United States v. Weathers

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 8, 2022
Docket3:18-cv-05189
StatusUnknown

This text of United States v. Weathers (United States v. Weathers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Weathers, (W.D. Wash. 2022).

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. 3:18-cv-5189-BHS 8 Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT, 9 v. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECISION 10 THOMAS WEATHERS, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 THIS MATTER came before the Court on a bench trial on the United States of 14 America’s (“the Government”) remaining claim against Thomas1 and Kathy Weathers 15 (“Weathers”) and Precision Property Management Corporation (“Precision”). 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 The Government brought this action against the Weathers and Precision claiming: 18 (1) that the Weathers fraudulently transferred property located at 605 Academy Street, 19 Kelso, Washington, (“the 605 Academy Property”) to Precision; (2) that Precision is the 20 Weathers’ alter ego; and (3) that Precision is the Weathers’ nominee. The Weathers 21 22 1 This Decision will use the Weathers’ first names for clarity where required. 1 denied these claims. Precision asserted a counterclaim for reimbursement for 2 improvements it made to the 605 Academy Property, and to other properties owned by 3 entities that have been determined by this Court in earlier proceedings to be owned by the

4 Weathers, and not by those entities, because the entities were the alter egos and nominees 5 of the Weathers and, therefore, subject to federal income tax liens. A two-day trial to the 6 Court was held on the claims and counterclaim on November 2–3, 2020. The Court finds 7 for Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims and for Plaintiff on Defendants’ counterclaim. 8 It is apparent that the Weathers received considerable benefits from their

9 relationship with Precision and undoubtedly had substantial influence over those who 10 owned, managed, and directed Precision’s operations. Even so, these benefits, which 11 were generally reasonable payments for the rental use of portions of the Weathers’ 12 residence and services performed for Precision by Thomas, and the Weathers’ influence 13 did not amount to the control and possession required to rise to a level that rendered

14 Precision as Weathers’ alter ego or nominee. Further, the transfer of the 605 Academy 15 Property was not fraudulent. Neither Thomas nor Kathy had any interest of value in that 16 property when Thomas assigned to Precision his purchaser’s interest in a Real Estate 17 Purchase and Sale Agreement involving the 605 Academy Property. 18 Precision’s Sixth Counterclaim seeks “reimbursement for the taxes and other

19 expenditures paid for the preservation, maintenance and improvement of the properties.” 20 Dkt. 33 at 18 (emphasis added). Precision also contends that it is entitled to a superior, 21 22 1 equitable lien2 on the other Properties it manages for T&K Limited Partnership (“T&K”) 2 and TKW Limited Partnership (“TKW”), to the extent its efforts preserved those 3 properties from condemnation, property tax liens and potential foreclosure on such liens,

4 and from foreclosure by the lenders. Dkt. 205 at 9. Precision primarily relies upon 5 Sumpter v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Government 6 correctly points out that Sumpter only permitted reimbursement for property tax 7 payments, which is not what Precision seeks here, and further that Sumpter appears to be 8 an outlier, inconsistent with Ninth Circuit law on the subject. See Dkt. 215 at 10 n.4

9 (citing United States v. Christensen, 269 F.2d 624, 629 (9th Cir. 1959) (mortgagee’s 10 payment of state taxes on mortgaged property after federal tax liens were recorded did 11 not give mortgagee a lien for such local taxes superior to the United States’ tax liens)). 12 Precision also conditionally claimed reimbursement for similar expenses paid for 13 the benefit of the 605 Academy Property, if the Court were to conclude that the Weathers

14 own that property. Because the Court finds for Precision on this issue, this counterclaim 15 is DISMISSED as moot. 16 II. DICUSSSION 17 The Government commenced this civil action to reduce tax assessments to 18 judgment and to foreclose federal tax liens in March 2018. It sought to recover taxes

19 owed by the Weathers, and alleged that three entities owned or controlled by the 20 Weathers were their nominees or alter egos, and that certain properties owned by the 21 2 Precision’s post-trial brief argues that its claims for reimbursement, restitution, or unjust 22 enrichment are essentially the same claim in the context of this case. Dkt. 212 at 22. 1 Weathers were transferred fraudulently, for the purpose of avoiding the Government’s tax 2 liens. The entities are T&K, TKW, and Precision. 3 The Government alleged that these entities between them owned nine properties

4 for the benefit of the Weathers. See generally Dkt. 1. The government sought and 5 obtained summary judgment as to the nature of eight of these properties (called 6 “Properties 1–8” throughout this case), and the Court’s Order Granting in part and 7 denying in part the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 159, details the 8 factual and procedural history of the Government’s claims regarding those properties.

9 That Motion and that Order did not address Precision’s interest in the ninth 10 property, the 605 Academy Property. The Government’s claims and Precision’s defenses 11 and counterclaims regarding the 605 Academy Property were the subject of the 12 November 2021 bench trial. 13 The Government correctly argues that in the context of federal tax liens, the

14 nominee and alter ego doctrines are analyzed similarly. Dkt. 213 at 16 (citing United 15 States v. Smith, No. C11-5101, 2012 WL 1977964, at *6 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012) 16 (“The factors to be considered in determining whether an entity is an alter-ego of a 17 taxpayer are similar to the nominee factors.”)); see also United States v. Black, 725 F. 18 Supp. 2d 1279, 1289–90 (E.D. Wash. 2010) (applying nominee and alter ego doctrines);

19 Sharp Mgmt. LLC v. United States, No. C07-402-JLR, 2007 WL 1367698, at *3 & n.3 20 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2007) (“[T]he alter ego doctrine [is] a close kin of the nominee 21 theory . . . .”). 22 1 Courts in this District have considered the following factors in making this 2 determination: 3 1. the nominee paid no or inadequate consideration for the property at issue; 4 2. the property was placed in the name of the nominee in anticipation of litigation or liabilities; 5 3. a close relationship exists between the transferor and the nominee; 4. the parties to the transfer failed to record the conveyance; 6 5. the transferor retained possession; and 6. the transferor continued to enjoy the benefits of the transferred property. 7 Smith, 2012 WL 1977964, at *5 (citing Black, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 1291–92; Sharp Mgmt., 8 2007 WL 1367698, at *3). Precision argues that the Government is obligated to prove its 9 case by clear and convincing evidence, but the Government accurately cites to authority 10 holding that both nominee and alter ego claims are subject to the preponderance of 11 evidence standard. Dkt. 215 at 6 (citing Sequoia Prop. & Equip. Ltd v. United States, No. 12 97-cv-5044-LJO, 2002 WL 31409620, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2002) (“The 13 Government has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence its 14 nominee/alter ego claims.”). 15 The government is obligated to prove its Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act claim 16 by “clear and satisfactory” evidence. Dkt. 213 at 23 (citing United States v. Allahyari, 17 980 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2020)).

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Related

United States v. Elta Mae Christensen, Etc.
269 F.2d 624 (Ninth Circuit, 1959)
Sumpter v. United States
302 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Michigan, 2004)
United States v. Komron Allahyari
980 F.3d 684 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)

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Bluebook (online)
United States v. Weathers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-weathers-wawd-2022.