United States v. Whipple Hardware Co.
This text of 191 F. 945 (United States v. Whipple Hardware Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is an action by the United States against the Whipple Hardware Company for the use and occupation of property in Jersey City. While the defendant was in possession of the property as tenant under a lease, its interest therein, and that of its landlord, the owner of the property, were acquired by the United States, by condemnation, under the congressional act entitled:
“An act to increase the limit of cost of certain public buildings, to authorize tlie purchase of sites for public buildings, to authorize the erection and, completion of public buildings, and for other purposes” — approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. at Large, 772).
[946]*946The final decree in the condemnation proceedings was entered April 21, 1909. The occupancy of the defendant continued from that date until April 13, 1910. There was a judgment in favor of the United States. This judgment the defendant now insists should be reversed.
One of the defendant’s contentions is that it continued to occupy the premises after the title had been acquired by the United States, not as a tenant, but as a trespasser. This rather remarkable defense, if proven, would defeat this action. But it is not proven. The .evidence shows clearly that the occupation continued with the consent of the United States.o Repeated efforts were made by the agent of the United States to reach an agreement with the agent of the defendant as to the rental value of the premises. The defendant was never treated as a trespasser, and it never assumed to occupy the premises otherwise than lawfully. The effort on the part of the United States to malee an express contract concerning the occupancy failed, but the obligation of the defendant to pay a reasonable sum for its use and occupancy remains.
“In case a site or addition to a site acquired under the provisions of this act contains a building or buildings, the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to rent, until their removal becomes necessary, such of said buildings as may he purchased by the government, or the land on which the same may be located where the buildings are reserved by the venders, at a fair rental value.” etc.
There was a building on the site here condemned, and, while the authority given to the Secretary of the Treasury is to rent buildings "purchased” by the government, the word “purchased” must be taken [947]*947in its legal .sense, which includes all modes of acquisition except that of descent.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed, with costs.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
191 F. 945, 112 C.C.A. 357, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-whipple-hardware-co-ca3-1911.