United States v. William Davis, Jr.

130 F.4th 114

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 23-4174
• Status: Published

Opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM ANTHONY DAVIS, JR.,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (4:22-cr-00057-RCY-DEM-1)

Argued: September 24, 2024 Decided: February 27, 2025

Before KING and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and William L. OSTEEN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Osteen wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Richardson joined.

ARGUED: Patrick L. Bryant, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Peter Gail Osyf, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Andrew W. Grindrod, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia; Anthony L. Pappas, Second Year Law Student, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL, Williamsburg, Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4174 Doc: 46 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 2 of 26

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge:

William Davis Jr. pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after

police arrested Davis for reckless driving and subsequently discovered a firearm hidden in

his waistband while transporting him for booking in the back seat of a patrol car. At

sentencing, the district court varied upward from a Sentencing Guidelines range of 21 to

27 months and imposed a sentence of 72 months. Davis appeals, arguing that the sentence

is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.

On March 20, 2022, police officers observed Davis driving while using a handheld

device and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. J.A. 40. Instead of stopping, Davis drove

through a red light and crashed into another vehicle. Id. The officers arrested Davis for

reckless driving and transported him for booking. Id.

During transport, Davis repeatedly complained about his handcuffs. S.J.A. 172.

After officers adjusted Davis’s handcuffs twice, he asked to have the handcuffs moved

from his back to the front—a request the officers denied. When Davis continued to move

around in the back seat, the officers became suspicious and asked him multiple times if he

had anything illegal on his person. Id. Davis hesitated to answer each time but eventually

confessed to having “a firearm hidden on his genitals.” Id. The officers pulled over and

located a loaded handgun in Davis’s waistband. Id. Davis was charged with possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

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B.

Davis eventually pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession charge, for which the

presentence report calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range as 57 to 71 months. This

range was founded upon a base offense level of 24, calculated pursuant to a U.S.S.G. §

2k2.1(a)(2) enhancement for Davis’s two prior felony convictions for controlled substance

offenses. J.A. 83–95; S.J.A. 189. The first of those convictions resulted from Davis’s

distribution of Schedule I or II controlled substances on February 16, 2012, and March 1,

2012, while on probation. J.A. 176–77. The second of those convictions resulted from

Davis’s distribution of powder cocaine on July 20, 2012, again while on probation. J.A.

177–78.

Prior to sentencing, Davis filed a written objection to the § 2k2.1(a)(2)

enhancement, relying upon United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022). See

J.A. 83–89. After hearing arguments of counsel, the district court held that the enhancement

did not apply. The court, using the categorical approach, analyzed the relevant Virginia

statute of conviction and stated:

[I]n United States v. Campbell, the Fourth Circuit held that attempt offenses do not qualify as controlled substance offenses under Section 4B1.2.

Here, Mr. Davis has two state court convictions under 18.2-248, a statute that, among other things, criminalizes the attempted delivery of drugs. . . . And here, the text of United States Guideline Section 4B1.2 includes only completed offenses, not inchoate offenses. . . .

Thus, the Court rules in favor of the defendant and sustains his objection to the total offense level. The base offense level will therefore be lowered from 24 to 14. As a result, Mr. Davis is only entitled to a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 12.

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J.A. 132–33.

Application of Campbell and the categorical approach to the predicate offenses

precluded consideration, for Guidelines-calculation purposes, of the fact that Davis’s drug

distribution offenses involved the actual, not attempted, distribution of controlled

substances. Accordingly, the properly calculated Guidelines in Davis’s case resulted in a

base offense level 14 instead of 24. With a base offense level 14, Davis’s Guidelines range

was calculated as follows: a total offense level 12 and a Criminal History Category IV,

resulting in a Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months rather than the initially calculated 57 to

71 months. There is no dispute that the Guidelines range was properly calculated.

C.

