BARNES, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a conviction by a jury on two counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (the interstate communication by telephone of a threat to injure a person) and of 18 U.S.C. § 876 (the use of United States mail to deliver a threat to injure a person).
Appellant was sentenced to a three year concurrent sentence on each count, with each sentence suspended and probation granted.
The telephonic threat was made on September 26, 1967 in Los Angeles to appellant’s former wife in Alaska, in which phone call appellant threatened to throw acid in the face of his former wife’s mother, Mrs. June Pate, unless his daughter, Tristón, wrote him. Thereafter, he called Mrs. Pate in Texas, advised her he had called his former wife (Mrs. Pate’s daughter) and told her (his former wife) that if he did not hear from his daughter “that he would come down there and throw acid in your face. I will disfigure you so that even your friends won’t know you. * * *”
The mailed threat was contained in a letter from appellant to his former wife, mailed in Los Angeles on October 6, 1967, addressed to his former wife, which stated, in part, as set forth in the margin.
Two errors are alleged:
First:
that the court erred in admitting evidence of the appellant’s telephone call to the mother, Mrs. Pate, because: “the two alleged crimes do not require specific intent and admission of such evidence was inflammatory, irrelevant, and prejudicial
to appellant.” Second: that misconduct of the jury required the trial judge to declare a mistrial.
We find no merit in either error urged.
As appellant recognizes in his brief, there exists little factual dispute — “the chief point in controversy * * * was whether appellant actually made an oral threat to injure the complaining witness, or whether he simply made derogatory oral statements concerning his former wife and her mother.”
Appellant urges that “intent” is no element of the offenses charged against him, citing United States v. Pennell, 144 F.Supp. 317 (N.D.Cal. 1956). Appellant misreads the holding of that case. It holds that under § 875(c) of Title 18, “Congress intended that the transmitting in interstate commerce of a communication threatening to injure the person of another should be, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute a violation under the Statute,”
without being coupled with an intent to extort money or other things of value,
as the other subdivisions of § 875 require.
“If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances, he intentionally breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent.” Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 257, 27 S.Ct. 600, 602, 51 L.Ed. 1047 (1906).
But proof of other criminal acts of an accused are admissible for several reasons other than to prove intent. As we so recently said in United States v. Jiminez-Robles, 415 F.2d 308, decided August 6,1969:
“Granted, the
general
rule is, as appellant asserts, that evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible. However, one well established exception to this rule is that such prior criminal conduct can be introduced to show state of mind or intent, design, knowledge or lack of innocent purpose. Craft v. United States, 403 F.2d 360 (9 Cir. 1968); Metheany v. United States, 390 F.2d 559 (9 Cir. 1968); Asher v. United States, 394 F.2d 424 (9 Cir. 1968).”
In Seeber v. United States, 329 F.2d 572, 577 (1964), we characterized four instructions given (under the statute in effect prior to the time Congress made § 875(c) a separate crime) as not referring “to the vital issue of intent, and to that extent are incomplete.” From this it can be inferred we considered a general intent to threaten is an essential element of the crime.
Relying on our
Seeber
case, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331 (1966) at 333, has specifically held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) “requires a showing that a threat was intended.”
Thus, the trial court was amply justified in admitting into evidence proof of the appellant’s subsequent threats to Mrs. Pate in the telephone call made to her
after
he had first called and threatened his former wife, to establish the appellant’s intent at the time the threat was made to his onetime wife.
For still another reason we hold the admission of such testimony “of other threats” was not error. It was introduced into evidence on cross-examination of the complaining former wife by appellant’s counsel (R.T. p. 28, 1. 20). No motion to strike the witness’ statement as nonresponsive (or on any other ground) was then made. On R.T. p. 30 appellant’s counsel admitted he asked for hearsay testimony with respect to threats made by appellant to his former wife’s mother, and specifically stated he had no objection to such testimony. Having thus created what is now asserted as error, appellant is in no position to complain.
Skiskowski v. United States,
81 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 158 F.2d 177, 182 (1946); United States v. Bramson, 139 F.2d 598, 600 (2d Cir. 1943); Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 1946).
As to appellant’s second alleged error, we quote with approval a portion of the appellee’s brief on this subject:
“[Tjhree jurors * * * had engaged in some brief speculation as to whether Appellant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time he wrote the letter and/or made the phone calls (Tr. 148-165). Mrs. Wilson, the juror who instigated the conversation about the Appellant’s possible use of alcohol or drugs, was excused by the Court and replaced by an alternate juror (Tr. 157). The other two lady jurors upon question by the Court, each stated that she could base her verdict solely on the evidence and testimony presented in the Courtroom (Tr. 160-163).
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BARNES, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a conviction by a jury on two counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (the interstate communication by telephone of a threat to injure a person) and of 18 U.S.C. § 876 (the use of United States mail to deliver a threat to injure a person).
Appellant was sentenced to a three year concurrent sentence on each count, with each sentence suspended and probation granted.
