United States v. Wheeler

1999 ME 54, 726 A.2d 1264, 1999 Me. LEXIS 55
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedApril 12, 1999
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 1999 ME 54 (United States v. Wheeler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Wheeler, 1999 ME 54, 726 A.2d 1264, 1999 Me. LEXIS 55 (Me. 1999).

Opinion

SAUFLEY, J.

[¶ 1] The United States Department of Agriculture, acting through the Rural Housing Service, formerly known as the Farmers Home Administration, 1 appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court (Newport, Hjelm, J.) granting its motion for summary judgment but refusing to allow it to recap *1265 ture certain interest subsidies. On appeal, the government contends that the court erred when it determined that the Subsidy Repayment Agreement precludes recapture of interest subsidies in the event of foreclosure. We agree and vacate the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The facts are undisputed. On November 17, 1987, Kenneth E. Wheeler and Kathleen R. Newton obtained two loans from the government, in the amounts of $43,000 and $5,600. 2 Each loan was evidenced by a promissory note and was secured by a mortgage on property owned by Wheeler and Newton, located in Dixmont, Maine. In addition to the promissory notes, the mortgage contract included a “Subsidy Repayment Agreement,” articulating the terms for repayment of government interest subsidies.

[¶ 3] The interest subsidies were provided to Wheeler and Newton pursuant to Title V of the Housing Act of 1949, a federal program providing low interest loans to individuals, primarily in rural areas, “who cannot obtain credit and are therefore unable to secure decent housing.” Pealo v. Farmers Home Admin., 562 F.2d 744, 745 (D.C.Cir.1977). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1471 et. seq. (1988). 3 Section 521 of the Act authorizes the government, as part of its assistance program, to provide interest subsidies, whereby a borrower’s interest rate may be set as low as 1% per annum. See 42 U.S.C. § 1490a(a)(l). Although the loans formally bear the maximum interest rate set by the government — 9.5% per annum in the present case — the actual interest rate payments paid by the borrower are the lower rates set in section 521. The borrower therefore receives a government subsidy in an amount which reflects the difference between the amount the borrower would have paid at the maximum interest rate and the amount paid at the lower rate set by the program.

[¶ 4] Eventually Wheeler and Newton defaulted on the promissory notes, and the government declared the entire debt due and filed a complaint seeking foreclosure, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6321 (Supp.1998). As of June 15,1998, the government alleged that Wheeler and Newton owed: $54,978.53 in principal and advances; $8,504.21 in accrued interest; and $28,180.64, as an interest subsidy subject to recapture. In their answer, Wheeler and Newton contested only the interest recapture.

[¶ 5] The government then filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking the principal due on both loans, all accrued interest, recapture of the interest subsidy, per diem interest, and collection costs. Again, the only portion of the statement of material facts contested by Wheeler and Newton was the interest subsidy. They contended that in the event of foreclosure the provision of the Subsidy Repayment Agreement that provides for recapture of the interest subsidy by the government is null and void.

[¶ 6] The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the government but concluded that the Subsidy Repayment Agreement precluded the government from recapturing any part of the interest subsidy. It determined that paragraph 6(g) of that Agreement “sets out the formula used to calculate interest subject to recapture. Paragraph 5, however, provides that [paragraph] 6 is inapplicable in cases ... of foreclosure. The effect of [paragraph] 5, therefore, is to remove the contractual basis under which the government would otherwise ... be entitled to seek recovery for interest subject to recapture.” In essence, the court determined that paragraph 6 contained the exclusive method for recapture of the interest subsidy and concluded that, because paragraph 6 is inapplicable in the event of foreclosure, the government was not entitled to recapture the interest subsidy.

*1266 [¶ 7] The government appealed directly to this Court, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 1901(2)(A), from the summary judgment entered by the District Court challenging only the court’s determination that the government may not recapture the interest subsidies.

II. THE SUBSIDY REPAYMENT AGREEMENT

[¶ 8] The Subsidy Repayment Agreement provides, in paragraph 3, that Wheeler and Newton pledge their property as security for repayment of the interest subsidy they received from the government and provides that “the subsidy is due and payable upon the transfer of title or non-occupancy of the property by me (us).” Paragraph 4 provides that the “amount of subsidy to be repaid will be determined when the principal and interest balance is paid.” In the event that the debt is satisfied in a manner other than the voluntary conveyance of the property to the government or a foreclosure, paragraph 6 prioritizes the distribution of sale proceeds, and provides the method of calculation for repayment of the interest subsidy after a sale. Paragraph 5 reiterates the parties’ agreement that paragraph 6 is inapplicable when the property is voluntarily conveyed to the government or “liquidated by foreclosure.”

III. DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law, see Fleet Bank of Maine v. Harriman, 1998 ME 275, ¶ 4, 721 A.2d 658, whereas interpretation of an ambiguous contract involves questions of fact, see Town of Lisbon v. Thayer Corp., 675 A.2d 514, 516 (Me.1996). The court did not consider extrinsic evidence when interpreting the contract, nor do the parties suggest that extrinsic evidence would assist the court in its interpretation of the contract. “Because the trial court interpreted the contract from the language of the document alone, we review the court’s interpretation de novo.” Alexander v. Fairway Villas, Inc., 1998 ME 226, ¶ 11, 719 A.2d 103.

[¶ 10] The court correctly determined that paragraph 6 is inapplicable when the government forecloses on the property. In the absence of foreclosure or voluntary conveyance of the property to the government, paragraph 6 establishes the priority by which proceeds from sale of the property are distributed and establishes a special formula for calculating the amount that must be repaid on the interest subsidy. The provisions of that paragraph, however, are tailored to circumstances where the borroiver sells the property.

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Bluebook (online)
1999 ME 54, 726 A.2d 1264, 1999 Me. LEXIS 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-wheeler-me-1999.