Prior to sentencing, the Government filed a memorandum seeking an upward

variance to the statutory maximum of ten years’ imprisonment. The Government argued

that Davis’s concealment of the firearm after being placed under arrest, his extensive

criminal history and disciplinary record while incarcerated, and the fact that Davis was

incarcerated or on probation for each of his criminal offenses since 2008, were key facts

compelling an upward variance under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. J.A. 44–

51. The Government also noted that the statutory maximum for Davis’s offense had

recently increased from 10 to 15 years, but that the change took effect after Davis’s offense

conduct. J.A. 46. 1

1 The Government’s motion further stated that Davis would have qualified for a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), had the Government charged and proved that Davis’s three (Continued) 4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4174 Doc: 46 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 5 of 26

At Davis’s sentencing hearing, the Government relied in part on its earlier briefing,

but also responded orally to several points raised by Davis in his presentence

memorandum. The Government emphasized that the offense was extremely serious,

contrary to Davis’s contentions that he possessed the weapon for no “nefarious purpose”

and that he “voluntarily” disclosed the firearm to the officers. J.A. 58, 137–38. The

Government argued that Davis’s disclosure of the weapon “was not a spontaneous

admission borne out of a selfless desire to reduce the risks to everyone involved,” J.A. 138,

but instead a disclosure he made only after (1) trying to evade arrest in the first place, (2)

requesting to have his handcuffs moved to the front, (3) moving around so much that the

officers became suspicious, and (4) repeatedly lying about having anything illegal on his

person, id. The Government further argued that it was only when Davis had exhausted all

other possible options, and was blocks away from the magistrate’s office, where the gun

would inevitably have been discovered, that he attempted to “cut[] his losses” and disclosed

the gun. J.A. 139. Finally, the Government noted that as Davis shifted around in the back

seat of the police cruiser, the gun moved from being completely concealed to “hanging

prior convictions for serious drug offenses—namely, distributing Schedule I and II controlled substances on February 16, March 1, and July 20, 2012—had occurred on different occasions. J.A. 48. However, the Government conceded that, because it did not indict Davis under the ACCA, this statutory minimum did not apply. For his part, Davis refuted that the ACCA would have applied even had the Government charged him under it, arguing that “these offenses did not occur on occasions different from one another” under the “facts-intensive inquiry” required by Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022). J.A. 142. These issues were not resolved, and did not play a role in the district court’s sentence.

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partly out of his waistband,” positing that “the fact that he wasn’t successful in reaching

his gun wasn’t for lack of trying.” J.A. 137–38.

Davis filed a written pleading prior to his sentencing and moved for a downward

variance from the original Guidelines calculation of 57 to 71 months, requesting a sentence

of 36 months. J.A. 54. After the district court applied Campbell and revised the Guidelines

range to 21 to 27 months, Davis argued at his sentencing hearing for a sentence at the low

end of the revised range. J.A. 140. In support of his position, he presented several

arguments in mitigation similar to the arguments raised in his written pleading for a

variance. Namely, he maintained that the nature of the offense was mitigating because “the

government has not suggested that Mr. Davis possessed the gun for any nefarious purpose”

and because “Mr. Davis voluntarily told the officers that he had a firearm in his pants,” an

admission that “helped keep everyone safe that day.” J.A. 58, 143–144. Additionally, Davis

argued that his difficult childhood experiences and recent, positive strides toward living a

law-abiding life prior to his arrest should factor into his sentence. J.A. 144–45.

Before issuing its sentence, the district court stated that it had reviewed the

presentence report, the attached Sentencing Guidelines, the parties’ positions on

sentencing, the defendant’s letters of support, the arguments of counsel, and the

defendant’s allocution. J.A. 149. The court then discussed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

It started by emphasizing the seriousness of the offense, stating that the evidence of Davis’s

guilt was “substantial,” and that it reviewed “paragraph 8 from the presentence report,

which also illuminated some of the facts and circumstances around the arrest.” Id. It then

recognized that Davis’s “childhood was marked by instability, sickness, and abuse.” Id.

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The district court went on to discuss Davis’s extensive criminal history, “which includes

convictions for robbery, gang activity, distribution or sale of Scheduled I or II controlled

substances, and driving on a suspended license,” and noted that the instant offense occurred

while Davis was under court supervision. J.A. 150.

The district court granted the government’s motion for an upward variance. J.A.

152. In doing so, the court emphasized that “Davis committed this offense after sustaining

at least two other convictions involving drug distribution,” that his “actions and attempting

to conceal the firearm from law enforcement upon his arrest placed a number of individuals

in serious danger,” and that he had “an extensive criminal history, alleged gang affiliations,

[and] repeated incarceration.” Id. The court expressed that it was “most trouble[ed]” by

Davis’s disciplinary record while incarcerated for his robbery offense, listing his numerous

citations and noting that “every time Mr. Davis has been convicted of a crime since he was

released on that robbery conviction, after committing all of these offenses while

incarcerated, he’s done so while he’s been under a period of supervision from the Court.”

