UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________ ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) v. ) Case No. 21-cr-208 (APM) ) THOMAS WEBSTER, ) ) Petitioner. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A jury convicted Petitioner Thomas Webster on multiple counts for participating in the riot
at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See United States v. Webster, 102 F.4th 471 (D.C. Cir.
2024) (affirming convictions and sentence). He now seeks a writ of coram nobis vacating his
convictions. Pet. for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, ECF No. 135 [hereinafter Pet.]. For the reasons
set forth below, the petition is denied.
A writ of coram nobis is appropriate only to correct “errors of the most fundamental
character.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Such instances are rare. Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that “[i]t is
difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where a writ of coram nobis
would be necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996)
(cleaned up).
Courts in this Circuit have required a petitioner seeking a writ to show: “(1) a more usual
remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse
consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of
Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character.” United States v. Cerroni, No. 24-3194, 2026 WL 124324, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Petitioner fails the last three of these requirements.
The court starts with the third. Petitioner received a pardon from the President. That act
of clemency “released [him] from the consequences of his offence . . . . It release[d] [him] from
all disabilities imposed by the offence, and restore[d] to him all his civil rights.” Knote v. United
States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877). Petitioner therefore lacks a cognizable injury in fact. See United
States v. Verrusio, No. 09-cr-00064 (BAH), 2017 WL 2634638, at *4 (D.D.C. 2017) (observing
that “a majority of courts require a coram nobis petitioner to show ongoing collateral consequences
above and beyond the conviction itself” and citing supporting cases). For his part, Petitioner
quotes from a portion of Carafas v. LaVallee, in which the Supreme Court wrote about a habeas
petitioner: “In consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot
serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any election
held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror.” 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Pet’r’s Answer to
U.S. Opp’n to Pet., ECF No. 149 [hereinafter Answer], at 18. But Carafas is inapplicable, because
that case was about mootness; specifically, whether a prisoner’s habeas petition had become moot
upon his release from incarceration while his petition was pending appellate review. The Court
held that, “[o]n account of these ‘collateral consequences,’ this case is not moot.” 391 U.S. at 237–
38 (footnote omitted). By contrast, Petitioner does not face the same collateral consequences
following his pardon, and the otherwise unspecified collateral consequences he invokes are not
sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement. See Verrusio, 2017 WL 2634638,
at *4.
Petitioner also fails the second requirement: he has not offered any reason for not attacking
his convictions earlier, in his case by filing a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
2 See United States v. Miles, 923 F.3d 798, 804 (10th Cir. 2019) (stating that “a claim pressed
through a coram nobis petition is ordinarily barred if the petitioner . . . simply failed to pursue the
claim under § 2255 when petitioner could have”). Petitioner was incarcerated for approximately
six months before his pardon and release. He offers no reason why he could not have brought his
present challenges as a habeas petition. See Answer at 20–21.
Petitioner likewise has not met the final requirement: demonstrating an error of
fundamental character. For his first claim, Petitioner asserts that Officer Rathbun lied to the
prosecution about the pendency of an administrative use-of-force investigation. Pet. at 6–7
(CM/ECF Pagination). The court had ruled that the defense could question Officer Rathbun about
the then-open investigation, but not delve into the details. See Webster, 102 F.4th at 486. On the
morning of his testimony, however, the prosecution announced that it recently had learned that the
investigation had closed; the defense then conceded it no longer had grounds to question Officer
Rathbun about the investigation. See id. Defendant claims that Officer Rathbun falsely told
prosecutors that the investigation had closed, when in fact it remained open on the day of his
testimony. Pet. at 6–7. Examining Officer Rathbun about the open investigation, Petitioner
maintains, would have allowed him to show that Officer Rathbun “was himself the subject of an
investigation and highly motivated to alter his testimony to conform with the prosecution’s
wishes.” Answer at 24.
But Petitioner is wrong twice over. For one, the record does not reflect that it was Officer
Rathbun who advised prosecutors about the status of the investigation. Rather, the government
represented that “Officer Rathbun just learned of [the investigation’s closing] last week after our
pretrial conference, and the information was just provided to our office late this past Sunday night.”
Trial Tr. 4/27/2022, ECF No. 117 [hereinafter Trial Tr. 4/27/2022], at 5:3-5. The government thus
3 did not specify that it was Officer Rathbun who advised them of the change. The prosecutor’s use
of the passive voice—“was just provided”—leaves unanswered who precisely provided that
information.
What’s more, Petitioner has not shown that the use-of-force investigation in fact remained
open when Officer Rathbun testified. He points to an affidavit filed in a D.C. Freedom of
Information Act case that he filed in D.C. Superior Court seeking records from the
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) regarding the incident that led to the use-of-force
investigation. Answer at 20 (citing Attach. 14, Decl. of Brandynn Reaves, ECF No. 149-1
[hereinafter Reaves Decl.], at 44–51). Petitioner made a request on June 16, 2023, while his direct
appeal was pending, for “[a]ll investigation notes and documentation regarding Officer Noah
Rathbun . . . concerning any and all incidents occurring on May 24, 2021.” Reaves Decl. ¶ 5.
True, MPD disclosed no records in part because, “at the time of the request and response,” the
“subject matter of the request was” “the subject of an open and ongoing investigation.” Id. ¶ 12.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________ ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) v. ) Case No. 21-cr-208 (APM) ) THOMAS WEBSTER, ) ) Petitioner. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A jury convicted Petitioner Thomas Webster on multiple counts for participating in the riot
at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See United States v. Webster, 102 F.4th 471 (D.C. Cir.
2024) (affirming convictions and sentence). He now seeks a writ of coram nobis vacating his
convictions. Pet. for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, ECF No. 135 [hereinafter Pet.]. For the reasons
set forth below, the petition is denied.
A writ of coram nobis is appropriate only to correct “errors of the most fundamental
character.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Such instances are rare. Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that “[i]t is
difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where a writ of coram nobis
would be necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996)
(cleaned up).
Courts in this Circuit have required a petitioner seeking a writ to show: “(1) a more usual
remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse
consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of
Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character.” United States v. Cerroni, No. 24-3194, 2026 WL 124324, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Petitioner fails the last three of these requirements.
The court starts with the third. Petitioner received a pardon from the President. That act
of clemency “released [him] from the consequences of his offence . . . . It release[d] [him] from
all disabilities imposed by the offence, and restore[d] to him all his civil rights.” Knote v. United
States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877). Petitioner therefore lacks a cognizable injury in fact. See United
States v. Verrusio, No. 09-cr-00064 (BAH), 2017 WL 2634638, at *4 (D.D.C. 2017) (observing
that “a majority of courts require a coram nobis petitioner to show ongoing collateral consequences
above and beyond the conviction itself” and citing supporting cases). For his part, Petitioner
quotes from a portion of Carafas v. LaVallee, in which the Supreme Court wrote about a habeas
petitioner: “In consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot
serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any election
held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror.” 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Pet’r’s Answer to
U.S. Opp’n to Pet., ECF No. 149 [hereinafter Answer], at 18. But Carafas is inapplicable, because
that case was about mootness; specifically, whether a prisoner’s habeas petition had become moot
upon his release from incarceration while his petition was pending appellate review. The Court
held that, “[o]n account of these ‘collateral consequences,’ this case is not moot.” 391 U.S. at 237–
38 (footnote omitted). By contrast, Petitioner does not face the same collateral consequences
following his pardon, and the otherwise unspecified collateral consequences he invokes are not
sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement. See Verrusio, 2017 WL 2634638,
at *4.
Petitioner also fails the second requirement: he has not offered any reason for not attacking
his convictions earlier, in his case by filing a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
2 See United States v. Miles, 923 F.3d 798, 804 (10th Cir. 2019) (stating that “a claim pressed
through a coram nobis petition is ordinarily barred if the petitioner . . . simply failed to pursue the
claim under § 2255 when petitioner could have”). Petitioner was incarcerated for approximately
six months before his pardon and release. He offers no reason why he could not have brought his
present challenges as a habeas petition. See Answer at 20–21.
Petitioner likewise has not met the final requirement: demonstrating an error of
fundamental character. For his first claim, Petitioner asserts that Officer Rathbun lied to the
prosecution about the pendency of an administrative use-of-force investigation. Pet. at 6–7
(CM/ECF Pagination). The court had ruled that the defense could question Officer Rathbun about
the then-open investigation, but not delve into the details. See Webster, 102 F.4th at 486. On the
morning of his testimony, however, the prosecution announced that it recently had learned that the
investigation had closed; the defense then conceded it no longer had grounds to question Officer
Rathbun about the investigation. See id. Defendant claims that Officer Rathbun falsely told
prosecutors that the investigation had closed, when in fact it remained open on the day of his
testimony. Pet. at 6–7. Examining Officer Rathbun about the open investigation, Petitioner
maintains, would have allowed him to show that Officer Rathbun “was himself the subject of an
investigation and highly motivated to alter his testimony to conform with the prosecution’s
wishes.” Answer at 24.
