United States v. White

2005 DNH 120

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 26, 2005
• Docket: 04-CR-219-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States v . White 04-CR-219-SM 08/26/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal N o . 04-cr-219-01-SM Opinion N o . 2005 DNH 120 Daisylyn A . White

O R D E R

This is yet another criminal case in which the government is

bringing charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements) for

conduct that amounts to passport fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1542). See

United States v . Muratoski, ___ F.Supp. 2d ___, 2005 DNH 61

(D.N.H. April 8 , 2005). That charging decision is no doubt a

function of the court of appeals’ decision in United States v .

Salinas, 373 F.3d 161 (1st Cir. 2004). In Salinas the court held

venue to be improper in this district in passport fraud cases

involving applications filed or mailed out of state that

eventually find their way to the National Passport Center in

Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The court did note, however, that

venue would be proper in this district if the conduct were

charged as a false statement offense under § 1001 - the

distinction being that passport fraud is a completed offense “at

the moment an applicant makes a knowing false statement in an application with a view toward procuring a passport,” Salinas,

373 F.3d at 165 (citing United States v . O’Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528,

1535 (11th Cir. 1985), while § 1001 offenses are generally

considered continuing offenses, with the material

misrepresentation “continuing into the district in which the

effects of the false statement are felt.” Salinas, 373 F.3d at

167 (citations omitted).

Defendant moves to transfer venue to the Eastern District of

New York, where she lives and works. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b).

The government objects.

Standard of Review

A district court has broad discretionary power to transfer a

criminal prosecution to another district “for the convenience of

the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b). In exercising that discretion, courts

generally consider a number of factors identified by the Supreme

Court in Platt v . Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964).

Those factors include: (1) the location of the defendant; (2) the

location of possible witnesses; (3) the location of events likely

to be an issue; (4) the location of documents and records likely

2 to be involved; (5) the disruption of defendant’s business if the

case is not transferred; (6) the expense to the parties; (7) the

location of counsel; (8) the relative accessibility of the place

of trial; (9) the docket condition of each district or division

involved; and (10) any other special considerations relevant to

transfer. Id. at 243-44. No one factor is likely to be

dispositive, but all should be considered under the

circumstances:

It is unlikely that any one of these factors will be present by itself in a particular case. Ordinarily the various factors appear in combination, with some pointing in favor of transfer and others against transfer. It is incumbent on the court in such a case to strike a balance and decide which factors seem to be of greatest importance in that case.

2 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 344 at 275.

Discussion

Having carefully considered the Platt factors, I find it

appropriate in this case to exercise my discretion to transfer

venue to the district in which the defendant lives.

3 Long Island, where defendant lives, is not terribly far away

- defendant could drive to New Hampshire in about six hours.

Driving home on the same day would pose a substantial hardship,

however, and staying here overnight would involve room and board

expenses added on to travel costs. After several trips, those

costs and burdens would become increasingly significant.

Defendant is employed, though at a comparatively modest wage

($7.00 per hour), as a home health aide. She has been determined

to be eligible for appointed representation and is represented by

the federal defenders office. All is all, economic impact upon

defendant of requiring her to litigate in New Hampshire counsels

in favor of transfer. Defendant had to travel all night by bus

for her initial appearance and arrived without money for food.

She had to return by bus that evening, arriving home after

midnight.

Defendant also states that she will be calling witnesses

from New York. Needless to say, it will be far more convenient

for those witnesses to have the trial (and, if defendant is

convicted, sentencing) in New York, where they live.

4 Transfer of venue poses no undue burdens for the government.

The critical evidence is likely in the form of documents which

are easily transported and authenticated. Government employee-

witnesses are either already located in New York or can easily

and conveniently travel from New Hampshire at no personal

expense. And, given the nationwide reach of the activity at the

Passport Center, the government must reasonably expect, and

prepare for, occasional travel in support of prosecutions it

deems appropriate to bring. In any event, the government’s

inconvenience is “a factor given little weight when other

considerations of convenience suggest transfer.” United States

v . Gruberg, 493 F.Supp. 2 3 4 , 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

Although this case could reasonably be tried here, and the

transfer question is arguable, the combination of factors

discussed and the principle that defendants, ordinarily, should

be tried where they live, United States v . Russell, 582 F. Supp.

660, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and the government’s charging decision

to avoid the more precise charge for the conduct at issue in

order to avoid a plain absence of venue, all tips the balance in

favor of exercising discretion to transfer this case to the

Eastern District of New York.

5 Conclusion

Venue is transferred to the Eastern District of New York for

the convenience of the defendant and witnesses, and in the

interests of justice. Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b).

SO ORDERED.

Steven J./McAuliffe :hief Judge

August 2 6 , 2005

cc: Alfred J.T. Rubega, Esq. Jeffrey S . Levin, Esq. U.S. Probation U.S. Marshal