United States v. Whitma

370 F. App'x 435

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 17, 2010
• Docket: 094518
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4518

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MANDY RAE WHITMAN,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. (4:08-cr-00367-TLW-4)

Submitted: February 24, 2010 Decided: March 17, 2010

Before MICHAEL, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

D. Craig Brown, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Mandy Rae Whitman pled guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (2006), and was

sentenced to 135 months in prison. Counsel has filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

stating that after a review of the record, he has found no

meritorious issues for appeal. The Anders brief nonetheless

highlights the fact that Whitman’s sentence was not based on a

one-to-one crack to powder cocaine ratio, as had been advocated

by defense counsel and the Government at sentencing. Whitman

has not filed a pro se supplemental brief despite receiving

notice that she may do so, and the Government declined to file a

responsive brief. Finding no error, we affirm.

In the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,

we review the adequacy of the guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11 for plain error. United States v. Martinez,

277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). A review of Whitman’s Rule

11 hearing reveals that the district court substantially

complied with Rule 11’s requirements. Whitman’s plea was

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, with full

knowledge of the consequences attendant to her guilty plea. We

therefore find that no plain error occurred and affirm Whitman’s

conviction.

2 We also affirm Whitman’s sentence. The district court

properly assessed Whitman’s criminal history as category IV and

calculated a total offense level of thirty, yielding a

Guidelines range of 135-168 months. Moreover, at sentencing,

the district court entertained counsel’s argument regarding the

weight that should be afforded the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)

factors, allowed Whitman an opportunity to allocute, and

thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors before imposing

Whitman’s sentence. We find that the district court adequately

explained its rationale for imposing Whitman’s sentence, the

sentence was “selected pursuant to a reasoned process in

accordance with law,” and the reasons relied upon by the

district court are plausible and justify the sentence imposed.

See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-76 (4th Cir.

2007); see also United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th

Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the district court must “place on

the record an individualized assessment based on the particular

facts of the case before it” and that the “individualized

assessment . . . must provide a rationale tailored to the

particular case at hand and [be] adequate to permit meaningful

appellate review”).

Moreover, Whitman’s challenge to the crack-to-powder

cocaine sentencing disparity is without merit. This court has

repeatedly rejected claims that the sentencing disparity between

3 powder cocaine and crack offenses violates either equal

protection or due process. See United States v. Perkins,

108 F.3d 512, 518 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Burgos,

94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fisher,

58 F.3d 96, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1995). Further, to the extent

Whitman seeks to have this court reconsider these decisions, a

panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of a prior

panel. United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir.

2005). Accordingly, we affirm Whitman’s sentence. See United

States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing

that this court applies an appellate presumption of

reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court

requires that counsel inform Whitman, in writing, of the right

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If Whitman requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Whitman. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

4 materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED