United States v. William Edgar Crowder

46 F.3d 1146, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373, 1995 WL 40301
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 27, 1995
Docket92-50644
StatusUnpublished

This text of 46 F.3d 1146 (United States v. William Edgar Crowder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. William Edgar Crowder, 46 F.3d 1146, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373, 1995 WL 40301 (9th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

46 F.3d 1146

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Edgar CROWDER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-50644.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted: Jan. 13, 1995.
Decided: Jan. 27, 1995.

Before: CANBY and NOONAN, Circuit Judges, and KING,* District Judge

MEMORANDUM**

* William Edgar Crowder was convicted of bank fraud and submission of false statements to a bank and savings and loan institution in support of a loan application. Crowder appeals the restitution portion of his sentence on due process grounds, maintaining that the district court computed his sentence on the basis of unreliable information. We review de novo the legality of his sentence. United States v. Lujan, 936 F.2d 406, 412 (9th Cir. 1991). We affirm.

II

A defendant challenging information used in sentencing must raise in the sentencing hearing his contention that the information is incorrect. See United States v. Roberson, 896 F.2d 388, 391, amended on other grounds, 917 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimball, 975 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1276 (1993) (noting that defendant has the burden of showing that information used in sentencing is false or unreliable when making a due process challenge to a presentence report). Because Crowder failed to object to the stated amount of the loss incurred by Dollar Dry Dock during the sentencing hearing, Crowder is barred from challenging that figure on appeal.1 See United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 442 (1991); Lujan, 936 F.2d at 412.2

AFFIRMED.

*

The Honorable Samuel P. King, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3

1

Crowder suggests that he did object to the loss figure. The record, however, clearly reflects that before the district court Crowder objected only to being held responsible for the loss; he did not contest the loss figure

2

The appeal from the district court's denial of the Rule 35 motion, which was entertained after the notice of appeal was filed, was abandoned during oral argument

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Related

United States v. Paul Roberson
896 F.2d 388 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Paul Roberson
917 F.2d 1158 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Michael Carl Visman
919 F.2d 1390 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Robert Steven Lujan
936 F.2d 406 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Robert Richardson Kimball
975 F.2d 563 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
46 F.3d 1146, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373, 1995 WL 40301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-william-edgar-crowder-ca9-1995.