But Petitioner is wrong twice over. For one, the record does not reflect that it was Officer
Rathbun who advised prosecutors about the status of the investigation. Rather, the government
represented that “Officer Rathbun just learned of [the investigation’s closing] last week after our
pretrial conference, and the information was just provided to our office late this past Sunday night.”
Trial Tr. 4/27/2022, ECF No. 117 [hereinafter Trial Tr. 4/27/2022], at 5:3-5. The government thus
3 did not specify that it was Officer Rathbun who advised them of the change. The prosecutor’s use
of the passive voice—“was just provided”—leaves unanswered who precisely provided that
information.
What’s more, Petitioner has not shown that the use-of-force investigation in fact remained
open when Officer Rathbun testified. He points to an affidavit filed in a D.C. Freedom of
Information Act case that he filed in D.C. Superior Court seeking records from the
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) regarding the incident that led to the use-of-force
investigation. Answer at 20 (citing Attach. 14, Decl. of Brandynn Reaves, ECF No. 149-1
[hereinafter Reaves Decl.], at 44–51). Petitioner made a request on June 16, 2023, while his direct
appeal was pending, for “[a]ll investigation notes and documentation regarding Officer Noah
Rathbun . . . concerning any and all incidents occurring on May 24, 2021.” Reaves Decl. ¶ 5.
True, MPD disclosed no records in part because, “at the time of the request and response,” the
“subject matter of the request was” “the subject of an open and ongoing investigation.” Id. ¶ 12.
But MPD never identified the “open” investigation as the one into Officer Rathbun’s use of force.
The affidavit is silent as to the subject of that investigation. The affidavit, however, does identify
a “Final Investigative Report Concerning Use of Force,” which it withheld from disclosure on
privacy grounds. Id. ¶ 19(d) (emphasis added). The affidavit thus says nothing that contradicts
the government’s representation that the administrative investigation into Officer Rathbun’s use of
force had closed by the date of his trial testimony. Petitioner offers no other evidence to the
contrary.
Petitioner’s second and third claims fare no better. In both, he asserts ineffective assistance
of counsel. He argues that his counsel performed unreasonably by (1) failing to cross-examine
Officer Rathbun with his prior inconsistent statements and (2) not attempting to introduce video
4 evidence of an earlier confrontation on January 6 between Officer Rathbun and another person.
Pet. at 8–11. If counsel had performed these tasks, Petitioner reasons, the former would have
undermined Officer Rathbun’s credibility and the latter would have shown him to be the first
aggressor, buttressing Petitioner’s assertion of self-defense. Id. But, as the government points out,
U.S. Opp’n to Def.’s Pet., ECF No. 141, at 25–26, the premise for Petitioner’s first theory of
ineffectiveness is wrong: defense counsel did in fact cross-examine Officer Rathbun about prior
inconsistent statements, see Trial Tr. 4/27/2022, at 86:8–88:19, 95:2–98:10. As for the second,
Petitioner has not shown that the evidence of the prior incident would have been admissible.
See Christpher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1 Federal Evidence § 4:25 (4th ed.) (stating that
“specific acts of unrelated aggression on the part of the victim against persons other than the
defendant are not admissible to prove that the victim was the first aggressor”); cf. United States v.
Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (permitting use of prior violent acts of a decedent in a
homicide case to establish self-defense); Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 144 (D.C. 1992)
(“The rule in this jurisdiction is that only in homicide cases may prior violent acts of the victim be
introduced as evidence to prove that the victim was the first aggressor.”). Petitioner therefore has
not demonstrated that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
Nor has Petitioner demonstrated prejudice. As the D.C. Circuit observed, the government
presented “overwhelming evidence against him—including at least four videos of the assault.”
Webster, 102 F.4th at 487. The jury also heard from Petitioner and rejected his claim of self-
defense. Given the strength of the evidence against him, and the apparent lack of credibility of his
own testimony, Petitioner has not shown that there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for his
counsel’s supposed errors, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
5 466 U.S. at 694. He therefore has not established an “error [] of the most fundamental character.”
Cerroni, 2026 WL 124324, at *1.
For the foregoing reasons, Thomas Webster’s Petition, ECF No. 135, is denied.
Dated: January 28, 2026 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge