F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH MAY 12 1997 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 96-2075 DORA WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO (D.C. No. CR-95-15 LH)
Submitted on the briefs:*
Ron Koch, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, and Charles L. Barth, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before PORFILIO, McWILLIAMS, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered submitted without oral argument. PORFILIO, Circuit Judge.
Of the several issues raised in this appeal of her conviction for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, the question whether defendant Dora Williams was competent
to stand trial predominates. We conclude she was not, vacate the judgment of conviction
and sentence, and remand with instructions for the trial court to determine Ms. Williams’
competence to stand trial. However, whatever slate that determination produces, we also
conclude it is free of the question of any possible evidentiary taint from the allegedly
unlawful search professed here.
I.
Ms. Williams was a passenger on an Amtrak train which DEA Special Agent
Kevin Small boarded during a routine stop in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Suspicious of
the new tweed suitcase perched above her seat in the coach car, Agent Small questioned
Ms. Williams and her traveling companion, Maricella McToy. Based upon their
statements, Agent Small seized the suitcase, broke off the locks, and uncovered
approximately five kilograms of cocaine. The grand jury subsequently charged Ms.
Williams and Ms. McToy with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
-2- Only Ms. Williams stood trial, the court having released upon certain conditions
Ms. McToy who promptly absconded from the jurisdiction. Ms. Williams’ second
attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized on the train and the statements she
made coincident to the seizure and her arrest. Although the court granted the motion in
part, suppressing the government’s use of her statements, it rejected her contention the
train encounter was nonconsensual and concluded, based upon both defendants’
statements to Agent Small, the suitcase was abandoned property.
Three weeks before trial, Ms. Williams fired her second attorney, and the court
appointed a third, Lawrence Chacon, who moved to withdraw as counsel after the jury
was seated. As her trial commenced, Ms. Williams, speaking rapidly and excitedly,
bombarded the court with requests, asking to make an opening statement, to fire her
attorney, to introduce a disputed tape and transcript of the train encounter, to ascertain the
presence of certain witnesses, and to protest the composition of the jury. Defense counsel
explained to the court his efforts to appease Ms. Williams’ concerns, discounting her
representations but acknowledging his difficulty reconciling her demands with his
professional responsibility.
The government then interjected that Ms. Williams was taking medication and
suggested the court inquire. Ms. Williams told the court she took Elavil, an
antidepressant, and explained, “when you was telling me to slow down in my talking, I’m
a very hyper person ... I started taking them because I’m in a situation ... I don’t have
-3- anything. ... They put me on medication because, when they released my co-defendant
and held me -- and I have heart murmur also. And the doctors sent me up to the hospital.
When I went out to the hospital, they examined my heart and stuff like that. They felt that
it was necessary for them to put me on some kind of antibiotics.” She told the court the
medication did not interfere with her ability to understand. Asked if it interfered with her
ability to communicate with her attorney, she responded:
Ms. Williams: Well, sir, my attorney right now -- The Court: Can you answer the question? Ms. Williams: No. I mean, yes, sir. My ability to deal with my attorney, my attorney is not for me. So yes, sir.
After a recess,2 the court ruled,
[W]hile the defendant is excitable and prone to making outbursts and interrupting the proceedings, that she is otherwise understanding the proceedings, is communicating with her attorney. She is able to cooperate and assist in her defense. And I conclude that the medication that she is on is not affecting her ability to do so.
With the jury seated, the government began its examination of Agent Small, soon
prompting Mr. Chacon to inform the court Ms. Williams was “just very, very, very, very
2 Prior to the recess, the court again permitted Ms. Williams to voice other concerns and attempted to address her questions although she persistently interrupted the explanations despite the court’s repeated admonition not to interrupt but to trust her attorney. “Sir, this man here only been on my case three weeks,” she told the court, interrupting again when the court attempted to tell her to communicate more with her attorney. The court denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. Again Ms. Williams asked, “Sir, is there any way that I can decline -- fire this attorney.” The court told her not at that stage in the proceedings, and she interrupted “Sir, you’re going to say that I don’t have a right to a fair trial? You said that I did.” The court then admonished Ms. Williams to confer quietly with her attorney.
-4- upset and she’s sitting there crying and can’t really control herself.” The jury excused,
defense counsel told the court,
I don’t know if she doesn’t understand the proceedings, the procedure, how court is conducted, how a trial is conducted. She is -- at this point, basically what I’m doing, because I’m not out in front of the jury doing something or cross-examining at this time Mr. Small. She just wants to leave. She doesn’t want to be a part of this. And she reiterates, I think, her need to, I guess, fire me, basically.
While telling Ms. Williams (“I’m not understanding you. Calm down.”), the court
assured her that defense counsel was adequately representing her interests although she
interrupted the explanation.
The government resumed questioning Agent Small again to be interrupted by Ms.
Williams who asked to leave the proceedings. The court retired the jury, and Ms.
Williams announced she was firing her attorney because he wasn’t representing her and
she couldn’t sit and “watch my rights be violated.”3 The court ordered her not to interrupt
and to sit down.
Ms. Williams: Sir, I’m leaving this courtroom. The Court: No, you’re not. Ms. Williams: Yes, I am. What you going to do, have me handcuffed to the chain? [sic]. You want me to sit here and watch you have all my rights violated?
3 Ms. Williams apparently expected her counsel to interrupt and ask questions during the government’s direct examination of Agent Small, not recognizing that defense counsel would preserve “her rights” by cross-examining the witness.
-5- Ending the stalemate by ordering the marshal to take Ms. Williams away, the court
recessed the proceedings. These interchanges pocked the first day of Ms. Williams’ two-
day trial.
On the second day, the proceedings fared no better, Ms. Williams having decided
to testify on her own behalf. Frustrated with the nonresponsiveness of her answers, the
court advised Ms. Williams to listen carefully to counsel’s questions and to talk slowly,
concentrating on the question, to best communicate her case to the jury. Ms. Williams
then told the court she did not take her medication, the marshal having forgotten to give it
to her that morning. The court made no further inquiry, and Ms. Williams proceeded to
testify, interrupting questions, her responses divagating from the questions into
argumentative or self-pitying statements, disregarding the court’s repeated warnings.
With Ms. Williams’ seeming disregard for the court’s caution, the court began striking
her responses, instructing the jury to disregard her nonresponsive narratives.
Continuously, the court told Ms. Williams, “[S]top. Do not say anything until [counsel]
has asked the question.” To say that Ms. Williams was out of control during the second
day of the proceeding euphemizes the record.
After the jury found Ms. Williams guilty, her fourth attorney appeared for a
hearing on two motions, the first for recusal, the second for a forensic evaluation. As to
the former, the court reviewed the history of the case and refused to recuse itself from
further proceedings, again entertaining Ms. Williams’ numerous interruptions. For the
-6- latter, new defense counsel, Ron Koch, asked the court to take note of Ms. Williams
“crying, extremely upset, very animated, in my opinion, hysterical.” The court then stated
for the record, “[t]he defendant is hysterical. She is interrupting the proceedings. She is
sobbing. What she is saying is such that I cannot understand it and my court reporter has
indicated to me that what she is saying is not possible to place in the record.” Counsel
then told the court of his concern about Ms. Williams’ competence and overall mental
health. He noted Ms. Williams’ long history of mental instability intertwined with her
continuous interactions with the criminal justice system beginning at the age of thirteen.
He informed the court that when he tried to review the presentence report with Ms.
Williams, she was unable to focus. “Now, where that raises questions in my mind is the
ability to assist. And I’m convinced that she wasn’t able to assist Mr. Chacon at trial
because Dora, in her own way, because of her mental condition, had her own agenda, and
that resulted in the repeated outbursts, the interruptions, all those kind of things, and, in
my mind, not a true understanding of the nature of the proceedings. I think that all stems
from mental disorder.” The court agreed that during trial Ms. Williams only focussed on
questions for a short time and frequently interrupted. It stated, “So it did concern me that
her attention span was shorter than I would have expected.” The court believed, however,
Ms. Williams’ ability to list several issues for her appeal evidenced she understood the
proceedings. Nevertheless, the court ordered a psychological evaluation to assist the
court in sentencing.
-7- Based upon an evaluation of her FBI arrest record, the Presentence Report, and
other documents, as well as psychological testing and personal interviews, the forensic
report noted Ms. Williams’ extensive history of legal problems and drug addiction. It
stated “[h]er use of Elavil is a continuation of her substance abuse pattern.” The
psychologists concluded Ms. Williams then displayed “adequate cognitive ability to
understand and appreciate the interaction which will occur among court personnel,
herself, and potential witnesses.” They concluded she was competent to proceed with
sentencing.
II.
Competency involves defendant’s mental state at the time of trial asking whether
the accused is capable of cooperating in her own defense. “The focus of a competency
inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether [she] has the ability to
understand the proceedings.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687
n.12 (1993). “Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It
seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist
counsel.” Id. at 2688. To make that assessment, the court reviews “evidence of
defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on
competence to stand trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
On numerous occasions arising in different contexts, the Court has reiterated that
the criminal prosecution of an accused person while legally incompetent offends the Due
-8- Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961
(1956); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). “It has long been accepted that a
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. To be
judged competent to stand trial, “the test must be ... whether [the defendant] has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding --- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (italics
added).