J.A. 152–53. In light of this pattern of criminal behavior and “everything as a whole,” the

district court concluded: “[W]hat has happened now has not worked, and I don’t believe,

when I look at this record, that a guideline range of 21 to 27 months is sufficient.” J.A.

153–54.

Despite granting the Government’s motion for a variance, the district court imposed

a sentence of 72 months rather than the 120 months requested by the Government, J.A.

154, stating “that this sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, pursuant to the

factors enumerated in [§ 3553(a)].” Id. After outlining the conditions of Davis’s supervised

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release, which included mental health treatment among other special conditions, J.A. 154–

56, the district court closed the sentencing hearing by stating that Davis has “been before

courts a number of times, and I hope . . . it’s going to finally sink in this time after this term

of imprisonment, that you’ll get your life together.” J.A. 158.

II.

Davis argues on appeal that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively

unreasonable. We “review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly

outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “Under this deferential standard, we first review for

procedural reasonableness. If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, we

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Blue,

877 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted).

We begin with Davis’s argument that his 72-month sentence was procedurally

unreasonable. “For a sentence to satisfy the procedural prong of our review, the district

court must begin its sentencing proceeding ‘by correctly calculating the applicable

Guidelines range . . . .’” Blue, 877 F.3d at 517 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 49). “The court

must thereafter give the parties the opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem

appropriate and consider those arguments in light of all of the factors stated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 2010). Davis does not

contend error in these threshold requirements.

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The district court must also “conduct an individualized assessment of the facts and

arguments presented and impose an appropriate sentence, and it must explain the sentence

chosen.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). In doing so, the district court “must address or consider all

non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why it has

rejected those arguments.” United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2020)

(cleaned up) (citation omitted). However, “this admonition focuses on the whole of a

defendant’s argument and does not require the court to address every argument a defendant

makes.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 2020). That is, the district

court is only required to address the defendant’s “central thesis” in mitigation and “need

not address separately every specific claim made in support.” United States v. Powers, 40

F.4th 129, 137 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 2

“[I]n determining whether there has been an adequate explanation, we do not

evaluate a court’s sentencing statements in a vacuum.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,

445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006). Rather, we may discern the court’s rationale from the

“context surrounding [its] explanation.” Id. “A sentencing court’s explanation is sufficient

if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular history and

characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the

2 We have recognized that “[a]ppellate review is not a game of ‘Gotcha!’ where we tally up the number of distinguishable arguments a defendant mentioned in the district court and then comb the sentencing transcript for proof the district court mentioned each one by name.” Powers, 40 F.4th at 137.

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statutory factors and in response to defense counsel’s arguments . . . .” Blue, 877 F.3d at

519 (cleaned up).

Our task on appellate review is to determine whether the district court provided

“some indication that [it] considered the § 3553(a) factors and applied them to the

particular defendant, and also that it considered a defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for

a lower sentence.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 212–13 (cleaned up) (citations omitted). Although

the district court’s explanation “need not be elaborate or lengthy,” when a district court’s

chosen sentence varies from the Guidelines range, we must be convinced that it gave

“serious consideration” to the extent of the departure and “adequately explain[ed] the

chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of

fair sentencing.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

Applying this standard, we are satisfied that the district court fulfilled its procedural

requirements.

Davis contends on appeal that the district court “failed to provide sufficient

consideration on the record,” and “fail[ed] to explain,” certain mitigation arguments he put

forward—specifically, those concerning his adverse childhood experiences (“ACEs”) and

his recent improvements toward a productive and law-abiding life. Opening Br. at 8–9.

However, the district court’s consideration of Davis’s arguments and explanation of its

sentence cannot be viewed fairly by isolating only one or two factors for appellate review.

An analysis of procedural reasonableness in many instances, including in this case, requires

evaluating the interplay of all § 3553(a) factors in context. See Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d

at 381 (“The context surrounding a district court's explanation may imbue it with enough

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content for us to evaluate both whether the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and

whether it did so properly.”).

