the firearms abroad. He also told agents that he could obtain silencers and switches,

devices that turn semi-automatic pistols fully automatic. After Jackson pleaded guilty to the

charges, the district court sentenced him to 84 months in prison, a sentence toward the top end of

the guideline range. On appeal, Jackson challenges the substantive reasonableness of the district

court’s sentence. We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Jackson first interacted with law enforcement in April 2022 when agents from the Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) arranged a meeting to discuss Jackson’s purchase of No. 24-3304, United States v. Jackson

several guns. R. 54 (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶ 6) (Page ID #439).1 Jackson

told agents that he was a “gun enthusiast who would sell guns when he was in Cleveland” but

denied knowingly selling guns to “someone who should not have one.” Id. During that meeting,

Jackson signed a “Warning of Straw Purchasing Letter” acknowledging that it was illegal to buy

a firearm for or on behalf of another person while having reason to know that the buyer was a

prohibited transferee or that the buyer intended to possess or transfer the firearm in furtherance

of a felony. Id.

A year later, in June 2023, ATF began an investigation into an alleged drug and firearm

trafficker known as Corte’z Buggs. Id. ¶ 7 (Page ID #439). A series of undercover drug and

firearm purchases from Buggs led ATF agents back to Jackson, whom Buggs identified as a

source of his firearm supply. Id. ¶¶ 7–11 (Page ID #439–40). From June through August 2023,

undercover ATF agents and confidential informants bought “more than 30 firearms, ammunition,

and firearms accessories/parts” from Jackson. Id. ¶ 30 (Page ID #443). Jackson told controlled

buyers that “he was in the business of selling firearms and could make custom firearms and obtain

Glock switches,” attachments that convert semi-automatic pistols into automatic ones. Id. ¶ 12

(Page ID #440); see id. ¶ 13 (Page ID #440) (“engag[ing] in conversation about his ability to

obtain Glock switches (machine gun conversion devices) and silencers”); id. ¶ 15 (same) (Page

ID #440); id. ¶ 18 (Page ID #441) (offering to sell firearms with “remove[d] serial numbers” and

“silencers”).

1 Because Jackson did not object to the facts set forth in the PSR, we treat those facts as admitted. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A); United States v. Stafford, 258 F.3d 465, 476 (6th Cir. 2001).

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In the series of controlled buys, Jackson sold firearms to an individual who said they were

a felon and at least one individual who said they planned to transport the firearms to Mexico. Id.

¶¶ 13, 30 (Page ID #440, 443). He also sold a firearm with a “partially obliterated” serial number

and a firearm that had been used in three different shootings in Cleveland. Id. ¶¶ 15, 20 (Page ID

#440–41). He suggested selling firearms without the requisite ATF paperwork and offered to

create a new identity for the self-identified felon, including a “fake Social Security card, passport,

and credit history.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14 (Page ID #440). Further investigation revealed that six other

firearms purchased by Jackson were “recovered by law enforcement between 2018 and 2022” in

Cleveland, Toledo, Mentor, Maple Heights, and New York City. Id. ¶ 30 (Page ID #443).

Jackson was arrested on August 10, 2023, and indicted on one count of dealing firearms

without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D) (Count 1), and one

count of trafficking in firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 933(a)(1) (Count 2). Id. ¶ 31; R. 12

(Indictment at 1–4) (Page ID #43–46). Jackson pleaded guilty to both counts of the indictment

without a plea agreement. R. 72 (Plea Hr’g Tr. at 15) (Page ID #597). At sentencing, the parties

agreed that Jackson’s sentencing guideline total offense level was 27, which accounted for upward

enhancements relating to the number of firearms sold, the sale of a firearm with a partially

obliterated serial number, and the sale of firearms to individuals who indicated that they were

felons or intended to transport the firearms abroad, as well as downward adjustments for

acceptance of responsibility. R. 75 (Sent’g Tr. at 5–6) (Page ID #644–45). The parties also

agreed that Jackson had no meaningful criminal history, so his criminal history score was I. Id.

at 6 (Page ID #645). Hence, his guideline imprisonment range was calculated as 60 months (the

statutory maximum) on Count 1, and 70 to 87 months on Count 2. Id.

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Jackson’s counsel sought a downward variance. He portrayed Jackson as a man who grew

up in a “tough area” but managed to secure a college scholarship to play basketball at the

University of Toledo, and then played semi-professionally abroad. Id. at 9 (Page ID #648). He

emphasized that Jackson had given back to his community by starting a charity that provides gifts

to underprivileged children, and that he had no prior criminal history. Id. at 10, 12 (Page ID #649,

651). Jackson’s counsel further argued that the guideline range was disproportionate to the crime,

considering that it was ATF agents who made statements indicating that they were felons or

planned to transport firearms to Mexico, and that “obviously the agents have a full understanding

of the enhancements.” Id. at 8 (Page ID #647).

The district court rejected defense counsel’s arguments. In the district court’s view,

Jackson’s achievements only highlighted the gravity of his offense conduct. See id. at 30–31

(Page ID #669–70). “[H]is athletic ability gave him the option and the opportunity to obtain an

education, to rise above whatever difficulty he may have faced in the community. Instead, . . . he

chose a different path, and that path is one that has landed him here.” Id. at 30 (Page ID #669).

The district court emphasized that Jackson had received a warning letter from ATF about selling

firearms to people like Buggs but nonetheless proceeded to sell numerous firearms. Id. at 30–31

(Page ID #669–70). And the district court explained that a lengthy sentence was warranted in

part because the case was not only “about guns,” but it was also “about switches” and “silencers.”

Id. at 32 (Page ID #671). The district court sentenced Jackson to 60 months on Count 1, and 84

months on Count 2, to be served concurrently. R. 62 (Judgment at 2) (Page ID #544).

On appeal, Jackson argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

district court “improperly relied upon his alleged involvement with the sale or transfer of

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‘switches’ and ‘silencers’” when he was not charged with selling any retrofitted firearms, and the

district court failed adequately to consider mitigating evidence, disparities with similarly situated

defendants, and the disproportionately high guideline range occasioned by the enhancements.

Appellant Br. at 22–23.

II. ANALYSIS

We review sentences in criminal cases for procedural and substantive reasonableness.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Procedural reasonableness ensures that the

defendant received adequate process at sentencing. It requires that the court “properly calculate

the guidelines range, treat that range as advisory, consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), refrain from considering impermissible factors, select the sentence based on facts that

are not clearly erroneous, and adequately explain why it chose the sentence.” United States v.

Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018). Even if the sentencing court followed the proper

procedures, a sentence may still be substantively unreasonable if the judge “‘abused his discretion

in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported’ the sentence imposed,” that is, if the judge

imposed a sentence that was greater than necessary to satisfy the § 3553(a) factors. Holguin-

Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 173 (2020) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 56)). “In short,

procedural review of a sentence concerns the propriety of the factors that go into a sentence;

substantive review assesses the reasonableness of the sentence that results.” United States v.

Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753 (6th Cir. 2020). If a defendant challenges the substantive

reasonableness of a within-guidelines sentence, we apply a presumption of reasonableness. Id. at

754. “We review claims of both procedural and substantive unreasonableness for an abuse of

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discretion, although we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo.” United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019).2

Jackson argues that his 84-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. Because the

sentence fell within the uncontested guideline imprisonment range, we apply a presumption of

reasonableness. Jackson tries to overcome that presumption by pointing to factors that he argues

were over- or under-weighed by the district court. We address each in turn.

First, Jackson argues that the district court should have given less weight to the guidelines,

considering that the offense level was driven by enhancements that resulted from the specific

conduct of the undercover agents and informants who told Jackson that they were felons or

planned to transport weapons abroad. Appellant Br. at 26–27. Jackson did not expressly invoke

sentencing entrapment or manipulation, which this circuit has yet to recognize as a basis for

downward variance. See United States v. Allen, 93 F.4th 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2024). We need not

pass on the potential validity of such an argument because it has little persuasive force here. The

record contains evidence that Jackson was engaged in a sizeable firearm-trafficking operation,

and that he was eager to provide undercover agents and confidential informants with firearms

regardless of legal requirements. See United States v. Hammadi, 737 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir.

2013) (concluding that a defendant failed to demonstrate sentencing entrapment or manipulation

2 Although Jackson characterizes his appeal as solely aimed at the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, the government urges that Jackson’s appeal concerns both procedural and substantive aspects of his sentence. Specifically, the government argues that Jackson’s contention that the district court improperly relied on allegations that he sold firearms with “switches” and “silencers,” when none of the firearms sold in this case included such attachments, Appellant Br. at 28, 30, is an argument about procedural reasonableness. And the government contends that we should review this challenge for plain error because Jackson’s counsel failed adequately to object to the district court’s portrayal of the facts at the sentencing hearing. Appellee Br. at 12–14. Jackson did not file any reply brief responding to the government’s arguments as to procedural reasonableness, forfeiture, or plain error. Accordingly, we consider only Jackson’s argument regarding substantive reasonableness.

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because he had not met his burden to show a lack of predisposition to engage in the charged

conduct). Especially noteworthy, Jackson undisputedly told the purported felon that he “could

create a new identity for the price of $3,000 to include a fake Social Security card, passport, and

credit history.” R. 54 (PSR ¶ 13) (Page ID #440).

Second, Jackson asserts that the district court “gave an unreasonable amount of weight”

to evidence that Jackson sold silencers and switches—even though no such attachments were sold

as part of a controlled buy in this case. Appellant Br. at 28. However, in pronouncing its reasons

for the sentence, the district court said only that the case was “about switches” and “about

silencers,” not that Jackson actually sold them. R. 75 (Sent’g Tr. at 32) (Page ID #671). And the

record contained evidence that in the context of four separate firearm purchases, Jackson indicated

his ability to obtain switches and silencers. R. 54 (PSR ¶¶ 12–13, 15, 18) (Page ID #440–41).

Accordingly, it was reasonable to afford some weight to the role of such devices in this case.

Third, Jackson argues that the district court gave insufficient weight to his background,

good character, lack of criminal history, community involvement, and exemplary conduct while

in pretrial detention. Appellant Br. at 30–31. In fact, the district court considered this

information, recognizing that Jackson’s own life had been affected by gun violence, and that he

had both education and opportunity. R. 75 (Sent’g Tr. at 30) (Page ID #669). The district court

just saw that information in a different light from how Jackson sees it: in the district court’s view,

the opportunities Jackson had in life and his personal experience with gun violence made his

criminal activity more egregious. Id. We cannot conclude that this was an abuse of discretion in

the context of this case because his conduct does not appear to be aberrant; rather, the record

suggests that Jackson was engaged in a sizeable firearm-trafficking operation involving

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individuals also engaged in the trafficking of illegal drugs. Under these circumstances, it was not

an abuse of discretion for the district court to consider Jackson’s history and characteristics in this

light.

Finally, Jackson contends that the district court should have given more weight to the

disparity between his sentence and the sentences of others with the same offense level and

criminal history category. Appellant Br. at 27. As the district court recognized, for individuals

like Jackson with an offense level of 27 and a criminal history category of I, the average sentence

is 53 months of imprisonment, and the median is 60 months. R. 75 (Sent’g Tr. at 29–30) (Page

ID #668–69). The district court reasonably concluded that a downward variance to the average

or median sentence was not warranted here. Beyond the reasons explained above, the district

court also noted that Jackson had received forewarning from ATF about selling guns to

individuals who planned to use them in criminal activity. Id. at 30–31 (Page ID #669–70).

Nonetheless, Jackson continued to traffic heavily in firearms, including firearms that had been

used in violent crimes. Id. at 31–32 (Page ID #670–71).

“[H]ow much weight a judge gives to any § 3553(a) factor is ‘a matter of reasoned

discretion’ to which we owe ‘highly deferential review.’” United States v. Richardson, 960 F.3d

761, 765 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442). We cannot conclude

that Jackson’s within-guidelines sentence of 84 months of imprisonment was substantively

unreasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.