Because neither side moved for the trial court to hold a competency hearing, we
must decide “whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose
failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced
doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.” United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826,
833 (10th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Moreover, with no competency determination
before us, our review is not limited by the clearly erroneous standard but is
comprehensive. Id.
Here, Ms. Williams claims deprivation of both her procedural and substantive
rights to due process, the former when the court failed to conduct a hearing on her
competency on its own initiative and the latter by submitting her to a criminal prosecution
-9- when she was incompetent to stand trial. Neither right can be waived, she asserts, nor can
the trial court avoid its responsibility to assure both.
We agree. In this case, although the court, at the government’s suggestion, asked
Ms. Williams about the medication she was taking, and ruled, based solely on her
statement, she understood the proceedings and could communicate with her attorney, Ms.
Williams’ demeanor during trial and irrational behavior should have challenged that
initial assessment. That is, Ms. Williams’ outbursts and hysteria should have triggered a
“bona fide doubt” about the petitioner’s competency to stand trial. Medina v. Singletary,
59 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1569-
70 (11th Cir. 1992)). Even if defendant appears competent at the start of trial, “a trial
court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the
accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.” Drope, 420 U.S. at
181.
Clearly, on the first day of trial Ms. Williams misapprehended her attorney’s role
and became upset, causing her attorney to advise the court that he wondered whether his
client understood the proceedings. Whatever present ability she had to consult her
attorney should have been further investigated when Ms. Williams cryptically answered
the court’s question about whether her taking the medication interfered with her ability to
communicate with her attorney. Indeed, if her erratic behavior on the first day of trial
was insufficient to alert the trial court to a bona fide concern, surely her demeanor during
- 10 - the second day should have. Ms Williams’ outbursts, hysteria, and defiance were
adequate warnings to alert the court of defendant’s present ability to assist in her defense.
Absent a motion for a hearing to determine her competency, the court “shall order such a
hearing on its own motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
Despite its patience and dispassion in controlling the proceeding, the court
misapprehended the scope of its inquiry into defendant’s competence to stand trial. Ms.
Williams’ listing issues for her appeal alone does not establish her competence. Proper
assistance encompasses more than merely providing information but is “extended to
comportment in the courtroom before a jury.” United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 295
(2d Cir. 1990). That defendant can recite the charges against her, list witnesses, and use
legal terminology are insufficient “for proper assistance in the defense requires an
understanding that is ‘rational as well as factual.’” Id. (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402).
Nor can the later forensic evaluation done for purposes of ascertaining Ms. Williams’
ability to assist in her sentencing validate its failure to inquire earlier. Retrospective
determinations of an accused’s competence to stand trial are, at best, problematic, and, at
worst, untrustworthy. Pate, 383 U.S. at 387.
Although Ms. Williams’ conduct included outbursts, interruptions of the attorneys,
and defiance of the district court’s instructions, we emphasize that we find that the record
raises a genuine, reasonable doubt about her competency to stand trial and not that she
merely engaged in obstructionism during the proceedings. The district court should have
- 11 - held an evidentiary hearing to resolve the doubt. Monty P. Sena v. New Mexico State
Prison, ___ F.3d ____, No. 95-2170, 1997 WL 111255 (10th Cir. Mar 13, 1997). “For,
once doubt is raised, the court cannot dispel it simply by relying on contrary evidence.
The protections of an adversary proceeding must be afforded the defendant.” Id., at *3
(citations omitted). Having failed to do so in this case was a denial of Ms. Williams’
right to procedural due process. Without having afforded Ms. Williams the opportunity to
establish her competence “in the crucible of a full-blown evidentiary hearing,” id., we
cannot say with surety that her substantive due process right to stand trial while
competent was not violated. With the hearing, we can assure her right to procedural due
process is met by affording defendant her constitutional right to a fair trial. Drope, 420
U.S. at 181-82.
We, therefore, vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for the trial court to
evaluate defendant’s present competence to stand trial. Based upon that outcome, the
trial court shall appropriately proceed with the case.
III.
Ms. Williams contends Agent Small singled her out because of her race and
complains the resulting encounter was an investigative detention conducted without
reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. She likens her case to
United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992), which invalidated an Amtrak
train search based, in part, upon finding the facts the DEA agent used to establish
- 12 - reasonable suspicion were as consistent with innocent travel as with his hunch about
criminal activity.
To agree with Ms. Williams, we must conclude the facts the trial court found were
clearly erroneous. United States v. Guerrero-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 983, 986 (10th Cir.
1996); United States v. Walker, 941 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991). Our review of the
evidence indulges the trial court’s determination. United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942
(10th Cir. 1997). “We are mindful that at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to the evidence, as well as the inferences
and conclusions drawn therefrom, are matters for the trial judge.” United States v. Little,
60 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 876
(10th Cir. 1994). Whether those facts then amount to reasonable suspicion is a question
of law which we review de novo. Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1456.
The trial court articulated several findings in denying the motion. It found Agent
Small boarded the train on December 13, 1994, making his way from the rear sleeper car
and eventually into the open coach car where he spotted a large new, blue tweed suitcase
without an identification tag on the overhead luggage rack. Crediting the agent’s
experience of 220 “events” involving suitcases, 180 of which were new and without
identification tags, the court also noted the agent observed the destination tag hanging
from the bag, “JOL,” for Joliet, Illinois, a stop before Chicago where there was no drug
interdiction unit. With no one sitting by the luggage, Agent Small hefted the bag, which
- 13 - was very heavy, which the trial court credited - in the officer’s experience - to indicate
controlled substances might be packed inside. His suspicion aroused, Agent Small left
the car to ask the train attendant who was sitting by that particular bag, and the attendant
identified Ms. Williams and Ms. McToy, passengers who had boarded in Fullerton,
California, with a baby and two large bags. When Agent Small returned to the car, he
found Ms. Williams sitting beneath the suitcase and playing with the child. He identified
himself and asked if he could speak with her. The trial court found Ms. Williams “was
rather defensive,”4 telling Agent Small he didn’t have probable cause to speak to her and
disassociating herself from the suitcase. With this disclaimer, Agent Small reached up
and removed the bag. Ms. Williams grabbed the suitcase,5 telling him she was watching
it for the lady who sat across the aisle. Agent Small left and soon observed this traveling
companion, Maricella McToy, return to her seat across the aisle from Ms. Williams.
Agent Small approached Ms. McToy, and upon finding her responses incongruous,
verified with the train attendant that these two women were, in fact, the ones who carried
on these bags. Ms. McToy also disclaimed ownership of the bag prompting Agent Small
4 According to Agent Small, when he asked Ms. Williams if he could talk to her, she answered, “what about?” When he asked where she was traveling to, she asked why and pointed up to the tag marked “JOL” hanging off the suitcase. She then asked the agent why he picked her out from all the other passengers on the train, and he told her it was because of the suitcase. Agent Small then asked her if the suitcase was hers. She hesitated and answered no.
Agent Small recorded some of this encounter although when Ms. Williams 5
attempted to grab the suitcase, she perhaps bumped the officer and the recording became inaudible. The later transcriptions of that recording became the subject of dispute at trial.
- 14 - to seize it, hauling it off to the baggage area where he broke off the locks and discovered
five kilos of cocaine under some clothing. His subsequent questioning of Ms. McToy
and Ms. Williams revealed they had purchased one-way train tickets with cash under
assumed names. A second black suitcase contained a small, blue tweed bag matching the
larger one Agent Small had seized.
Based on these facts, the court found “at no time was [Ms. Williams] restrained in
any way and that she was free to go.” The court also concluded, based on Ms. Williams’
testimony, the bag had been abandoned. Ms. Williams contests neither conclusion but
argues Agent Small lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her and question her about
possible criminal activity.
Although the trial court did not elaborate, its finding Ms. Williams was not
restrained and free to go indicates it concluded this police-citizen encounter was
consensual, not implicating the Fourth Amendment. Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1450 (citations
omitted). Based on his observation of the new suitcase, its weight and destination tag,
Agent Small approached Ms. Williams and asked her several non-intrusive questions.
During that initial questioning, Ms. Williams was free to leave and did, in fact,
communicate her desire not to communicate with him. Bostick established “a seizure
does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991). Ms.
Williams volunteered the suitcase wasn’t hers. Although Agent Small might have
- 15 - decided to provoke what transformed itself into an investigative detention by removing
the suitcase, Ms. Williams then volunteered information permitting the agent - based on
his present objective observations and her responses - to question Ms. McToy. The result
of that questioning permitted Agent Small to conclude the suitcase was abandoned,
precipitating the search and seizure of cocaine. Whatever investigative detention
subsequently transpired was surely supported by that evidence.
Consequently, we conclude when Agent Small first encountered Ms. Williams and
questioned her, she was not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As
the district court also found, even after agents discovered the cocaine, Ms. Williams left
the train to make a telephone call. We conclude the trial court properly denied her motion
to suppress.
This case is therefore VACATED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not address the additional issues raised given this disposition.
- 16 -