United States v. William L. Sexton

2 F.3d 218, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20541, 1993 WL 306194

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: August 11, 1993
• Docket: 92-3716
• Status: Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

William Sexton pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it and to possessing a firearm in relation to a drug crime. Because Sexton previously had been convicted of four burglaries — three in Sangamon County and one in Logan County — the court sentenced him as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Sexton argues on appeal that the court erred by counting these four burglaries as separate offenses when it should have counted them as “related cases” as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). The eases are related, argues Sexton, because he committed them with the same confederates, within a three-week time frame, using the same fence, at the same time of day, taking the same types of property from rural residences, using the same get-away ear, and with the same motive to make money. Sexton adds the alternative argument that because his sentence for the Logan County burglary ran concurrently with the sentences for the San-gamon County burglaries they should be deemed related cases.

Cases are “related” under the Guidelines “if they resulted from offenses that (1) occurred on the same occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were consolidated for trial or sentencing.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment, (n. 3). Sexton tries to fit his first argument into the second definition of related, “a single common scheme or plan.” The factors that Sexton points to indeed show that he committed like crimes that were close in time and similar in style. But crimes are not related just because they have similar modus operandi, U nited States v. Woods, 976 F.2d 1096, 1099 (7th Cir.1992), or because they were part of a crime spree. United States v. Ali, 951 F.2d 827, 828 (7th Cir.1992). Sexton must show that his crimes were jointly planned or that the commission of one entailed the commission of another. Woods, 976 F.2d at 1099. There is no evidence to satisfy that burden.

Sexton tries to fit his second argument into the third definition of related. The courts that have faced this argument have held that concurrent sentences do not automatically create cases consolidated for sentencing. United States v. Davis, 922 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir.1990), see also United States v. Kinney, 915 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir.1990) (“a merely concurrent sentence of the same number of years given by a separate jurisdiction at a different date is not consolidated for sentencing”). We agree. Sexton’s cases were not consolidated for sentencing, and as we have stressed already, there is nothing further that would make these cases “related” in the sense meant by the Guidelines. See Woods, 976 F.2d at 1101-02 (discussing natural breadth of the definition of “related”).

AFFIRMED.