Two of the district court’s findings explain in large part its analysis of the statutory

factors and its reasons for imposing a different sentence than that argued for by Davis. See

Blue, 877 F.3d at 519. Those two findings are with respect to Davis’s criminal history and

the nature and circumstances of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

With respect to criminal history, the district court explained that “[w]hen

considering [§ 3553(a)] factors, [it] notes that Mr. Davis has an extensive criminal history

. . . which includes . . . distribution or sale of Scheduled I or II controlled substances.” J.A.

150. After announcing that it would grant the Government’s motion for an upward

variance, it again emphasized that Davis “committed [the instant] offense after sustaining

at least two other convictions involving drug distribution.” J.A. 152. This repeated

emphasis of Davis’s prior drug distribution offenses makes clear that the district court

viewed Davis’s individualized culpability to be more in line with the higher Guidelines

range of 57 to 71 months that would have resulted under the U.S.S.G. § 2k2.1(a)(2)

enhancement.

The district court relied on the facts underlying Davis’s prior convictions when

determining his sentence, rather than the elements of “least culpable conduct criminalized

by the predicate offense statute” that it used to calculate his Guidelines range. See

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Campbell, 22 F.4th at 441 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 A sentencing

court “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable” and must rather “make an

individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 4 “A factual

finding of this kind is reviewed for clear error, and the evidence [of Davis’s past drug

distribution offenses] demonstrates this finding was not clearly erroneous.” See United

States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 291 (4th Cir. 2021). Although the district court could

have explained its reliance on these facts more explicitly, “the context of [the district

court’s] explanation [makes this] patently obvious.” See Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 381.

As to the nature and circumstances of the offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the

district court’s explanation makes clear that it flatly rejected Davis’s position. In pre-trial

filings and at his sentencing hearing, Davis sought to minimize his offense conduct, arguing

3 A member of this court, writing in concurrence, recently explained:

Remarking on [discretionary sentencing], other courts have noted that “district judges may and should use their sound discretion to sentence . . . on the basis of reliable information about the defendant's criminal history even where strict categorical classification of a prior conviction might produce a different guideline sentencing range.” United States v. Carter, 961 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus even when a statutory enhancement is inapplicable, the “law leaves much to ‘the judge's own professional judgment.’” United States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 137 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rita [v. United States], 551 U.S. [338,] 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456 [2007]).

United States v. Graham, 67 F.4th 218, 228 (4th Cir. 2023) (Wilkinson, J. concurring). 4 “Congress has further established that, ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.’” United States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661).

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that while he should not have possessed a gun, there was no indication that he had used or

intended to use the firearm for nefarious purposes. J.A. 58. Further, Davis argued in his

pleadings to the district court that

Mr. Davis voluntarily told the officers that he had a firearm in his pants. The officers – who missed the gun when searching Mr. Davis initially – were able to safely recover the firearm. . . . His honest statement to the officers helped keep everyone safe that day. His guidelines range does not reflect that “super- acceptance” of responsibility upon arrest.

J.A. 58–59. Davis persisted in those arguments at sentencing: “[T]here is no evidence or

suggestion that he had that gun for any nefarious purpose.” J.A. 145.

The district court rejected Davis’s arguments and instead viewed his actions in the

back of the patrol car as aggravating conduct. The court responded to Davis’s arguments

by reading from paragraph 8 of the presentence report and alerting defense counsel that it

would consider the facts within that paragraph as part of the nature, circumstances, and

seriousness of the offense. 5 J.A. 146–47. Moments later, when discussing the sentencing

5 Paragraph 8 of the presentence report states the following:

A review of the government’s file revealed that after officers placed the defendant under arrest for reckless driving, he was searched incident to the arrest and placed in the back of the patrol car. He began complaining of pain from the handcuffs. Officers adjusted the handcuffs twice. The defendant asked to be handcuffed in the front, and officers denied the request. While being transported, the defendant began moving around in the back seat of the vehicle. He told officers that it was because of a shoulder condition, but since his handcuffs had already been adjusted twice, officers became suspicious and asked him if he had anything illegal on his body. After being asked multiple times and hesitating on answering all of them, the defendant confessed to having a firearm hidden on his genitals. Officers pulled over (Continued) 13 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4174 Doc: 46 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 14 of 26

factors, the court again emphasized that it “read paragraph 8 from the presentence report”

and that the paragraph “illuminated some of the facts and circumstances around the arrest.”

J.A. 149. Paragraph 8 describes Davis’s movement in the back seat of the police car and

request to have his handcuffs moved to the front “because of a shoulder condition.” 6 S.J.A.

172. It also describes the officers’ growing suspicion and their repeated attempts to

question Davis about whether he had anything illegal before he finally admitted to

possessing the firearm. Id. After reviewing this paragraph, the district court explicitly found

that “Mr. Davis’ actions and attempting to conceal the firearm from law enforcement upon

his arrest placed a number of individuals in serious danger.” J.A. 152.

We see no error in the district court’s findings as to the seriousness of the offense

based on the information contained in paragraph 8. We have no difficulty in understanding

the district court’s comment that Davis’s actions “placed a number of individuals in serious

danger” to recognize Davis’s acts as particularly concerning—at minimum, maintaining

possession of a firearm while in custody following his arrest, but possibly even attempting

and gave him commands to tell them the exact location of the firearm. The firearm was located in his waistband and was secured.

S.J.A. 172. 6 Notably, although Davis alleged “a shoulder condition” in his request to be handcuffed in the front, the presentence report provides only limited support. Davis reported that he was laid off from employment “after he hurt his shoulder on the job,” S.J.A. 184, but offered no additional information in his description of his physical condition in the report, see S.J.A 183. Regardless of the credibility of Davis’s allegation that he needed to be handcuffed in the front because of a shoulder condition, the district court had ample grounds to recognize the offense as one that “placed a number of individuals in serious danger.” See J.A. 152.

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to access the firearm while in the back of the patrol car—making his offense conduct far

more serious than a simple possession. Nor do we have any difficulty understanding the

district court’s comments that Davis “attempt[ed] to conceal the firearm from law

enforcement upon his arrest” as a rejection of Davis’s position that “his honest statement”

and “voluntary” disclosure of the weapon “helped keep everyone safe that day.”

These findings from the district court as to the nature, circumstances, and

seriousness of the offense negated several of Davis’s mitigation arguments. For one, Davis

argued that he should receive credit for voluntarily disclosing that he possessed the firearm.

J.A. 58, 143–44. Davis’s argument was made without the benefit of the court’s findings as

to the offense conduct and thus, was nonfrivolous at the time he made it. However, once

the court announced its findings as to Davis’s actions in the back of the patrol car and found

that those actions “placed a number of individuals in serious danger,” J.A. 152, his

argument required no further explanation from the court because, here, the district court’s

“individualized assessment” of the facts,” see Nance, 957 F.3d at 215, explained why it

rejected the argument, see Webb, 965 F.3d at 270.

Additionally, Davis cited cases from the Eastern District of Virginia in which

defendants convicted of similar crimes were given sentences of less than 36 months. J.A.

63–64. However, Davis did not identify any cases where a defendant repeatedly lied to law

enforcement officers and maintained a firearm on his person, even possibly attempting to

surreptitiously access that firearm, while in a confined space with those officers. Once

again, the district court found that “Mr. Davis’ actions and attempting to conceal the

firearm from law enforcement upon his arrest placed a number of individuals in serious

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danger.” J.A. 152. This finding as to the seriousness of the offense, which we do not find

to be “clearly erroneous,” see McKinnie, 21 F.4th at 291, explains the district court’s

rejection of Davis’s argument that the cited cases involved “similarly situated” defendants,

J.A. 63, even absent a separate addressing of each case. A district court is required to

address the defendant’s “central thesis” in mitigation and “need not address separately

every specific claim made in support.” See Powers, 40 F.4th at 137 (cleaned up) (emphasis

in original).

In addition to negating several of Davis’s mitigation arguments, these findings as to

the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offense also explain the district court’s

eventual weighing of the sentencing factors. The task of a sentencing judge is to conduct

an “individualized assessment of the facts and arguments” and—as part of fashioning a

substantively reasonable sentence—to “determin[e] the weight to be given each of the

§ 3553(a) factors” and decide, “on a whole,” how the balance of those factors justifies a

particular sentence. See Nance, 957 F.3d at 212, 215 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Davis asserts on appeal that the district court failed to adequately consider and

explain its response to certain, discrete aspects of Davis’s mitigation evidence and

arguments. We disagree. It is clear to us, instead, that the district court considered this

mitigation evidence and simply decided it was outweighed by competing § 3553(a)

factors—a finding based on the “whole” of the factors, and one that does not require the

district court to explicitly accept or reject each argument in order to fulfill its procedural

requirements. See United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012).

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Nonetheless, we will address Davis’s mitigation evidence and arguments that he

asserts the district court failed to consider and explain, reviewing the arguments within the

context of the whole of the district court’s findings.

In arguing for a sentence at the low end of the revised Guidelines range, Davis

pointed to evidence contained in the presentence report describing difficulties he faced

during his childhood and argued that those adverse childhood experiences, or ACEs, “help

explain his criminal history.” J.A. 59, 61–62. Davis argued that he grew up “in an

environment of fear, abuse, and danger.” Opening Br. at 5–6. He suffered from learning

disabilities as a child. S.J.A. 181. Both his mother and father used crack cocaine; his

mother, father, and stepfather all physically abused him, and he was left homeless for a

period when his mother and stepfather separated. S.J.A. 180–81. Davis also cited to

research, published by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (“CDC”), about how childhood trauma negatively impacts brain

development. J.A. 59–61. Davis concluded his argument: “The adversity and violence

[Davis] experienced as a child and his documented learning disabilities and mental illness

clearly put [him] at a major disadvantage in life. Those circumstances surely help explain

his criminal history.” J.A. 62.

Davis contends on appeal that the district court did not “grapple with this argument

in a meaningful way.” Opening Br. at 12. 7 More specifically understood, Davis contends

7 In addition to ACEs, Davis also argues that the district court insufficiently considered, and explained its response to, his evidence of recent improvements toward a productive, law-abiding life, such as “his increasing maturity, his turn away from drugs, (Continued) 17 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4174 Doc: 46 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 18 of 26

that the court committed procedural error by failing to conduct an individualized

assessment of the facts and argument, see Nance, 957 F.3d at 212, and by failing to

“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to

promote the perception of fair sentencing,” see King, 673 F.3d at 283 (citation omitted).

We disagree.

First, the district court conducted an individualized assessment of the facts

pertaining to Davis’s ACEs because it expressly found that “Mr. Davis’ childhood was

marked by instability, sickness, and abuse. His father abused alcohol and crack cocaine.

His stepfather physically abused him. And both his stepfather and mother also abused

drugs. He spent time in the hospital as a child and dealt with learning disabilities.” J.A.

149–50. Later, the district court commented that it “considered Mr. Davis’ background,

both the troubled background he had as a child and the parental influences on him.” J.A.

152. In accepting and recounting these findings, the court “outline[d] the defendant’s

particular history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of

its analysis of the statutory factors.” Blue, 877 F.3d at 519 (citation omitted). As with each

of Davis’s arguments in mitigation, the “record makes clear that the [district court] listened

to [the] argument,” “considered the supporting evidence,” and “was fully aware of [Davis’s

and his contributions to his family.” Opening Br. at 9. However, the very commission of the present offense and possession of the firearm undermine that argument to a degree. More importantly, the district court clearly considered this evidence, stating on the record that it reviewed Davis’s character letters. And the court’s other findings make clear that any evidence of recent, positive improvements did not outweigh Davis’s lengthy history of criminal violations and infractions, nor the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the present offense.

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ACEs] and imposed a sentence that [took] them into account.” See Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 358

(2007).

Second, most significantly, Davis’s ACEs argument did not undermine the district

court’s clear explanation that it determined a lower sentence to be insufficient after taking

into consideration “everything as a whole.” J.A. 154. In other words, the court concluded,

and sufficiently explained, that the sentence it imposed “was warranted in light of,” see

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 584 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added), its findings as

to the record “as a whole,” which included Davis’s ACEs. After accepting and recounting

Davis’s ACEs argument, the district court explained:

The Court has also considered the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and to protect the public from the further crimes of the defendant.

When considering these factors, the court notes that Mr. Davis has an extensive criminal history that began when he was 19 years old, which includes convictions for robbery, gang activity, distribution or sale of Scheduled I or II controlled substances, and driving on a suspended license.

J.A. 150. The court continued:

[T]he government moves for an upward variance . . . [a]nd so the court has reviewed the presentence report, has considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, has considered Mr. Davis’ background, both the troubled background he had as a child and the parental influences on him, and has considered his history and characteristics of what he’s done since he’s 19 years old.

Having considered the arguments and the Section 3553(a) factors, I’m going to grant the government’s motion for an upward variance.

