United States v. Willems Calixte, Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: June 18, 2024
• Docket: 21-13578
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 21-13578 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13578 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus WILLEMS CALIXTE, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cr-60153-WPD-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 21-13578 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 21-13578

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Willems Calixte, Jr. appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in vi- olation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal, Calixte challenges the ap- plicability of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (“ACCA”) and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). After careful review of the parties’ arguments, we affirm. I We review de novo whether a prior state conviction quali- fies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. See United States v. How- ard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). However, “we review unpreserved sentencing objections only for plain error.” United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1037 (11th Cir. 2019). The ACCA requires that any person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years when he has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed on separate occasions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In Borden v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that a crim- inal offense with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a “vio- lent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause to enhance a USCA11 Case: 21-13578 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 3 of 5

21-13578 Opinion of the Court 3

defendant’s sentence. 593 U.S. 420, 423–24, 429 (2021) (plurality opinion); id. at 446 (Thomas, J., concurring). 1 In Somers v. United States, we relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that state-law aggravated assault requires a mens rea of at least knowing conduct and could not be committed recklessly to hold that Florida aggravated assault “categorically qualifies” as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause, even after Borden. 66 F.4th 890, 896 (11th Cir. 2023). And in United States v. Fritts, we held that a conviction under Florida’s armed-rob- bery statute “categorically qualifies” as a violent felony under the ACCA based on the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation that a violent act was required. 841 F.3d 937, 942–43 (11th Cir. 2016). Under the prior precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, as an initial matter, because Calixte failed to challenge the applicability of the ACCA before the district court, we review his current arguments only for plain error. Corbett, 921 F.3d at 1037. We find no error, plain or otherwise, because Calixte’s

1 When the Supreme Court decides a case and “no single rationale explaining

the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg- ments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quotation marks omitted). USCA11 Case: 21-13578 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 21-13578

arguments that his aggravated assault and armed robbery convic- tions are not violent felonies under the ACCA are foreclosed by our binding precedent. Somers, 66 F.4th at 890, 896; Fritts, 841 F.3d at 942–43. To the extent that Calixte contends that our precedent was overturned by Borden, we disagree; that decision did not overturn or undermine our previous holdings to the point of abrogation. See Somers, 66 F.4th at 895–96; Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. 2 Accordingly, we affirm in this respect. II Under federal law, a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment may not possess a firearm or ammunition that has moved through interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In United States v. Rozier, we held that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on possession of fire- arms by felons was a “constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people.” 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010). We have since held that Rozier was not abrogated by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024). There- fore, Calixte’s argument that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment in light of Bruen is foreclosed by our binding prece- dent.

2 Because at least three of Calixte’s prior felonies were qualifying violent felo-

nies under our binding precedent, we decline to examine whether a Florida armed-kidnapping conviction qualifies as a violent felony. USCA11 Case: 21-13578 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 5 of 5

21-13578 Opinion of the Court 5

Accordingly, we affirm in this respect as well. AFFIRMED.