United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.

890 F. Supp. 1, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 967, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5563, 1995 WL 388460
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 28, 1995
DocketCiv. A. 82-0192
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 890 F. Supp. 1 (United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 967, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5563, 1995 WL 388460 (D.D.C. 1995).

Opinion

OPINION

HAROLD H. GREENE, District Judge.

I

Introduction

Pending before the Court is a motion by the Regional Bell Operating Companies (Regional Companies) to modify Section 11(D) of the decree to allow them to provide cellular and other wireless services across LATA boundaries. 1 In essence, the Regional Com *2 panies wish to be able to offer interexchange service (colloquially referred to as long distance service) to their cellular customers.

This motion comes before the Court with mixed reactions from the other parties. The Department of Justice supports the motion, but only if certain conditions are imposed upon the Regional Companies. The interex-change carriers, on the other hand, oppose the motion, even if the Department’s conditions are incorporated. Intervenors and ami-ci have taken various positions, some vigorously opposing the motion, others expressing support.

When the motion was first filed, congressional action on a telecommunications bill seemed imminent. For that reason, inter alia, the Court deferred consideration of the matter pending such action. However, when it became obvious that a bill would not be enacted in the 103rd Congress, the Court began considering the motion in earnest and convened a hearing on the matter. At that hearing, the Court sought and received additional guidance on the key questions raised by the motion. Having considered this additional guidance, as well as the full record, the Court now concludes that, to a degree and with certain conditions, the motion should be granted.

In order to understand how this motion is being resolved, one must first understand the factual and legal context in which it arises.

II

The Bottleneck Issue

The Regional Companies have made it a central theme of their argument in support of the waiver that the American public will benefit from more competition in cellular long distance, and that they are a potentially significant resource in this respect. The Court does not disagree with these propositions. Competition is basic to the decree in this case, and it obviously should be fostered. See Part VI, infra.

The Court’s commitment to the protection and enlargement of competition in telecommunications of course includes competition in the cellular portion of long distance. Thus, the Court’s immediate inclination was to permit the Regional Companies to enter this market, for both on the basis of their experience in telecommunications and their access to the necessary capital, these companies are particularly well suited to operate in this field as effective competitors to the more entrenched long distance carriers. Beyond that, the Court — as others, in Congress and elsewhere — is of course desirous of terminating the restrictions in the decree when this can prudently be done, rather than enshrining them as permanent features of the business landscape.

That, however, can only be accomplished when the conditions which gave rise to those restrictions no longer exist. Put most simply and bluntly, restrictions on long distance service by the Regional Companies can be completely eliminated only when these companies no longer have the capacity to exploit what has throughout this litigation been termed the “bottleneck.” Lest the significance of that condition has been lost to the memory of those who are part of the telecommunications business or have the obligation and power to regulate that business, through legislation or otherwise, it is still worthwhile to recapitulate, briefly, why the bottleneck concept plays such a central role here.

As the Court explained in its approval of the decree proposed by the Department of Justice and AT & T (the two parties to the underlying antitrust action), the Bell System’s anticompetitive activities, which had surfaced in the evidence during the eleven-month trial of this case, were made possible in large part “because of its control of the local Operating Companies — whose facilities were and are needed for interconnection purposes by AT & T’s competitors.... ” United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F.Supp. 131, 162 (D.D.C.1982). The Court further noted at that time that, with divestiture, the Regional Companies’ guarantee of access to *3 the network by all long distance carriers would be meaningful only because the Regional Companies “will not be providing [long distance] services” of their own. Id. at 165. Other, similar expressions are found throughout the Court’s Opinion that approved the decree, as well as in subsequent Orders and Opinions of the Court. See, e.g., especially, United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 673 F.Supp. 525 (D.D.C.1987) (Triennial Review Opinion).

Thus, in the Triennial Review in 1987, the Court emphasized the central role of the bottleneck in these terms:

The first question must necessarily be whether the Regional Companies have retained monopoly control of an “essential facility”.... It was their control of [such essential facilities] that gave the Bell System its power over the competition. That control enabled the System to foreclose or impede interconnection to its network of lines of its long distance competitors and of the equipment produced by its manufacturing rivals. It also made possible the subsidization of one activity with the profits achieved in another. As long as the Regional Companies retain these same bottlenecks, the potential for the same or similar anticompetitive conduct is plainly still present.

673 F.Supp. at 536 (internal citations omitted). The concepts expressed in that Opinion still apply today, and the Court continues to be informed by their logic. The continued existence of bottlenecks remains the factual predicate for the interexchange restriction. Before the Regional Companies can enter a new market they will have to show that there is no substantial possibility that they could use their bottleneck monopoly control to impede competition in that market.

The Regional Companies and the Department of Justice advance different responses to this bedrock proposition. The Regional Companies attack the factual predicate for the restriction, arguing that there is no bottleneck in this particular market. The Justice Department, on the other hand, acknowledges that the bottleneck problems continue to exist, but it contends that these problems can be adequately resolved if certain conditions, which as a practical matter will reduce the risk that the Regional Companies will discriminate against the long distance competitors, are placed on their entry into the long distance cellular market. The Court examines the Regional Company argument in Parts III and IV, infra, and the Department of Justice submission in Part V, infra.

Ill

Cellular Operation

In order to evaluate the assertion that there is no bottleneck in this particular market, one must first understand some basic facts about how cellular phone service works.

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890 F. Supp. 1, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 967, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5563, 1995 WL 388460, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-western-elec-co-inc-dcd-1995.