J.A. 151–52. And later, it concluded:

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[I]n addition to all of that, also, every time Mr. Davis has been convicted of a crime since he was released on that robbery conviction, after committing all of these offenses while incarcerated, he’s done so while he’s been under a period of supervision from the Court.

So obviously, what has happened now has not worked, and I don’t believe, when I look at this record, that a guideline range of 21 to 27 months is sufficient, given the nature of the circumstances that’s before me now and his criminal history and his history and characteristics when I look at everything as a whole.

J.A. 153–54. It is evident from the district court’s explanation that it found Davis’s ACEs,

as well as his other arguments in mitigation, insufficient to overcome the seriousness of

the offense, the need for specific and general deterrence, and the need to protect the public.

“[I]t was well within the court's discretion to accord more weight to the host of aggravating

factors and decide that the sentence imposed would serve ‘the § 3553 factors, on a whole.’”

Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d at 105.

Davis’s central thesis—that ACEs “help explain his criminal history”—did not

necessitate the district court to provide a lengthy, or detailed, explanation for why the

argument failed to outweigh the court’s other findings as to the § 3553(a) factors. A

sentencing court is required to conduct an “‘individualized assessment’ based on the

particular facts of the case before it” and “impose an individualized sentence.” Blue, 877

F.3d at 518 (citations omitted). When performing that analysis, “[t]he adequacy of the

sentencing court’s explanation depends on the complexity of each case. . . . ‘The

appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say,

depends upon the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356).

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There is no dispute that Davis’s childhood circumstances were tragic. But the record

accompanying his ACEs argument did not elucidate an individualized connection between

the research he cited and his own history and characteristics, nor did it advance an

individualized, § 3553(a)-grounded, mitigation argument more complex than that inherent

to a generalized assertion that childhood trauma may interfere with brain development. The

research Davis cited makes clear that the neurodevelopmental effects from ACEs are

possibilities, not certainties. For example, the CDC study he cited concludes that “exposure

to ACEs is associated with increased risk for health problems across the lifespan,” J.A. 61

(emphasis added), and notes that “[t]oxic stress from ACEs can change brain development

and affect how the body responds to stress,” id. (emphasis added). The presentence report

suggests Davis was diagnosed with insomnia, anxiety, and PTSD sometime in 2021, and

depression when he was a juvenile, see S.J.A. 183, but the record provided no further

linkages between the CDC and DOJ research and Davis’s own individual history and

characteristics to suggest that the type of developmental effects that can happen, did in fact

happen here. Under these circumstances, see Blue, 877 F.3d at 518–19, the district court

was not required to engage in lengthy analysis of how Davis’s history and characteristics,

including his ACEs, interact with other § 3553(a) factors in light of the district court’s

overall explanation.

The district court’s explanation of its sentence makes clear that Davis’s personal

history and characteristics did not diminish the seriousness of his offense, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A), did not diminish the need for adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(B), and did not diminish the need for the sentence imposed to protect the

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public from further crimes, id. § 3553(a)(2)(C)—all of which were factors upon which the

district court explicitly relied in concluding that an upward variance was necessary to

fashion “a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” id. § 3553(a).

“We acknowledge that the [district court] might have said more,” see Rita, 551 U.S.

359, but find that the court nonetheless “adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence” such

that it “allow[s] for meaningful appellate review and promote[s] the perception of fair

sentencing,” see King, 673 F.3d at 283. In announcing its sentence, the district court

repeatedly emphasized its review of the presentence report, which includes pertinent facts

referenced by the court during sentencing: Between the ages of 19 and 24, Davis was

convicted of a physically violent robbery, S.J.A. 174, gang-affiliated criminal acts, S.J.A.

175–76, and multiple distributions of Schedule I or II controlled substances, S.J.A. 176–

77. Between the ages of 19 and 34, Davis spent the majority of his years serving a prison

sentence or under court supervision. Davis is now in his mid-thirties, and whatever the

underlying cause—adverse childhood experiences or something else—the district court

reasonably found that his criminal record is extensive, that his criminal activity has

persisted, and that his conduct in the present offense was far more serious than a simple

possession. As the district court recognized at sentencing, “what has happened now has not

worked.” J.A. 153. What “has not worked,” as the record establishes, is more than ten years

of intermittent imprisonment and long-term supervision. After more than ten years of

imprisonment and supervision, Davis not only possessed a firearm unlawfully, but did so

in a manner that “placed a number of individuals in serious danger.” J.A. 152.

