United States v. William Floyd, III

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 22, 2023
• Docket: 22-50087
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 22 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-50087

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 5:17-cr-00275-ODW-1

v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM CURTIS FLOYD III,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2023**

Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

William Curtin Floyd III appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the 36-month term of imprisonment and 20-month term of supervised

release imposed upon the second revocation of his supervised release. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Floyd contends that the district court erred by failing to consider his

arguments, failing to explain the sentence adequately, and basing the sentence on

improper factors. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-

Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none.

The record reflects that the district court listened to Floyd’s arguments but

concluded that an above-Guidelines imprisonment term and additional supervision

were warranted in light of Floyd’s repeated violations of court orders. The court’s

explanation was sufficient. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.

2008) (en banc). Moreover, the district court relied only on proper sentencing

factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062

(9th Cir. 2007) (the seriousness of the offense underlying the revocation “may be

considered to a lesser degree as part of the criminal history of the violator”).

Floyd also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because

the significant upward variance was unwarranted. In light of the § 3583(e)

sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, however, the district court

did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

We do not reach the parties’ dispute over the supervised release term

because neither party seeks modification of the 20-month term imposed in the

written judgment.

AFFIRMED.

2 22-50087