The telephonic threat was made on September 26, 1967 in Los Angeles to appellant’s former wife in Alaska, in which phone call appellant threatened to throw acid in the face of his former wife’s mother, Mrs. June Pate, unless his daughter, Tristón, wrote him. Thereafter, he called Mrs. Pate in Texas, advised her he had called his former wife (Mrs. Pate’s daughter) and told her (his former wife) that if he did not hear from his daughter “that he would come down there and throw acid in your face. I will disfigure you so that even your friends won’t know you. * * *”
The mailed threat was contained in a letter from appellant to his former wife, mailed in Los Angeles on October 6, 1967, addressed to his former wife, which stated, in part, as set forth in the margin.
Two errors are alleged:
First:
that the court erred in admitting evidence of the appellant’s telephone call to the mother, Mrs. Pate, because: “the two alleged crimes do not require specific intent and admission of such evidence was inflammatory, irrelevant, and prejudicial
to appellant.” Second: that misconduct of the jury required the trial judge to declare a mistrial.
We find no merit in either error urged.
As appellant recognizes in his brief, there exists little factual dispute — “the chief point in controversy * * * was whether appellant actually made an oral threat to injure the complaining witness, or whether he simply made derogatory oral statements concerning his former wife and her mother.”
Appellant urges that “intent” is no element of the offenses charged against him, citing United States v. Pennell, 144 F.Supp. 317 (N.D.Cal. 1956). Appellant misreads the holding of that case. It holds that under § 875(c) of Title 18, “Congress intended that the transmitting in interstate commerce of a communication threatening to injure the person of another should be, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute a violation under the Statute,”
without being coupled with an intent to extort money or other things of value,
as the other subdivisions of § 875 require.
“If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances, he intentionally breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent.” Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 257, 27 S.Ct. 600, 602, 51 L.Ed. 1047 (1906).
But proof of other criminal acts of an accused are admissible for several reasons other than to prove intent. As we so recently said in United States v. Jiminez-Robles, 415 F.2d 308, decided August 6,1969:
“Granted, the
general
rule is, as appellant asserts, that evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible. However, one well established exception to this rule is that such prior criminal conduct can be introduced to show state of mind or intent, design, knowledge or lack of innocent purpose. Craft v. United States, 403 F.2d 360 (9 Cir. 1968); Metheany v. United States, 390 F.2d 559 (9 Cir. 1968); Asher v. United States, 394 F.2d 424 (9 Cir. 1968).”
In Seeber v. United States, 329 F.2d 572, 577 (1964), we characterized four instructions given (under the statute in effect prior to the time Congress made § 875(c) a separate crime) as not referring “to the vital issue of intent, and to that extent are incomplete.” From this it can be inferred we considered a general intent to threaten is an essential element of the crime.
Relying on our
Seeber
case, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331 (1966) at 333, has specifically held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) “requires a showing that a threat was intended.”
Thus, the trial court was amply justified in admitting into evidence proof of the appellant’s subsequent threats to Mrs. Pate in the telephone call made to her
after
he had first called and threatened his former wife, to establish the appellant’s intent at the time the threat was made to his onetime wife.
For still another reason we hold the admission of such testimony “of other threats” was not error. It was introduced into evidence on cross-examination of the complaining former wife by appellant’s counsel (R.T. p. 28, 1. 20). No motion to strike the witness’ statement as nonresponsive (or on any other ground) was then made. On R.T. p. 30 appellant’s counsel admitted he asked for hearsay testimony with respect to threats made by appellant to his former wife’s mother, and specifically stated he had no objection to such testimony. Having thus created what is now asserted as error, appellant is in no position to complain.
Skiskowski v. United States,
81 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 158 F.2d 177, 182 (1946); United States v. Bramson, 139 F.2d 598, 600 (2d Cir. 1943); Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 1946).
As to appellant’s second alleged error, we quote with approval a portion of the appellee’s brief on this subject:
“[Tjhree jurors * * * had engaged in some brief speculation as to whether Appellant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time he wrote the letter and/or made the phone calls (Tr. 148-165). Mrs. Wilson, the juror who instigated the conversation about the Appellant’s possible use of alcohol or drugs, was excused by the Court and replaced by an alternate juror (Tr. 157). The other two lady jurors upon question by the Court, each stated that she could base her verdict solely on the evidence and testimony presented in the Courtroom (Tr. 160-163). After the alternate juror had been seated, the trial Court then asked whether there was any juror who could not base his decision solely upon the evidence presented in the Courtroom, to which no juror responded (Tr. 164). The Court thereupon reminded the jury of its sworn duty to base its verdict solely on the evidence in the ease and that it would be a violation of such duty to base the verdict upon ‘anything other than the testimony and evidence that you hear here in the Courtroom’ (Tr. 164). Finally, in the instructions at the close of the case, the District Court again reminded the jury of its duty to consider only the evidence properly admitted in this case (Tr. 271).
“In view of the careful and repeated instructions of the trial Court in this regard we submit that no prejudice requiring reversal of the jury’s decision can be shown in this case. Cavness v. United States, 187 F.2d 719, 723 (C.A. 9). This is especially true when it is considered that the nature of the speculation indulged in by the jurors was whether Appellant may have been under the influence of alcohol or drugs — factors which, if true, are ordinarily introduced by the
defense
in order to negative criminal intent. Indeed, it was the Appellant himself who later raised this issue when, in his closing argument to the jury, he denied that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs but stated that, if such was the case, it would be a ‘valid mitigating defense’.” (Tr. 182-184; Appellee’s Brief, pp. 9-10.)
We affirm the conviction on each count.