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In sum, “[t]he context surrounding [the] district court’s explanation [] imbue[s] it

with enough content for us to evaluate both [that] the court considered the § 3553(a) factors

and [that] it did so properly.” See Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 381. The “central thesis” of

Davis’s arguments, see Powers, 40 F.4th at 137, and the “most important issue at

sentencing,” see Nance, 957 F.3d at 213, was whether Davis’s adverse childhood

experiences and recent improvements explain and outweigh the nature, circumstances, and

seriousness of the instant offense, as well as his pattern of undeterred criminal conduct.

The district court determined it did not and fashioned a sentence in accordance with that

determination. Because the district court adequately explained its chosen sentence, and did

not abuse its discretion, the sentence is procedurally reasonable.

We next consider Davis’s argument that his sentence was substantively

unreasonable. “In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we ‘examine the

totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in

concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).’”

McKinnie, 21 F.4th at 292 (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Mendoza-

Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010)).

“[A]fter calculating the correct Guidelines range, if the district court determines that

a sentence outside that range is appropriate, it may base its sentence on the Guidelines

departure provisions or on other factors so long as it provides adequate justification for the

deviation.” United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2011) (emphasis

in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir. 2008)). “Although

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the district court's justification for the sentence must support the degree of the variance,

and a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor

one, a district court need not justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range with a finding

of extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 366 (cleaned up) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

“[V]ariant sentences are generally reasonable when ‘the reasons justifying the

variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.’” McKinnie, 21 F.4th at 292 (quoting

United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019)). Ultimately,

district courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors, and the fact that a variance sentence deviates, even significantly, from the Guidelines range does not alone render it presumptively unreasonable. Instead, we must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.

Nance, 957 F.3d at 215 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the district court expressly concluded that the Guidelines range was

insufficient to serve the § 3553(a) factors and varied upward to 72 months based on an

individualized assessment of Davis’s history, criminal history, and conduct in this case.

The court’s justifications for the variance are tied to § 3553(a) factors and wholly plausible.

See McKinnie, 21 F.4th at 292. Further, the extent of the variance, although significant, is

likewise reasonable.

The district court reasonably concluded that Davis’s offense conduct—repeatedly

failing to disclose that he possessed a gun and then asking for his handcuffs to be adjusted,

including to the front of his body—indicated that Davis was attempting to harm the

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officers, or at least had created a significant risk of harm to the officers. J.A. 152. Because

the Guidelines range for his felon-in-possession charge did not fully account for that threat

of serious harm, this reason justifying an upward variance is entirely plausible. See

McKinnie, 21 F.4th at 292. Further, because Davis committed the instant offense while

under court supervision, and because Davis possesses a lengthy criminal record, as well as

a lengthy disciplinary record while incarcerated, the district court plausibly concluded that

his Guidelines range did not provide for adequate specific deterrence.

Finally, the court’s repeated emphasis of Davis’s previous drug distribution

convictions makes clear that it viewed his culpability to be more consistent with the

originally calculated Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months, rather than the lower range that

resulted on account of the application of the categorical approach to the statute of

conviction, which included the possibility of conviction for an attempt offense. Although

the district court did not state this reason for a variance as explicitly as it stated others, it is

apparent to this court and similarly plausible. As discussed earlier in this opinion, Davis’s

offense conduct underlying the prior drug distribution convictions involved the actual

distribution of a Schedule I or II controlled substance. The district court was not required

to forgo consideration of those facts when applying the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See

supra n.3, n.4 and corresponding text.

Taking “everything as a whole,” J.A. 154, the district court reasonably concluded

that a variance upward to 72 months was necessary to reflect the § 3553(a) factors and

determine a sentence “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” Particularly given the

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discretion afforded to sentencing courts to make these determinations, we find that Davis’s

sentence of 72 months is substantively reasonable.

III.

Davis’s contention that the district court failed to adequately address his mitigation

arguments is not unreasonable. However, in reviewing the record, we do so within the

context of the facts and arguments before the district court, the court’s explanation of the

§ 3553(a) factors, and the relevant precedent guiding the court’s exercise of discretion.

Considering the record as a whole, the district court’s explanation allows for meaningful

appellate review and promotes the perception of fair sentencing. Similarly, in reviewing

the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined that a sentence of 72 months satisfied the standards set forth in §

3553(a).

The district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.