United States v. Willette

764 F. Supp. 759, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7325, 1991 WL 94370
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. New York
DecidedJune 3, 1991
Docket90-CR-53
StatusPublished

This text of 764 F. Supp. 759 (United States v. Willette) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Willette, 764 F. Supp. 759, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7325, 1991 WL 94370 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

MeCURN, Chief Judge.

Background

On March 7, 1990, a federal grand jury formally indicted Scott Willette (“Willette”) with transporting stolen goods across state lines. This indictment charged that from about January 1, 1988, through December 14, 1988, Willette transported, in interstate commerce, knives Willette knew to be stolen from the Camillus Cutlery Company (“Camillus Cutlery or the Company”) in *760 New York to the State of Ohio. Specifically, Willette was charged with a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314, which states, in relevant part:

Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud ... [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.

18 U.S.C. § 2314 (West Supp.1990). The value of the knives purportedly stolen by the defendant was allegedly more than $5,000.00.

At a trial tried to a jury on October 4 and 11, 1990, the government sought to establish Willette’s guilt through the testimony of witnesses who allegedly sold knives, known to them to be stolen, to the defendant; as well as by the testimony of several individuals who claimed to have purchased such knives from Willette in Ohio.

In attempting to obtain a conviction in this action, the government offered into evidence’ various brands and types of knives which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) contended implicated the defendant and had itself obtained from a variety of sources; including individuals who claimed to have either received or purchased knives from Willette, as well as from the defendant’s own home. 1 In trying to demonstrate a connection between the knives, Camillus Cutlery and Willette, the government also called to the witness stand several employees of the Company, including Mike Dillon, Donald Cook and its president, James Furgal. At the close of the government’s proof, Willette, through his attorney, moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 29, claiming that the government had failed to meet its burden of proving that the value of the stolen knives was $5,000.00 or more. For the reasons stated below, this court granted the defendant’s motion.

Discussion

In order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, the value of goods known to be stolen and transported in interstate commerce must be $5,000.00 or greater. Section 2311 of this Title defines “value” as the “face, par or market value, whichever is the greatest.” Additionally, the aggregate value of all goods referred to in a single indictment constitutes the “value” thereof. Id. Because the knives allegedly stolen and transported in this case had no face or par value, proof of their market value was essential for conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 687 F.2d 359, 360 (11th Cir.1982) (citation omitted).

At trial, the government contended that the correct market value of the stolen knives was their retail market value. They based this assertion on the proposition that value should be, in accordance with the language and spirit of section 2311, the greatest value of the knives to the person who allegedly stole the property — in the present case, the retail value of the knives sold by Camillus Cutlery. The government claimed that United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. Stoner, 487 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.1973) and Husten v. United States, 95 F.2d 168 (8th Cir.1938) supported their contention that the legitimate retail market price of the knives allegedly stolen should have been utilized in determining whether Willette had stolen property whose value equalled or exceeded $5000. However, all of these cases were distinguishable from the facts present before the court.

In Berkwitt, the court was faced with the arduous task of determining the appro *761 priate value of “sound waves’’ which were illegally recorded onto eight-track cassettes and thereafter sold to the public. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d at 657. The property at issue in that case was not the actual eight-track recordings made by the manufacturer, but rather the copies of the manufacturer’s recordings made by the accused. That court found that a strong argument could be made for utilizing the legitimate retail market value in determining the stolen property’s value, because the bootleg tapes competed with their legitimate counterparts. Id. Based upon the unique, intangible property which was stolen, however, the court found the legitimate retail market value misleading in as much as it may have included a profit margin the defendants never could have realized. Id. The court thereafter found that a “thieves market” evaluation was a fair representation of the value of the goods, because such market reflected the full price a willing buyer in this market would have paid a willing seller in the same market. Id. at 658. Thus, it was the illegitimate retail price, not the legitimate retail price, which established the value of the stolen goods.

The action before this court presented a different situation than that addressed by the Berkwitt court. The Camillus Cutlery employees who testified at trial, Donald Cook, Mike Dillon and James Furgal, indicated that the knives presented as evidence were defective in that they had factory damage, were unfinished work products, or lacked the requisite etching or serialization. 2 Thus, unlike the goods in the Ber-kwitt case, the merchandise in the present case was either damaged or incomplete; therefore they could not have competed with the legitimate products of Camillus Cutlery.

Stoner similarly provided no support for the government’s contention. In that case, the defendants were accused of stealing thirty-eight suits from a Memphis, Tennessee merchant. While the appellant-defendants’ claims that the government be bound by the wholesale value of the stolen suits were summarily dismissed, it is clear that the suits were taken from a clothing store which sold its goods at retail, rather than wholesale prices. Stoner, 487 F.2d at 653. In the present case, the testimony of the government’s witnesses clearly established that the Company operates as a wholesale distributer of the knives it manufactures.

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Related

Schaffer v. United States
362 U.S. 511 (Supreme Court, 1960)
United States v. Joseph Theodore Wigerman
549 F.2d 1192 (Eighth Circuit, 1977)
United States v. Mark Berkwitt and Barry Berkwitt
619 F.2d 649 (Seventh Circuit, 1980)
United States v. John Robert Perry
638 F.2d 862 (Fifth Circuit, 1981)
United States v. Hilton Robinson
687 F.2d 359 (Eleventh Circuit, 1982)
The United States of America v. Fred Cummings
798 F.2d 413 (Tenth Circuit, 1986)
Husten v. United States
95 F.2d 168 (Eighth Circuit, 1938)
United States v. Stoner
487 F.2d 651 (Sixth Circuit, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
764 F. Supp. 759, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7325, 1991 WL 94370, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-willette-nynd-1991.