United States v. Weathers

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided February 8, 2022·No. 3:18-cv-05189·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT TACOMA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. 3:18-cv-5189-BHS Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT, v. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECISION THOMAS WEATHERS, et al., Defendants. THIS MATTER came before the Court on a bench trial on the United States of America’s (“the Government”) remaining claim against Thomas1 and Kathy Weathers (“Weathers”) and Precision Property Management Corporation (“Precision”). The Government brought this action against the Weathers and Precision claiming: (1) that the Weathers fraudulently transferred property located at 605 Academy Street, Kelso, Washington, (“the 605 Academy Property”) to Precision; (2) that Precision is the Weathers’ alter ego; and (3) that Precision is the Weathers’ nominee. The Weathers 1 This Decision will use the Weathers’ first names for clarity where required. denied these claims. Precision asserted a counterclaim for reimbursement for improvements it made to the 605 Academy Property, and to other properties owned by entities that have been determined by this Court in earlier proceedings to be owned by the

Weathers, and not by those entities, because the entities were the alter egos and nominees of the Weathers and, therefore, subject to federal income tax liens. A two-day trial to the Court was held on the claims and counterclaim on November 2–3, 2020. The Court finds for Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims and for Plaintiff on Defendants’ counterclaim. It is apparent that the Weathers received considerable benefits from their

relationship with Precision and undoubtedly had substantial influence over those who owned, managed, and directed Precision’s operations. Even so, these benefits, which were generally reasonable payments for the rental use of portions of the Weathers’ residence and services performed for Precision by Thomas, and the Weathers’ influence did not amount to the control and possession required to rise to a level that rendered

Precision as Weathers’ alter ego or nominee. Further, the transfer of the 605 Academy Property was not fraudulent. Neither Thomas nor Kathy had any interest of value in that property when Thomas assigned to Precision his purchaser’s interest in a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement involving the 605 Academy Property. Precision’s Sixth Counterclaim seeks “reimbursement for the taxes and other

expenditures paid for the preservation, maintenance and improvement of the properties.” Dkt. 33 at 18 (emphasis added). Precision also contends that it is entitled to a superior, equitable lien2 on the other Properties it manages for T&K Limited Partnership (“T&K”) and TKW Limited Partnership (“TKW”), to the extent its efforts preserved those properties from condemnation, property tax liens and potential foreclosure on such liens,

and from foreclosure by the lenders. Dkt. 205 at 9. Precision primarily relies upon Sumpter v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Government correctly points out that Sumpter only permitted reimbursement for property tax payments, which is not what Precision seeks here, and further that Sumpter appears to be an outlier, inconsistent with Ninth Circuit law on the subject. See Dkt. 215 at 10 n.4

(citing United States v. Christensen, 269 F.2d 624, 629 (9th Cir. 1959) (mortgagee’s payment of state taxes on mortgaged property after federal tax liens were recorded did not give mortgagee a lien for such local taxes superior to the United States’ tax liens)). Precision also conditionally claimed reimbursement for similar expenses paid for the benefit of the 605 Academy Property, if the Court were to conclude that the Weathers

own that property. Because the Court finds for Precision on this issue, this counterclaim is DISMISSED as moot. The Government commenced this civil action to reduce tax assessments to judgment and to foreclose federal tax liens in March 2018. It sought to recover taxes

owed by the Weathers, and alleged that three entities owned or controlled by the Weathers were their nominees or alter egos, and that certain properties owned by the 2 Precision’s post-trial brief argues that its claims for reimbursement, restitution, or unjust enrichment are essentially the same claim in the context of this case. Dkt. 212 at 22. Weathers were transferred fraudulently, for the purpose of avoiding the Government’s tax liens. The entities are T&K, TKW, and Precision. The Government alleged that these entities between them owned nine properties

for the benefit of the Weathers. See generally Dkt. 1. The government sought and obtained summary judgment as to the nature of eight of these properties (called “Properties 1–8” throughout this case), and the Court’s Order Granting in part and denying in part the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 159, details the factual and procedural history of the Government’s claims regarding those properties.

That Motion and that Order did not address Precision’s interest in the ninth property, the 605 Academy Property. The Government’s claims and Precision’s defenses and counterclaims regarding the 605 Academy Property were the subject of the November 2021 bench trial. The Government correctly argues that in the context of federal tax liens, the

nominee and alter ego doctrines are analyzed similarly. Dkt. 213 at 16 (citing United States v. Smith, No. C11-5101, 2012 WL 1977964, at *6 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012) (“The factors to be considered in determining whether an entity is an alter-ego of a taxpayer are similar to the nominee factors.”)); see also United States v. Black, 725 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1289–90 (E.D. Wash. 2010) (applying nominee and alter ego doctrines);

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