United States v. William Edward Rabb Appeal of Samuel J. Malone

Third Circuit

United States v. William Edward Rabb Appeal of Samuel J. Malone

450 F.2d 344, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7524

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedOctober 19, 1971

Docket19486

StatusPublished

This text of 450 F.2d 344 (United States v. William Edward Rabb Appeal of Samuel J. Malone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. William Edward Rabb Appeal of Samuel J. Malone, 450 F.2d 344, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7524 (3d Cir. 1971).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d).

Three males participated in the robbery in issue. Two actually entered the bank and confronted the personnel while the third man remained outside as a *345 lookout. The Government contended at appellant’s trial that he was the third participant. It offered in support of its position: (1) the in-court identification of an alleged eyewitness to the robbers’ getaway; and (2) a written police report of appellant’s purported in-custodial oral statement to federal agents while being held under state charges. Appellant’s substantial contentions on appeal involve the admissibility of this evidence.

We find no merit in appellant’s contention that the in-court identification should have been excluded on the basis of reasoning analogous to that undertaken in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970) and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). As the Coleman court itself concluded, we feel here that the in-court identification resulted from the witness’ observations at the time of the robbery, independent of the prior line-up or photograph presentation. See 399 U.S. at 5-6, 90 S.Ct. 1999; United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687, 689 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 583, 24 L.Ed.2d 509 (1969). See also United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 526-527 (3d Cir.1971).

Concerning admissibility of the oral confession, it is evident that the court employed the procedures mandated by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Viewed in connection with this court’s decision in United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 888, 89 S.Ct. 206, 21 L.Ed.2d 166 (1968), we find no reversible error. See also Government of Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 378 F.2d 799, 804-805 (3d Cir. 1967) (statement to federal officers not inadmissible because given while detained under local charges).

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d).

Three males participated in the robbery in issue. Two actually entered the bank and confronted the personnel while the third man remained outside as a *345 lookout. The Government contended at appellant’s trial that he was the third participant. It offered in support of its position: (1) the in-court identification of an alleged eyewitness to the robbers’ getaway; and (2) a written police report of appellant’s purported in-custodial oral statement to federal agents while being held under state charges. Appellant’s substantial contentions on appeal involve the admissibility of this evidence.

We find no merit in appellant’s contention that the in-court identification should have been excluded on the basis of reasoning analogous to that undertaken in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970) and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). As the Coleman court itself concluded, we feel here that the in-court identification resulted from the witness’ observations at the time of the robbery, independent of the prior line-up or photograph presentation. See 399 U.S. at 5-6, 90 S.Ct. 1999; United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687, 689 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 583, 24 L.Ed.2d 509 (1969). See also United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 526-527 (3d Cir.1971).

Concerning admissibility of the oral confession, it is evident that the court employed the procedures mandated by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Viewed in connection with this court’s decision in United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 888, 89 S.Ct. 206, 21 L.Ed.2d 166 (1968), we find no reversible error. See also Government of Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 378 F.2d 799, 804-805 (3d Cir. 1967) (statement to federal officers not inadmissible because given while detained under local charges).

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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